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Preliminary Results

Prosecutor's Office Investigates Voting 'Deviations'

PM2212141593 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 22 Dec 93 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Election Results: Prosecutor's Office Reaction"]

[Text] An assessment has been published on the results of the work of the special groups set up in the Russian General Prosecutor's Office and in the prosecutor's offices of the republics, krays, and oblasts to monitor compliance with legislation on the elections to the Federal Assembly State Duma and Federation Council and on the nationwide ballot on the draft Constitution.

The Russian Federation Prosecutor's Office Information and Public Relations Center announces that deviations from operative legislative acts on the elections were uncovered in several places during the campaign. The necessary responsive measures were taken by prosecutors. All statements and materials received by the special groups were examined according to the procedure established by law. In particular, the Russian General Prosecutor's Office is currently conducting an inquiry in connection with a 10 December Information Arbitration Court appeal requesting a legal assessment of certain statements [vystupleniye] in the mass media by Russian Federal Assembly candidates V. Zhirinovskiy, N. Bondarik, A. Nevzorov, Yu. Kuznetsov, S. Govorukhin, and certain others.

Criminal proceedings have been instituted in connection with a number of events. In particular, an investigation is under way in Rybinsk, Yaroslav Oblast, into the falsification of signature lists by Christian Democratic Party activists. Criminal proceedings have been instituted in Saratov in connection with hooligan actions against candidate V. Lysenko. The investigation into the murder of Federation Council candidate B. Gadzhiyev, former Dagestan Republic minister of trade, is continuing. In Tambov Oblast M. Zhalin has been arrested because, while in a state of intoxication, he shot the administration representative at the polling place with a revolver, wounding him in the head. He has been charged. The course of the investigations into the cases mentioned are being monitored by the Russian general prosecutor.

At the same time Dmitriy Olshanskiy, director of the Center of Strategic Analysis and Forecasting, believes that, because of the numerous violations during the ballot, Boris Yeltsin has the possibility of annulling the State Duma election results. D. Olshanskiy expressed the hypothesis that "results of this kind satisfy neither the president, nor the country." "In the president's place I would return to the draft edict on annulling election results."

Meanwhile, in his opinion, the elections to the Federation Council and the ballot on the constitution passed off without substantial violations and there should be no question of annulling their results. In such a situation, in the expert's view, the Federation Council would remain the representative organ of power.

Central Electoral Commission Becomes Permanent Body

PM2312115193 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 23 Dec 93 p 2

[Edict No. 2227 of the Russian Federation president "On Measures To Improve the Electoral System in the Russian Federation," signed by President Boris Yeltsin and dated the Kremlin, Moscow, 20 December]

[Text] With a view to improving the electoral system in the Russian Federation and in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation I decree that:

1. The Central Electoral Commission for Elections to the Federation Council and Elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly in 1993 shall be transformed into the Central Electoral Commission [CEC] of the Russian Federation.

2. It shall be established that the CEC of the Russian Federation heads the system of electoral commissions formed to conduct elections of federal organs of state power, referenda (nationwide ballots), and elections of representative organs of state power in krays, oblasts, cities with federal status, autonomous oblasts, and autonomous okrugs and operates on a permanent basis.

3. The CEC of the Russian Federation, jointly with the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, shall be tasked with formulating and submitting to the president of the Russian Federation a draft federal law on elections of State Duma deputies and a draft federal constitutional law on referenda (nationwide ballots) in the Russian Federation.

4. Pending the adoption of the new legislation on elections the CEC of the Russian Federation shall be guided, when conducting new elections in electoral districts in which elections have not been held or were ruled invalid or to replace outgoing deputies, by the Statute on Elections of Deputies of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly in 1993 and by the Statute on Elections of State Duma Deputies in 1993.

In preparing and conducting elections the CEC of the Russian Federation is independent of other state organs.

Decisions of the CEC of the Russian Federation adopted within the bounds of its competence are binding on all state organs, public associations, enterprises, establishments, and officials, who are obliged to afford it assistance, create the necessary conditions for its work, and provide information and material.

5. All unexpended funds allocated for conducting the elections of deputies of the Federation Council and the State Duma of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly

in 1993 and the nationwide ballot on the draft constitution of the Russian Federation shall remain at the disposal of the CEC of the Russian Federation and shall be transferred to its newly opened current account and used to fund expenditure involved in exercising its powers.

6. The Government of the Russian Federation shall make provision in a separate item of the Russian Federation Republic budget for funds for the CEC of the Russian Federation for conducting elections to federal organs of state power, referenda, and elections to representative organs of state power in krays, oblasts, cities with federal status, autonomous oblasts, and autonomous okrugs.

7. The Administration of the Russian Federation president (S.A. Filatov) and the Administration of Affairs of the Russian Federation president (P.P. Borodin), by agreement with the chairman of the CEC of the Russian Federation, shall house the CEC of the the Russian Federation and its apparatus in the complex of buildings on Staraya Ploshchad vacated by the Government of the Russian Federation, on the basis of the staffing prescribed by the president of the Russian Federation for the Commission and its apparatus, providing a building at the following address: No. 4, Nikitinov Pereulok.

8. The Administration of Affairs of the president of the Russian Federation (P.P. Borodin) shall be assigned responsibility for the material and technical support of the activity of the CEC of the Russian Federation and socioconsumer and medical provision for members of the CEC of the Russian Federation, as well as personnel in its apparatus.

9. This edict comes into force as soon as it is signed.

[Signed] Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin

[Dated] The Kremlin, Moscow, 20 December 1993

Official Reaction

ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA Interviews Kozyrev

PM2312112193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 23 Dec 93 First Edition pp 1, 7

[Report on interview with Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev by Mikhail Shcherbachenko; place and date not given: "Before and After 12 December. Andrey Kozyrev on the Elections"]

[Text] Two topics have dominated post-election public thinking: The success of the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] and the failure of "Russia's Choice." Actually, this is a single topic as the cause of the takeoff of the one was the effect of the set-down of the other and vice versa. It is all closely intertwined. But while the spotlight is trained on the main conflict of the moment, is it not time to shed some light on the area around the "dueling ground." There are things of interest there too.

Bounds That Turned Into Break

One explanation of disarming simplicity for the LDPR's success was its categorical rejection of the current authorities. The Russian people will vote for anyone, apparently, even for a "negro of advanced years," as long as he bawls out the helmsman. This is neither the time nor the place to argue the toss; I will offer just one counterargument—a local one, perhaps, but one that needs to be understood nonetheless.

In the by no means prosperous Arctic region, in Murmansk Oblast, the Russian foreign minister came in well ahead of nine rivals for the Duma. In its 7 December issue ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA published a conversation with Andrey Kozyrev, in particular about his election campaign. Now—hard on its heels, so to speak—we had another meeting.

Andrey Vladimirovich is proud of his victory and does not even try to hide it. But who was it a victory for—"Russia's Choice," for which Kozyrev was running in Murmansk? But the minister was obviously not trying to get into the Duma "on the back" of the bloc, of which he was one of the organizers and mainstays; he did not emphasize the link, although he did not conceal it either. Kozyrev declared some personal trump cards, if you will forgive the pun [Russian for trump card is "kozyr"]. The people of Murmansk were worried not so much about Russia's foreign policy as about local ills, and it was on these that the minister was well and truly put through the mill. But they failed to catch him out—I did not see it, anyway.

And the votes cast for him (at first the majority of these very voters did not even know that candidate-for-deputy Andrey Vladimirovich Kozyrev was the same Kozyrev), if they were able to speak, would say: We support the Russian Foreign Ministry's regional, "northern" policy and we are entrusting the running of our affairs not to compatriots who have no influence in the capital but to a minister, who has placed at our service not only his own geopolitical knowledge (for which, in the end, he gets paid), but, his geo-Murmansk knowledge, so to speak.

So the winner in the Arctic region was a representative of the center, thus demonstrating that the authorities' strength can lie not in the authorities' strength, but in the personalities in authority. But again in Murmansk and in the country Kozyrev was a flop as one of the leaders of "Russia's Choice." Andrey Vladimirovich comments:

"To be honest, I still do not know the answer to the question of specifically where the democratic blocs differ. Their leaders are loyal to the president's course, yet despite this a division occurred in a group of people who had previously been together; its leaders sat and continue to sit in the same government, have strong links, you would think, and are considered to be democrats and reformists...

"Let us look at the recent past. Despite the referendum results it was clear that neither Rutskoy nor the Supreme Soviet was intending to change anything—on the contrary, they were getting even wilder. Things were clearly unwinding. It was then that several people—myself included—came up with the idea that formed the basis of 'Russia's Choice.' Admittedly, from the very outset we had a principled argument among ourselves about what needed to be set up—a party or an electoral bloc. Although it was not yet a question of elections at that time, everyone understood that they would have to be faced.

"As for me, I advocated a bloc, and this concept prevailed, since it proved possible to demonstrate its advantages. Why? It was clear that certain friends and colleagues were thinking not so much of the elections to the new parliament as of the presidential elections—all the more so as some people in the Supreme Soviet were hinting at the time at a kind of deal. They would allegedly leave the scene if Yeltsin put himself to a vote.

"Of course, every presidential candidate has to have his own party and be its leader. That is why I proposed setting up the kind of bloc within which both Shakhray, Yavlinskiy, and anyone else could set up their own parties, but without splitting the electorate at this first stage of the parliamentary elections. We needed to present a united front—reformers and democrats on their own list, Communists on theirs, and the national patriots on theirs.

"But what happened was that it was not ideological differences that split comrades in arms—they split because of individual interests, trying to find political grounds for them and elaborating their own separate platforms. This is an exceptionally dangerous process, because the middle ground of reform and the defense of democracy—even though, of course, amendments are required in this area—has been taken by what now calls itself 'Russia's Choice.' Further on a dubious area begins. We usually call it centrist, but in actual fact it is something transitional between the reformist and the communist or national patriotic. Personal ambitions are essentially pushing the new parties and their democratic leaders into areas that are ideologically alien to them. Someone from the Yavlinskiy bloc stated that they had allegedly not split the electorate, that they have a different electorate. This means that they themselves already recognize that their voters come from another part of the spectrum. And it is quite possible that they now do indeed have some kind of new political orientation.

"Before the election we needed a specific answer to the question of what would happen in the future and what our new society would look like. Some of my friends and colleagues kept on railing against the Soviet system. But nobody is interested in that—it has already been destroyed and communism as such no longer exists. Even the Communist Party purports to be a party of working people uniting workers, peasants, entrepreneurs (!), and shareholders (!).

" 'Russia's Choice' came to the election with something incomprehensible. It was not lies but abstract, general democratic slogans allied to an inability to explain what we want and even what we are doing at a time when all that was needed was to interpret things on a human level.

"Instead of this we got a wretched advertising campaign with those self-satisfied faces on the screen.... Probably even I had a similar sort of expression—admittedly, just before my trip to the Arctic. And what about the clip with the dog! I got back from Murmansk and switched on the TV—terrible! That clip could do nothing but incite class hatred. Against the backdrop of the way people live in the North, this well-fed dog.... We should have given it more thought! I admit that I, as one of the organizers of 'Russia's Choice,' take responsibility for not knowing what our TV films were like."

Some People Do Not Know How Lucky They Are

You have to agree with Kozyrev, the "Russia's Choice" advertising campaign was held under the paraphrased Roman slogan "I have spoken. If anyone can do worse, let them do so." To give them their due, nobody could do worse. And our voters will long remember the pictures of Yegor Timurovich mooching down a corridor to the unusually appropriate accompaniment of Ravel's "Bolero." Then came the higher mathematics of economic reform. "He spoke thus unto a poor heart...."

On the night of 12-13 December at the Shabolovka TV studio I talked about the electoral party and bloc advertising with Anatoliy Lysenko, a TV veteran known to everyone. And he said this: "The election was good in that it will definitely lead to the emergence of TV producers for political campaigns. This time everyone seems to have realized that they were needed."

A politician has to be an actor—the experience of all eras and peoples is enough to silence the opponents of this idea. And the politician's image, if successful, has probably been worked on by people who know their stuff in a science which no longer needs translation—public relations. It was immediately apparent—particularly on television, where everything is laid bare—just who heeded professional advice (like Zhirinovskiy), who listened to advice but did not entirely understand it or implement it (like Shakhray), and who thought themselves self-sufficient (like...but you know that yourselves).

But why stop with electoral structures? Let's gird our loins and set our sights even higher. Why, when Mrs. Thatcher talks to an interviewer, does she not want to please him—and not as a woman but as a politician? Because she sees her interviewer as representing the electorate sitting in front of their TV's at home. They will decide her fate. But I simply cannot understand why, when the Russian president talks with a movie director, Eldar Aleksandrovich wants to please Boris Nikolayevich, but you get the impression that Boris Nikolayevich does not want to please anybody—even though our president is not lacking acting ability. Perhaps he is

afraid of not being serious enough in front of the people. But we are not talking about coquettishness....

Again and again I have been going over in my mind the pictures of "talking head" candidates and, quaking at my own temerity, I ask myself whether we have any professional politicians—that is, people who understand politics as a profession where the creation of a public image is a hard job and a most important component of success.

When this question was put to Kozyrev, Andrey Vladimirovich answered right away: There are none.

"Where would those professional politicians come from? How could they emerge in the Soviet Union? In the Komsomol committee? And who would they learn from—the West? But that is a satisfied society. Some people do not know how lucky they are, as the saying goes. Even though they suffer too. So, for instance, an American-style election campaign is unacceptable to us—with its flag-waving, bands, and girls in short skirts, it would simply annoy people. Although for America that is all normal and right. It will remain a supremely democratic country.

"During the preparations for the election my adviser Aleksandr Kuznetsov gave me an American book which recommends that candidates promise the earth, lie their heads off, and see how it goes. It does not say so outright, of course, but that is the gist of it. To me that is unacceptable. We would have to descend to Zhirinovskiy's level. But that would be lying on a cosmic scale in quite a different spectrum, so to speak; it would not work in our spectrum.

"Now, since the election, I have been inundated with questions: Will Russia's foreign policy change in the wake of Zhirinovskiy's victory? Well, first, "victory" is putting it too strongly; it is more of a success. Of course, what Zhirinovskiy is calling for cannot be taken seriously. All the more so as he himself is distancing himself from his own words; it is not clear how he will behave in the future. Nor is it clear what kind of people he has brought with him—I, for instance, do not know any of them. So we should not be so quick to lose our composure.

"People abroad are conjecturing too—is not the reason you oppose joining NATO that you are making concessions to your own 'brownshirt Reds'? And there are circles which are making capital out of this. From Ukrainian supporters of nuclear weapons to those European countries which for some reason want to join NATO—even though they themselves cannot explain what they will get out of it and do not even have a very good idea of what will be required of them when they are members.

"Needless to say, not everyone in the West has an interest in letting us enter world markets. There is also a corporate interest in maintaining the arms race, albeit at a residual level. It is a money-maker and, of course, without us in the marketplace things are easier than they are with us. They latch onto any pretext to cry 'Look, we were right, the Russians cannot be trusted.' And our so-called patriots happily provide suitable arguments.

"I am prepared to state that Zhirinovskiy's success will not produce any changes in foreign policy. The fact that the course and results of the election campaign have to be taken into account is another matter, of course. Although foreign policy remains the president's policy, it undergoes constant tactical amendments in terms of specific nuances. Otherwise it would become dogmatic.

"Now to turn to work in parliament. Why it is mainly necessary? In order to create a legislative basis, including a basis for foreign policy. In order to ensure parliamentary control—that is the case in any normal state. In order to provide opposition—after all, a parliament should ideally reflect moods in society. I asked the former Supreme Soviet to give me a chance to take the rostrum once every two weeks to report on current events and answer questions. They refused. I asked them again—how about once a month? Then once a quarter! And even when it became clear that the Supreme Soviet would not let me, I still kept knocking on their door. After all, meetings are absolutely essential—they are useful for deputies and our ministry alike. We have to know parliamentarians' ideas, we have to hear constructive criticism!

"I always told the Supreme Soviet that communist-fascist sentiments were a great impediment, that they were a self-inflicted blow to the state. But the former parliament willingly inflicted this blow, and its pseudo-patriotic rhetoric only exacerbated the position of the Russian-speaking population in the former Union republics. Because garden-variety nationalism with regard to Russians increased many times over and continues to increase after various careless statements....

"Of course, opposition in the new parliament cannot be avoided, but it is necessary to be able to unify people's interests. I have something to say about the Communists in this regard. If they are opposition members who do not care with whom they ally themselves, they should remember that, despite our implacable ideological differences, we can be allies against fascism. The Soviet Union fought in World War II against fascist Germany and did so alongside the United States. This did not rule out an ideological hard line against the United States as a capitalist power. That is why I say that, yes, we are trying to prevent the formation of a communist-fascist bloc. The Communists, if they are real Communists, should join the antifascist bloc."

Poltoranin Views 'Forces' Behind Zhirinovskiy

PM2212154093 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 22 Dec 93 First Edition pp 1-2

[Interview with Mikhail Poltoranin, head of the Federal Information Center, by unidentified correspondent;

place and date not given: "Mikhail Poltoranin: Zhirinovskiy Is Being Used as a Probe To Measure the Depth of Dissatisfaction"]

[Text] ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA's correspondent met with Mikhail Poltoranin, head of the Federal Information Center, and asked him to share his thoughts on the political situation in the country and the role of the press. This is what he said.

[Poltoranin] The Russian press at the moment is like a crowd of passengers on the deck of a ship. They dash from side to side in panic, rocking the ship —first it is fear of a Russia "turning brown," then outbursts of delight at the smallness of the number of LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] seats in the State Duma. But it is not surprising: This is the usual style of lazy, "unharnessed" journalism. Now it has gone haring off to study Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's habits: what he eats, who he sleeps with, which hemisphere of the brain he favors. True, analytical articles in the reputable publications stand out, as always. Much has already been said. Let me just add a few of my own observations.

Let us ask ourselves what is probably the most important question: Why should the Russian people, who lost tens of millions of people in the war against fascism and came through the horrors of the Gulag, through the poverty and humiliations of Bolshevism, why should this people, in a free vote, choose the terrible path that goes back to the past, and not forward to democratic values? After all, a large number of voters voted for the LDPR, along with the Communists and the Agrarian Party, who reject reforms. Is it possible that our people were pining for freezing trenches, for barbed wire, for ever longer lines for a loaf of bread? Surely not!

The people turn backward because when they look ahead they can see no clear points of reference. Not only clear, but attractive, tempting. I do not, of course, mean that there are no such points of reference—we know by heart the noble goals of the president's reforms. What I am saying is that many people cannot yet see these points of reference.

Who is to blame—the journalists again? Yes, among others. The rare voice of citizenship is today drowned out amid the noise of self-publicity, tendentious attacks, and campaigns. You can see for yourself the ebb and flow of unbridled persecution of politicians who uphold the state's interests. It has become fashionable not to explain the nature of the new life to people, but to frighten them, to whip up an atmosphere of terror and confusion. But the average journalist is himself the man in the street who does not always understand the underlying processes behind the changing formations. He too needs signposts along the roads of reforms. And it is strange that the dozens of analytical bodies that have been set up within and under the auspices of the Russian Government have yet to succeed in turning our government's economic policy into comprehensible, populist formulas. After all, the reforms are happening. And people must be shown (by way of quarterly program charts, for instance) what they can expect in a month's time, in six months, or in a year.

But this is certainly not the root cause of the Russians' psychological emigration to the past. Nor does the cause lie in the decline in living standards. I do not agree with the widespread view that it was the poorest strata of the population who voted for Zhirinovskiy. Incidentally, there is much evidence to refute that conclusion. Let me tell you, for instance, about my recent tour of rayons in the Moscow region. Here is a typical picture: A rich family—and they became rich thanks to the economic reforms—had voted solidly for the LDPR. I asked the guys: Why? And they told me: "We could not breathe any more—criminal groups were stifling us with their extortion. If you don't give them what they demand, they threaten to take reprisals against your family. It is as if the authorities did not exist. Zhirinovskiy promised strict order."

Or take another, similar example. Some Korean peasants from Stavropol Kray told me recently that during the harvest they joined together to hire several armored carriers with their crews, and in this way defended themselves against ruinous raids by gangsters from the neighboring North Caucasian republics. The peasants told me that this case is not exceptional and that the struggle for survival has become a way of life there. Now I look up Stavropol Kray in the table of results of the vote for the State Duma on party lists. A staggering 37.7 percent of the population of this traditionally rich kray voted for the LDPR. That figure reflects bitter disappointment in the administration's helplessness, as well as an attempt to clutch at the straws of promises.

Heaven forbid that we should now sink so low as to start trying to distinguish between the various Ivanovs and Petrovs: which of them failed to see, failed to recognize the threat of communo-fascism. We must all be more self-critical and take a broader view of problems. One major reason for the voters' protest, it seems to me, is that in general the authorities in Russia have become "shamefully indifferent to good and evil." Zhirinovskiy did not "steal" the Communists' electorate, he drew votes from among the confused masses. Leniency toward evil gives cruelty and violence a free rein. And that always leads to the demoralization of society.

"Evil must be possible for good to be possible"—those are the words of the humanist Nikolay Berdyayev. I quote them not only to reaffirm the need for an effective struggle against crime. These words enshrine an attitude toward the policy you pursue, toward personnel, toward people in general. Evil must be cut down in all its forms in order to make room for useful deeds.

It is no secret that in many oblasts of Russia, people who openly oppose reforms and persecute democrats with impunity are prospering in key posts. It is also no secret that in many places the president's supporters are under

siege from criminals and the nomenklatura, while indifference, like a desert wind, scorches the green shoots of private farming and enterprise.

We are wrong to be surprised now at what may look like a logical inconsistency: In the same regions, voters voted for both the constitution and the LDPR. I think it can all be explained. The vote for the constitution was a vote for strong power, and many people saw Zhirinovskiy as a strong man. Later they will perceive behind the peacock feathers of demagoguery the true sparrow nature of their choice. But the warning bell has rung, all the same. It has rung, if only in the sense that if society has entered upon a phase of broad freedoms, it is impossible, without cost to the citizens, to regulate these freedoms by yesterday's methods—when the somnolence of the power structures is interrupted from time to time by hysterical bursts of activity.

There is no need to torment oneself with fits of defeatism—Russia, in the referendum, did not fall off the mountain pass, it successfully negotiated it. Now we are people with a new sociopolitical system in a country that is our own, but somehow unfamiliar. What next?

Next comes the difficult work of providing organizational and structural support for the operation of the new constitution. Creating guarantees for the human rights, economic and political, that were voted for in the referendum—that is the crux of this work. Is the existing vertical structure of the executive power appropriate to this task? Where is the precise point of balance between the interests of the federal administration and of local self-government? Why have the law-enforcement structures proved ineffective, and are they capable, in their present form, of safeguarding the operation of the constitution that has been adopted? The reform of Russia's political system has posed many questions. Answers must be found, with no time to spare.

In preelection tours of various cities, I constantly heard the voters say: "Do not stand still. Get things moving more quickly. Uncertainty is dragging Russia into the quagmire." That was why we wanted to have a majority in parliament, so that the steam wou'd not all blow out as hot air in interparty squabbles. So as to avoid a destructive "locking of horns" between the branches of power. Because this leads to a decline in the pace of reforms, or even a switch to mere drifting. And if policies go on drifting for just six months more, the people will demand the iron fist.

I do not think that forces behind the scenes are preparing the LDPR leader for this role: He is too talkative, and deliberately draws fire onto himself. Zhirinovskiy is just the probe they used to measure the depth of dissatisfaction in Russia. Another man is ready to spring out from behind his back—I cannot see his face yet, but I can just make out his general's shoulder boards through the smoke.

It is our duty to prevent this. First and foremost it is the duty of democratically inclined members of parliament. The fragmentation of our forces is echoed in the election results. How many people can fall into the same trap! The members of the "Russia's Choice" faction are prepared to seek a rapprochement with all sober-minded deputies.

Let me come back to the discussion of the mass media. I will not dwell now on the topic of the pernicious idea of selling off the state television channels to commercial dealers. All credit to the Central Electoral Commission—through its innovations it demonstrated in a couple of weeks where unrestrained TV demagoguery could lead a confused Russia. Yes, I am in favor of independent television. But despite insulting attacks by NTV's inarticulate anchormen, I will uphold the paramountcy of state structures in this sphere as long as a real threat of explosion exists in Russia—no matter where I am working: in the president's team or in parliament.

All the same, about the position of the press in general. It seems to me that it is time to improve the standard of ethical demands on journalists. Many of them see freedom of speech as total freedom to be irresponsible—hence the mischievous tone, the shameless lies, the substitution of concepts in certain items. Here our legal regulators are still weak, and the poison spreads all over Russia, once again giving rise to dissatisfaction with the authorities.

These journalists are prompted by various motives. I remember that not so long ago the leadership of a well-known bank showed up in my office with a request for help with something. In return they offered their services: They brought along a young man, and said: "If you want to 'do someone over' in a newspaper, give him the job, and we will pay for his services. He's Aleksandr Minkin from MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS. Is it a deal?" The newspaper "mercenary" stood there in patient readiness to publish someone's bidding. Naturally, I refused. But I see nowadays politicians are being "done over" to right and left by the rich bosses' newspaper lackeys.

Journalists who can be bought—that is a national disaster. The Russian Journalists Union should tackle this problem seriously. And the problem of professional duty in general.

Through stupidity or on the principle of establishing themselves on the cheap, many young journalists make it their rule to attack the dignity of the Russian president in passing. And they laugh, not realizing that they are striking at the foundations of the power that holds the country together. As for insults, even from the TV screen, against Russian traditions and Russian culture—surely that is just provoking chauvinist sentiments. Sentiments which also contributed to the rise of the Zhirinovskiy party.

Many other factors also affected the results of the December elections. Society, through a free vote, gave all of us an alarm signal: Analyze yourselves, mend your ways, act more intelligently, more systematically... All

who are in any way involved in the formulation and implementation of state policy. Some people think this is a signal to put the brakes on the reforms. A dangerous misconception. On the contrary, it is a sign of protest against inconsistent moves, against lack of resolve.

If people's lives become more secure and easier, then the shadow of the threat that has today alarmed the whole world will be lifted from Russia.

Party, International Reaction

Russia's Choice Deputy on Possible Coalition

PM2312105193 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 23 Dec 93 p 2

[Report by Ravil Zaripov: "Who Will Be in Charge of the Microphones"]

[Text] The last few days have been filled with various meetings and separate talks between the leaders of the blocs which passed the elections' 5 percent barrier. What is the pro-government, pro-president "Russia's Choice" counting on in the new parliament? Future State Duma deputy Sergey Yushenkov assesses the situation like this:

"Compared with the previous Supreme Soviet the situation for us is more favorable since there will be fewer opponents of the government course. According to our assessments the implacable opposition will amount to 40-43 percent of the State Duma deputies. The democratic factions will receive 32-35 percent of votes. The remainder are the centrists, for whom we must fight.

"In the situation which has taken shape there is an obvious alliance between three blocs—'Russia's Choice,' Yavlinskiy's bloc, and the 'Party of Russian Unity and Accord'—which will be joined by a certain number of independent deputies. They are also counting on part of the 'Women of Russia' bloc, who have a recognizable orientation and will hardly join the opposition. As for Gaydar's statements about a possible alliance with the Communists, I do not rule that out either. There are communists and communists. We shall cooperate with sober, practical politicians like Yegor Stroyev from Orel Oblast. In the Federation Council the situation is simpler for us since there are no representatives of the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] there."

[Zaripov] It is not hard to assume that a struggle will develop immediately for the command seats, in particular the seat of State Duma chairman. Will "Russia's Choice" succeed in putting "its own man" there? And who do they plan to nominate for the post?

[Yushenkov] To confidently lay claim to the command seats you must control something like 200 seats. The LDPR has about 80 votes, which is obviously not enough. "Russia's Choice" with its allies has 150-160 votes while the Agrarian Union and the Communists have about 120 votes. If the LDPR unites with the latter then.... We shall try to block their nominations.

As for specific proposals, some people in "Russia's Choice" are inclined toward the candidacy of Sergey Adamovich Kovalev. He is not only the most senior deputy. He is a man of irreproachable honesty who has defended democratic principles all his life and was in the camps.

[Zaripov] And to the Federation Council?

[Yushenkov] Most likely the administration heads will not lay claim to the chairman's seat. It is not out of the question that Vladimir Shumeyko will be nominated for this post. But before that we must finally specify what his role in government is.

Christian Democrats Analyze Zhirinovskiy Success

LD2212121093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1142 GMT 22 Dec 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Aleksandrova]

[Text] Moscow December 22 TASS—The leaders of the Russian Christian Democratic Union (RCDU), which is part of the Yavlinskiy-Boldyrev-Lukin (YBL) bloc, held a news conference, dealing with the election results, at the socio-political centre here on Wednesday.

"There is an idea of turning the YBL into a steadier political movement. Talks to this effect are under way, but it is yet unclear what will come of them," RCDU Co-Chairman Valeriy Borshchov said in response to a question from the ITAR-TASS correspondent.

At any rate, the Christian Democrats, the Social Democrats and the Republicans, who are members of the YBL bloc, "get on well and find a common language", Borshchov said.

The RCDU leaders described the election results as positive for their party. They said they had won three seats in the State Duma. However, they take a pessimistic view of the situation in the country as a whole. "Our coutnry has suffered a misfortune," Borshchov said in comment on the Liberal Democrats' electoral success. However, he added, "one should not get into hysterics about it".

In the opinion of Viktor Uchitel, co-chairman of the Moscow branch of the RCDU, the successes of the Vladimir Zhirinovskiy party are accounted for by "societal crisis and mounting irrational factors in people's behaviour".

Zhirinovskiy Against Ex-Republics' Joining Russia

LD2212150393 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1024 GMT 22 Dec 93

[ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandr Kuzmin]

[Excerpt] Vienna, 22 Dec—[passage omitted] Touching on the situation on the territory of the former Soviet Union, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR] leader [speaking at Schwechat Airport] noted that many former republics of the USSR, especially Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan are prepared to join Russia but "we do not want that as there are big differences between us and those republics in the way of politics, economics, and culture. The program of our party does not envisage the former Soviet republics joining Russia."

According to an APA report, V. Zhirinovskiy is in Klagenfurt at the invitation of former timber mill owner Edwin Neuwirth who in his own words is not a supporter of any party. Today V. Zhirinovskiy goes to the FRG.

Planning Dubayy Vacation

MK2212144093 Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 22 Dec 93 p 1

[M. Stakhov report under the "Bon Voyage" rubric: "He Is Ordered To Go to Dubayy..."]

[Text] Vladimir Volfovich appears to have been the first one to have grown tired of the endless discussion sweeping the mass media on why Zhirinovskiy's party put up so strong a showing at the elections. Whether he is tired of his stormy campaigning or preparing for future parliamentary battles, there is no telling. So, we will apparently not see or hear much of him next week. Vladimir Volfovich, in his new capacity, has decided to chart himself the first route to the warm seas, in which he wanted the Russian soldier "to wash his jackboots." We have learned from reliable sources that on 23 December the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia leader will leave for Dubayy with a number of his comrades-in-arms, ostensibly as a tourist.

This is an entirely personal matter after all—a man wants to take a rest in the emirate's hot sun from Moscow's dank weather, so what? All the more so because his beloved Iraq is nearby, too.

On the whole, he makes a typical tourist. However, I inadvertently recall Vladimir Volfovich's campaign calls for a settlement of Russia's economic problems by selling arms, primarily to Arab countries. This is why an absolutely idle question arises: What are Zhirinovskiy and his comrades intent on studying in the first place—local attractions or a potential arms market?

As for a breakthrough to the warm seas, why shouldn't we put up in the short historical run with Vladimir Volfovich's embarking on this excursion alone?

LDP Figure Rules Out 'Rigid Alliances' in Duma

LD2212171193 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1522 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] One of the leaders of Russia's Liberal Democratic Party [LDP], Aleksey Mitrofanov, says there will be no rigid alliances formed at the initial stage of work by the State Duma, the lower house of the country's new parliament. But he does not rule out the possibility of factions uniting on separate issues.

The Liberal Democrats and Russia's Choice Party had in fact rallied together behind the country's draft new constitution during the recent election campaign, Mitrofanov told Interfax. At the same time, he said, like many other parties, the LDP is opposed to RC's methods of economic management and the current pace of reforms leading to the breakdown of the country's industry.

Mitrofanov spoke of holding consultations with other political groups on LDP's behalf on forming parliamentary committees and commissions.

The two houses of the Federal Assembly, the State Duma and the Federation Council, are scheduled to meet in a first joint session on January 11.

It is now known that 68-year-old Dr Georgiy Lukava of the LDP will open the new parliament. Mitrofanov said Lukava was a member of the party's analytical group along with three other academicians, nine professors and one general- lieutenant, all of them winning seats on the party list.

He said Lukava would prepare his opening speech without consultations with the party leadership. Although there is no rigid party control as it used to be in the former Soviet Communist Party, said Mitrofanov, Lukava will certainly highlight some of the LDP's positions.

The 31-year-old Mitrofanov, himself a graduate from the Moscow Institute for International Relations and foreign minister of the LDP's shadow cabinet was elected to parliament on the party list. The LDP won about 24% of the vote in the recent Russian elections.

Vologda Party Gives 'Unconditional Support' to LPDR

PM2212123793 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Dec 93 First Edition p 2

[Viktor Filippov report: "People May Be Beaten Up for Criticizing Zhirinovskiy in Vologda"]

[Text] Vologda—The oblast's most powerful political organization—the "Vologda People's Movement"—has declared its unconditional support for Zhirinovskiy's party.

This organization was set up by entrepreneurs who have a strong aversion to Communists and advocate capitalism with a Russian face. These energetic guys with their bulging billfolds became popular in Vologda after a series of scandalous acts. In particular, they staged a pogrom at the market among traders of "Caucasian nationality," held a rally calling for the resignation of the mayor of Vologda, and burned a number of city tax inspectorate notices to pay fines on the steps of the inspectorate building. During the election campaign the

members of the "movement" vigorously campaigned against having Communists elected to the new Russian parliament from Vologda.

In its address to local people the "Vologda People's Movement" Political Council stated that it is "assuming the right to demand that judicial organs institute proceedings against anyone who supplies distorted information about V.V. Zhirinovskiy and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR], linking its sociopolitical activities to fascist ideology." Moreover, the "movement's" members promised to take "any measure to urgently sort things out with individuals or representatives of the mass media who try to discredit V.V. Zhirinovskiy or the LDPR." This is a very serious warning if you bear in mind that the "Vologda People's Movement" has its own squad of gunmen.

Communist Party Thanks Voters for Support

PM2312101393 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 23 Dec 93 p 1

[Statement issued by the Russian Federation Communist Party Central Executive Committee Presidium: "Thanks for Support"]

[Text] The results of the elections to the Federal Assembly have been made public. The elections to the Duma and Federation Council have shown that the Russian Federation Communist Party is one of the most influential organizations in the spectrum of Russia's public forces. During the election campaign the Communist Party received powerful support within the country and won recognition in the international arena.

In this connection the Russian Federation Communist Party Central Executive Committee Presidium expresses profound thanks to all its voters, allies, and supporters. We feel profound gratitude toward the millions of Russians who by their votes expressed their trust in our party. We also assess highly the selfless aid of hundreds of thousands of our citizens who have ensured the Communist Party's success by their support and participation in the distribution of leaflets and other campaign material and in work as observers at polling places.

[Signed] The Russian Federation Communist Party Central Executive Committee Presidium

Agrarian Leader Wants Discussion of October Events

LD2212204193 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1533 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] The leader of Russia's Agrarian Party said it was a duty of the new parliament to make a statement on the Moscow events of October 3-4.

Mikhail Lapshin told Interfax on Wednesday [22 December] that it was a matter of principle for his party's deputies in the State Duma, the lower house of the legislature, to receive an answer to the question "why a tank attack on the Supreme Soviet was possible." "In the future nobody must be tempted to give any such commands or carry them out," he said.

Lapshin said the Agrarian deputies would demand that a plaque be put up at the entrance to the State Duma bearing the names of those foreign leaders who gave their approval to the storming of the parliament building on October 4 and who "probably couldn't even imagine such a thing ever happening in their own countries."

Lapshin said it would be the main purpose of the Agrarian parliamentary group, which he expects to consist of at least 70 people, to prevent the uncontrolled sale of land with the aim of making easy profits and to ensure state support for all farmers.

Clinton Advisers Urge 'Less Shock, More Therapy'

PM2212164293 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Dec 93 First Edition p 3

[Report by Vladimir Nadein: "Washington Advises Moscow: Less Shock, More Therapy"]

[Text] Washington—A group of advisers to President Bill Clinton is preparing special recommendations for the Moscow meeting with Boris Yeltsin, breaking in a new formula: Less shock, more therapy for Russian people.

The expression comes from Strobe Talbot, special ambassador and chief coordinator of U.S. policy with regard to the countries of the former Union (see IZVESTIYA No. 245).

Both Vice President Al Gore and Talbot have expressed their disappointment at the insensitive attitude of the World Bank and the IMF to the Russians' transitional difficulties.

The international financial institutions have let it be known that they did not know before, and do not know now, how much money will be needed to fill the bottomless pit of inflation.

Nonetheless, Ernesto Hernandez-Cata, chief representative of the IMF at the talks with Russia, stated: From now on the IMF will insist on Moscow's fulfilling rigorous economic demands as a preliminary condition for the granting of aid. Ernesto Hernandez-Cata believes that the demand for Russia to reduce inflation to 2 percent a month in 1994 could be relaxed—a level of 3-5 percent will be deemed acceptable.

This statement came after Talbot's remarks, which means that Washington has begun to review its strategy with regard to Russia. Too much attention has been paid to economic reforms and not enough to improving people's lives.

This could be taken to mean that the U.S. Administration considers it its task to help Russia to extend a strong

system of social support for the population. However, Talbot was unable or unwilling to indicate specific ways of obtaining the considerable funds that would be needed for that purpose.

In September the U.S. Congress adopted a law on aid to Russia for 1994, to the tune of $1.6 billion. There is virtually no hope of obtaining additional money for social needs, since these same needs are not satisfied in the United States itself.

A spokesman for the World Bank leadership also said that the $72 million allocated by the bank on 24 November specially to set up a system of social protection for those who are temporarily out of work has not yet been taken up by the Russian Government, because of failure to meet the conditions for receiving this kind of aid.

This spokesman also said that the international financial institutions are receiving highly contradictory signals from Moscow, all emanating from the same government. The aims of the Cabinet of Ministers as set forth by Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin and his deputies Yegor Gaydar and Boris Fedorov appear mutually exclusive.

It may be assumed that the Clinton administration will no longer call on Yeltsin to implement the reforms as quickly as possible.

The administration's new ideas are already coming under criticism. THE WASHINGTON POST, clearly by way of a reproach to the chief expert on "Soviet" problems, states: "The cause of social privations in Russia was not the reforms, but the lack of reforms. The old Soviet economy has collapsed beyond return. What is called 'reforms' is the way out from under the wreckage to something that offers hope. Social conditions in Russia are better than, say, in Ukraine. The reason is that Russia has taken the important first steps along the path of reforms, while Ukraine has done little, and is suffering as a result."

Christopher, Talbott Cited

PM2212124593 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 22 Dec 93 First Edition p 6

[ITAR-TASS report: "Election Results Sound Alarm Bell"]

[Text] U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher appraised the parliamentary elections which took place in Russia as "an extraordinarily important event of truly historic significance." "These were the first free and honest elections in Russia's history," he told journalists Monday [20 December].

"The endorsement of the new constitution, which safeguards human rights, endows the executive with broad powers, and provides for the separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches, constitutes a major step forward," W. Christopher noted. At the same time, he went on, the "election results prompted a number of questions in the West." "The outcome of the elections may serve as an alarm bell for advocates of reform in Russia," the leader of America's diplomatic department believes, "and it may force reformers to become aware of the burdens brought about by market reforms, and to pay due attention to the needs of the Russian people." In the secretary of state's words, the Russian election results should nudge the United States toward an awareness of the need "to adopt measures of an economic nature aimed at alleviating the burdens of the transition period."

"We do not intend to halt support for reforms in Russia, and we see no proof" that this is how the Russian people intend to act, Strobe Talbott, ambassador at large and special adviser to the U.S. secretary of state on the new independent states, announced. It would be a great mistake to interpret the results of Russia's elections as a victory for reaction, he stressed at a special briefing in the U.S. Department of State devoted to the situation in Russia. "We must have a clear idea of our national interests, which are to support the advocates of reforms who will wield influence in the new parliament. And, of course, those who will take up strong positions in Yeltsin's government," he went on.

In S. Talbott's words, the United States "supports the very process of reforms, in which many people are involved."

The policy of the United States, the high-ranking Department of State staffer added, will be to help Russian economic strategists to find those paths which will pave the way to "easing or reducing to a minimum the social and political burdens associated with the implementation of reforms." He stressed that "intensive discussions" are under way right now in the U.S. Administration on how it might be possible to activate support for the reforms process with due consideration for the will of the Russian people.

Media Analysis, Commentary

Yeltsin News Conference, Plans for Party Viewed

MK2312110093 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 23 Dec 93 p 1

[Sergey Parkhomenko report in the "Power" column: "On the Eleventh Day, the President Starts Talking"]

[Text] Yesterday the long-awaited possibility of presenting a more or less clear-cut idea about the viewpoint by the head of the Russian Government on the results of the parliamentary elections and the constitutional referendum, as expected, gathered an unprecedentedly large audience in the hall of the presidential press center in the Kremlin. Judging by the immediate reaction of the audience, which actually represented the entire international journalist colony in Moscow, the following two statements from the president aroused the greatest interest:

—on the decision to create a "presidential political party," which was prompted by the "election results," and

—on the impossibility of forming a "purely coalition" government, given the Kremlin's firm intention to keep the present cabinet in power for the next two years and to maintain its reformist course.

With respect to President Yeltsin's plans in the sphere of party organization, it is essential to point out that he earlier came out with similar proposals on at least three occasions. The usually well-informed sources in the Kremlin to which SEGODNYA turned for comment this time proved unable to add anything to the president's announcement. In the end they admitted that this was the first time they had heard about his intentions to this effect. The traditional and inevitable rumors about Gennadiy Burbulis' allegedly receiving another "assignment" from Boris Yeltsin did not receive any confirmation either.

This all appears perfectly natural amid reports coming in from Russia's Choice headquarters: People there are saying quite frankly and confidently that after the failure suffered by the pro- presidential bloc on 12 December, Mr. Burbulis has lost the last chance he had for rapprochement with the president and has in fact been deprived of the mandate, issued a year ago, to create a political movement supporting the actions of the current administration. Meanwhile, Choice leaders are not abandoning their plans of gradually transforming the pre-election association into a fully-fledged political party acting in league with President Yeltsin—at any rate, as long as he promises benefits to both sides. In this, the role of the main organizer is being assigned to Anatoliy Chubays.

Therefore one can only assume that there is an indirect coincidence between several fairly vague phrases made by the president at this press conference and the unabating—regardless of Boris Yeltsin's intentions—activity by Russia's Choice.

As for the president's declarations about the stability of the cadre composition and so forth, the following should be borne in mind. By the end of the fall 1993 political campaign the correlation of forces in the upper echelon of the Russian executive branch had changed substantially. The figure that has succeeded in deriving the most substantial advantages from the election campaign here is Viktor Chernomyrdin. Signs are that the formation of a new government of "the epoch of the fifth Duma" will proceed under intensifying pressure. Boris Yeltsin has no right to forget that he has ceased to be the sole source of the government's authority, its only buttress of power, and therefore the sole authority determining its configuration and personal composition.

In this context, the mere presence of Yegor Gaydar in the cabinet may prove to be far from sufficient to guarantee the continuity of the "pre-election" course. After all, Mr. Gaydar can be "kept" at a regular ministerial post or even in a less significant position. The question is whether he will agree to a downgrading of his actual status.... Similar doubts assail Boris Fedorov, who with respect to his future official position is Mr. Gaydar's closest ally in the government.

One should note here the disappointment with the methods of "lobby politics" whose abuse has largely predetermined the election failure: The leaders of the reformist movement in Russia are no longer prepared to conceal this disappointment, increasingly talking about the advent of an era of "public politics," with which the president, too, is ready to agree. One should also pay attention to the pessimistic statements made recently by Gaydar and Fedorov themselves as well as to the conceited and fairly aggressive statements by Mr. Chernomyrdin.

It is not yet entirely clear what (or who) continues to feed Boris Yeltsin's intransigent conviction that he still has the power to reshuffle the government deck at will.

The list of fairly conspicuous contradictions and paradoxes, in which the verbatim record of the Russian Federation president's historic press conference abounds, is far from exhausted by those cited here. Yet the motive to which the journalistic audience was particularly attentive came across loud and clear: Boris Yeltsin decisively rebuffed the "aggressive populism" currently laying claim to leadership in the domestic political process.

This firmness, as is known, did not come naturally to the president. But at the end of the day the country had the right to expect it from the guarantor of its constitution. Especially if he really intends to stay in his post for another two and a half years.

Election Results Seen Bolstering Regions' Hand

PM2212120793 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Dec 93 First Edition pp 1, 2

[Valeriy Vyzhutovich article: "New Constitution Adopted, Threat of Separatism Remains"]

[Text] The new Russian constitution is coming into effect. The Central Electoral Commission has finally officially announced that the referendum on the draft fundamental law was valid and that the necessary majority of the country's population approved this draft. However, the political reality prevailing after 12 December gives more grounds for alarm than for reports of victory.

The arrival in parliament of Zhirinovskiy with his promise to abolish all national-territorial formations and to resurrect the empire is forcing the Russian republics' leaders and populations to adopt a militant stance. The constitution's adoption has in no way removed the specter of disintegration permanently hanging over the Federation. The letter of the fundamental law, which enshrines Russia's integrity and the unity of the system of state power, may turn out to be impotent in the face of

the spirit of separatism encouraged by the imperial promises of this newfound "dominant influence" who, God forbid, may dominate the Duma as well.

The concept of federalism and the principle of Russia's unity and indivisibility proclaimed by the Kremlin with a categorical insistence that sometimes frightens the provinces have been picked up in a distorted form by Zhirinovskiy. Just as the outcome of the elections strengthened Ukraine's desire not to part with its nuclear weapons, the results of 12 December tell the Russian republics to insist in an even more determined manner on their sovereignty. Almost half of them voted against the constitution, and Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaymiyev has now found even more justification for such an expression of the people's will than on the eve of the referendum: "This is the constitution of a unitary state with Federation window dressing."

Having received a nationwide mandate to pursue more autonomous, more independent policies, the regional leaders will naturally not pass up the opportunity of using them. The two months of loyalty to the center after the October events will soon be nullified.

What chances does the Kremlin have of preserving the vertical power structure without subjecting Russia's integrity to dangerous tests?

The terms of the referendum make it possible to interpret its unspectacular results (58.4 percent of the 58 million who voted were in favor of the Constitution) as nationwide approval while ignoring the number of republics (nine) and oblasts (10) that opposed it. Having accepted such an interpretation as a guide to resolute action, Moscow may, of course, strictly demand of the "separatists" that they submit unequivocally to the will of the people. But then the following question will follow equally strictly: Of which people? That, for example, is the question that will be asked by Murtaza Rakhimov, president of Bashkortostan (53 percent of whose population rejected the Constitution), who has already stated: "For us the basis of our policies is the Declaration on Bashkortostan's State Sovereignty and the results of the republic's referendum of 25 April. What is more, no one has repealed the Federation Treaty yet."

If we keep in mind the fact that Bashkortostan intends to adopt at a Supreme Soviet session 23 December its own constitution enshrining its state sovereignty, and if we take into consideration the similar and equally steadfast stances of Tatarstan, Tuva, and Kalmykia, any attempts to establish the forcible supremacy of the Russian two-headed eagle over the ethnic republics' coats of arms will not strengthen the Federation but explode it.

Until 12 December it was still possible, as Sergey Filatov did, to suggest to people for campaign purposes that the regional leaders are seeking not so much the republics' sovereignty as sovereignty of power, and that we should, so he said, separate the political elite's interests from those of the people. But it is now clear that the republics' leaders want and are seeking the same thing as the overwhelming majority of the provincial population. Logically, to continue to doubt this is to cast doubt on the idea that those who voted for the constitution made a conscious choice.

No, the only sensible response from the president to this new challenge from the provinces is to hold talks. This is what Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaymiyev, for example, is already insisting on. Indeed, Article 11 of the Russian constitution itself proposes the "delimitation of areas of responsibility and powers between organs of state power of the Russian Federation and organs of state power of components of the Russian Federation." This delimition may be carried out by both federal and, as it says, "other treaties," that is, on a bilateral basis. However tortuous this procedure is for the contracting parties and whatever new political haggling this may mean, we have no alternative.

In working out his postelection policies in relations with the Russian regions, Yeltsin will have to take into consideration the fact that more or less all the republic, kray, and oblast leaders have been elected to parliament's upper chamber—the Federation Council. Kalmyk President Kirsan Ilyumzhinov, Karelian Supreme Soviet Chairman Viktor Stepanov, Bashkortostan President Murtaza Rakhimov, and the demoted Urals governor, Eduard Rossel—for all their personal and political diversity—have been and remain strictly pragmatic and, very importantly, capable of controlling the situation in their regions. At least it is clear what can be expected of them. Unlike parliament's lower chamber, which for the moment is frighteningly unpredictable.

The Federation Council, it seems, is returning to the role which the president assigned to it this fall but which, owing to well known circumstances, it simply did not play. Having been unable to be a counterweight to Khasbulatov's parliament, the Federation Council in its new capacity will now be able when necessary to bring the Duma legislators to their senses by using its veto over the most important decisions in the area of internal and foreign policy. Another right possessed by the upper chamber—that of passing a vote of no confidence in the president—will presumably put Yeltsin on his guard against risky improvisations.

In short, it is preferable in all respects for the Russian president to try to reach agreement with the regional leaders, however difficult this may be, rather than quarrel with them.

According to the press secretary of the president of Kalmykia, the republic leaders have now prepared a coordinated program of action envisaging, in particular, changes in the Russian cabinet of ministers.

The president is faced with a choice: Either he forms a coalition government with watered-down economic tasks, or he strengthens a team of reformers capable of making the transformations which have been begun irreversible. The outcome of the president's "vote," the

last one this December, will become clear in the next few days, when the Kremlin's silence, justified by the fact that the final results of the elections and referendum are being calculated, will finally be broken.

Article Analyzes Likely Strength of Duma Factions

PM2212181593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Dec 93 First Edition p 4

[Article by Sergey Chugayev: "Disposition of Forces in State Duma Does not Promise Dramatic Events"]

[Text] The long wait for the official results of the elections to the State Duma (according to the Central Electoral Commission they will only be published on Saturday) has prompted many analysts to forecast the disposition of forces in the lower chamber of the Federal Assembly on the basis of the preliminary figures. The start of the process was initiated by experts from the president's administration who published the results of their studies back last Saturday. Comparing their assessments with subsequent ones one can conclude that in general they accord with reality.

Despite the fact that the assumption that over 100 seats in the Duma should go to "Russia's Choice" is giving rise to doubts which it will only be possible to resolve finally after the parliament has started work (on learning the real positions of the independent deputies registered as supporters of "Russia's Choice" elected for single-seat districts and also bearing in mind that after the publication of the official election results a number of officials will have to choose between a deputy's seat and state service) it still seems most likely that "Gaydar's party" will manage to form the largest Duma faction. But its majority will not be overwhelming. The distance from its main rivals, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia and the Communists, will most likely be 20-30 votes. Thus it may be assumed with a large degree of confidence that no faction in the future parliament will have an undisputed advantage. Consequently, in talking of the possible disposition of forces in the Russian parliament it is logical primarily to view the possibility of factions entering into alliances with each other.

And here the opinion of the president's analysts regarding the possible creation of a large bloc of democratic factions capable of controlling over half the votes in the Duma does not look undoubted. Even an quick analysis of the election results attests that there would have to be quite extraordinary events in the country—the total collapse of the economy or the threat of the establishment of a fascist dictatorship—for half the Duma deputies to join any alliance, not to mention to control over two-thirds of the votes. It is hard to imagine an alliance between "Russia's Choice" and Yavlinskiy's bloc, just as a bloc consisting of the Communists and the Liberal Democrats can be seen as far from certain.

It may be assumed that the main thing is that after the new constitution has been adopted the factions in parliament will have nothing to fight for except victory at the presidential and parliamentary elections in 1996. Therefore it is most likely that each faction will try to play its own game, using the Duma as a rostrum, as a kind of warming-up arena. And it is obviously from this viewpoint that we will have to view the activity of the Federal Assembly's lower chamber.

The solution of all the most important questions has switched to the executive power structures and the importance of the correlation of forces recedes into the background, giving way to the problem of the correlation of forces between the president's administration, the government, and the Federal Assembly as a whole. The situation in the Duma will depend mainly on the president, and primarily on his choice of economic policy.

B. Yeltsin's retention of the present government, which after the elections has according to all the rules become a coalition government since it includes representatives of at least three future deputies' factions ("Russia's Choice," the Agrarian Union, and the Party of Russian Unity and Accord) will most likely ensure that V. Chernomyrdin is supported by the majority of democratic and potentially centrist factions. Therefore the only procedure whose results could be influenced by the disposition of forces in the Duma—the approval of the prime minister's candidacy—will most likely get through without particular difficulty. But V. Chernomyrdin's support group will hardly be long-lived.

Ultimately it is highly likely that public interest in events in the Duma will die out quite soon.

'Fuss' Over LPDR, Speculation on Army Vote Criticized

PM2212152993 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Dec 93 p 3

[Yuriy Belichenko "Viewpoint": "No Need To Curse Russia"]

[Text] Throughout the week after the elections I had the feeling, as a statistically average and perfectly law-abiding Russian, that I was being insulted.

In the unanimous opinion of foreign observers, the elections in Russia were conducted, on the whole, in a calm, honest, and organized manner, in accordance with international norms. All the blocs and parties which participated in the elections had been officially registered. Every Russian was granted the legal right to choose freely among them for the first time in his life. But something strange, to put it mildly, began almost as soon as figures recording the as yet very preliminary voting results appeared on the screen of the Ostankino computer, the main character in the nighttime television show which flopped. On approaching the microphone or replying to the presenters' questions, people who call themselves politicians and intellectuals started saying

irritably that Russia had "turned stupid," likening its citizens to a Brechtian flock of sheep and intimidating people with the specter of approaching fascism. As though it never occurred to them in their quick temper that by insulting those who, in their opinion, voted "wrongly" they were insulting all Russians who participated in the elections.

There is more to come.

What is the chief result of the voting? The new constitution, of course. Whether it is perfect or not very perfect, it is precisely on its legal basis that we have to live and to revive Russia. Society is undoubtedly entering some new, as yet not quite understood quality. Just what quality, and what are its special features?—this is the question which naturally arises. But, as though not noticing or hearing this question, the Russian and foreign mass media comment with frightening monotony on just one thing through the mouths and pens of their reviewers: the victory of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia [LPDR] in terms of the number of votes cast for the blocs and parties. Why do they talk only of this, and why is a generally explicable phenomenon, albeit an unexpected one, perceived almost as the end of the world? What has the word "victory" to do with this? Taking into account the voting results in single-seat districts, it certainly does not reflect the political reality which is taking shape.

Such a fuss has been raised over this party and its leader that it long ago drowned out both common sense and the terrible echo of the still recent Russian tragedy. But maybe it is particularly important to remember right now the grim lesson of this fall: Political intolerance underpinned by perfectly real economic difficulties and by the problems of one's fellow citizens brought us then to the brink of civil war. Have we really forgotten?

If not, why inject society once again with the bacilli of hatred? "Those who voted for the Communists and the LDPR are not the people, they are the mob," the not unknown V. Novodvorskaya, for example, maintains in a brief interview in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. "Therefore a national guard must be created within a few weeks. We will all join it without delay. If it is equipped with modern weapons and aircraft, we will have the means to defend ourselves." Defend ourselves against whom, forgive me, and in the name of what? Who are these "we"? Why has a gulf again been excavated between "us" and "them"?

Of course, both biological nationalism and, even more so, fascism are terrible, destructive phenomena. But they do not grow up suddenly, of their own accord—they grow out of an exacerbation of social contradictions, out of mass uncertainty about the future. They also grow in the soil of outraged national dignity and infringement of man's natural patriotic principles. Why encourage them in people by kindling enmity and by accusing wholesale the more than 10 million voters who cast their votes for the LDPR of potential allegiance to fascism, and even set up antifascist fronts in this connection? This is both insulting and dangerous, since Russians essentially voted *not so much personally for Zhirinovskiy, Gaydar, or* Zyuganov as for their own pains and hopes, for their own future, for a new, prosperous, democratic Russia and certainly not for a fascist Russia.

Why the politically and ethically reproachable calculations about whom precisely the Army voted for and in what proportion? The Army voted for itself, for its own interests, which certainly are not narrow corporative, petty interests but state interests. For a strong, united, and patriotically oriented Russia. For politicians not to drag it into their games in the future. For the Army to be respected and socially protected. For worthy service for its new recruits and a worthy life for its veterans.

I would like to believe, however, that the election passions will soon subside. That people vested with power, including the elite "shapers of opinion," [vlastiteli umov] will at last understand that the sharp-toothed fish of extremism takes on any coloration and inhabits only the dirty and putrid water of unspirituality. That the antidote to dangerous "predators" of this kind has long been known in Rus—it is the clearly and distinctly expressed, creative and unifying idea of patriotism. That the reforms will proceed and will be supported by the masses if the patriotic essence of these reforms is highlighted, when they clearly and unambiguously display both concern for the interests of all fellow citizens without exception and concern for the interests of Russia itself.

The newly elected parliament is capable of becoming the generator of social accord if it takes the path of constructive cooperation in the name of the good and the worthy future of its compatriots. It is only important to remember that mutual tolerance, respect for public opinion, and the total rejection of insulting labels from the arsenal of the election struggle, which polarize society, can become the natural guarantee and guarantor of such cooperation.

Elections Result in Collapse of 'Political Center'

PM2312115593 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 23 Dec 93 p 1

[Andrey Kolesnikov article: "The Collapse of the Political 'Center': 'Farewell, and if Forever, then Forever Farewell!'"]

[Text] The utter collapse of the so-called political "center" is an almost unnoticed result of the 1993 elections. The significant handshake in front of the television cameras between Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and Aleksandr Tsipko, a major ideologist of centrism and Gorbachevism, was the culmination of this fiasco.

However, let us ask ourselves the question: Was there anything to collapse? After all, the "center," just like other "embodiments" of Civic Union, existed almost exclusively in the imagination of Arkadiy Volskiy,

Vasiliy Lipitskiy, and Oleg Rumyantsev. It is understandable that these politicians are very angry at the press, which for some years has denied the existence of a serious centrist organization of social democratic and state capitalist hue as if Civic Union were a UFO. How come, given that there were joint gatherings, splits, alliances, heated discussion, articles in the mass media, and press conferences with and without refreshments laid on? But **real** political life is not gauged by the number of events you organize. Someone who regards himself as a writer is not necessary such. And this applies with equal justice to politics...

The "centrists" complain today that the democrats' reluctance to cooperate with them led to Zhirinovskiy's triumph. They say with a wry smile that "centrism" has been undervalued, but that its time will come and the people will twig who the real politicians and saviors of the motherland are. Let's do some political speculation, then.

It is a nuisance, of course, that the people, exasperated by "monetarist" reforms, refused to put their faith in the democrats and voted for Zhirinovskiy rather than for the moderate socialists, but the elections, which are a kind of public opinion poll, showed that citizens prone to fascist leanings constitute a considerable section of the population. While the enterprise directors who have not learned how to manage in the new conditions, the financial drug addicts whose raison d'etre is bemoaning life and extracting loans, constitute precisely the insignificant section of the electorate which voted for Civic Union. If this is the political "center," if the distorted economic sense of some superannuated politicians and economic managers lies behind such a grand title and even greater claims, then I don't know what "left-wing" forces means...

The left-of-center politicians have exagerrated and continue to exagerrate to this day the significance of **structure** in politics. It seems that the only conclusion which Volskiy has drawn from the election results is that the structure was wrong. And it will be more correct to return to a form of structure that was approved but then forgotten about, the industrial party's version. God help us! Isn't it better to mull over the fact that Chernomyrdin, who is almost the toughest monetarist in the government, has had no intention whatsoever of becoming an object of "privatization" by Volskiy and the industrial lobby, on which Arkadiy Ivanovich has smugly pinned his hopes, and consider the fact that the real political center, judged by the criteria of Western political science, is located in a completely different place, a place considerably farther to the right, namely, the parties of Shakhray and Yavlinskiy or, if you wish, among some the members of Gaydar's party.

Despite the crushing election defeat, Arkadiy Ivanovich continues instructing the government on how to proceed and advocates the departure of "weak and incompetent people" from it, by which of course is to be understand the liberal wing of the cabinet. The Civic Union members pin their hopes on the formation of a centrist faction in parliament. Bearing in mind that Travkin split noisily from Civic Union (which contributed to his party's breaking through the 5-percent barrier) the Democratic Party of Russia will exercise extreme caution about forming a bloc with the left-of-center deputies scattered like confetti throughout parliament. On the other hand, if you disregard the stance of Sergey Glazyev, who remains a convinced neoliberal, there should be no ideological differences among the former allies.

The Women of Russia are another potentially pro-inflation bloc and constitute a likely ally of the left-of-center politicians in parliament. If Shakhray decides to take real umbrage at Russia's Choice or a split occurs in the "collective Yavlinskiy party," microcoalitions and the integration of the pseudocentrists into these proper centrist blocs are possible.

The left-of-center politicians no longer have independent significance in Russian politics. The left wing has been occupied by proper left-wingers, and the center by real centrists who are drawn to liberalism. The logic of the development of the Russian economy is ousting the left-of-center politicians from economic life . The bankruptcy mechanism exists for that purpose.

Ashgabat Summit of CIS Defense Ministers Continues

CIS Armed Forces Command Abolished

LD2212203193 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1925 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] The CIS Council of Defense Ministers meeting Wednesday in Ashgabat has decided to annul the CIS Armed Forces Command. Instead, a staff will be formed, subordinate to the CIS Council of Defense Ministers, which will be in charge of coordinating military-technical cooperation among the CIS countries.

Those present agreed that they recommend General Viktor Samsonov to be approved at the summit as the chief of staff. Earlier the general was chief of staff of the CIS Armed Forces.

Ukraine's Radetskyy Comments

LD2212204793 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1533 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] The Ukrainian Defense Ministry is ready to conduct "constructive dialogue" on settlement of the issues concerning the Black Sea Fleet and nuclear weapons situated on its territory with the Russian Defense Ministry and other parties concerned. This was announced by Ukrainian Defense Minister General Vitaliy Radetskyy at the meeting of the Council of the CIS Defense Ministers in Ashgabat (Turkmenistan) on Wednesday.

Radetskyy also pointed out that Ukraine was ready to take "the most active part" in the meetings of the CIS Council of Defense Ministers and wanted to have a permanent representative on the staff of the CIS United Armed Forces. In his words, the Ukrainian leadership and Defense Ministry reviewed their opinion on the CIS military bodies for coordination in which they had not participated before.

Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev said when commenting on the statement of the Ukrainian delegation that this move of the Ukrainian party was unexpected for him. "This statement is encouraging. It shows the readiness of Ukraine to consider the issues at the level of the Council of the CIS Defense Ministers," Grachev remarked.

Radetskyy, Grachev Meet

LD2312100393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0901 GMT 23 Dec 93

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondent Vladimir Gondusov]

[Text] Ashgabat December 23 TASS—Russian Defense Minister General Pavel Grachev and his Ukrainian colleague General Vitaliy Radetskyy met here behind closed doors today. The talk lasted thirty minutes.

Radetskyy told journalists after the negotiations that it was his first personal meeting with Pavel Grachev. Formerly, they only had some telephone talks. The Ukrainian general said that complete mutual understanding was established between him and Grachev, especially on military-technical problems. "Our views coincide almost entirely", Radetskyy said.

Speaking about the problems of nuclear weapons, now deployed on Ukrainian territory, Radetskyy noted that in accordance with its military doctrine his country would eventually become a nuclear-free state, and "we are gradually heading in this direction".

Asked about problems linked with the Black Sea Fleet, Radetskyy said that the views of the Russian and Ukrainian defense ministers also coincided on this matter. "We shall promptly get down to the stage-by-stage solution of Black Sea Fleet problems. We are concerned most of all about men, not ships," Radetskyy added.

The Russian military delegation today signed bilateral agreements on military-technical cooperation with Tajikistan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and several other states of the Commonwealth. In expert opinion, these bilateral agreements with Russia, as the strongest military and economic power, will contribute to the strengthening of the CIS system of collective security.

A joint meeting of the CIS defense and foreign ministers will take place here in the afternoon today. Several agreements, discussed the day before, are expected to be signed in the course of the meeting.

Defense Agreements Signed

LD2312135893 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1133 GMT 23 Dec 93

At a session of the CIS Defense Ministers Council in Ashgabat on Thursday [23 December], Russia signed bilateral treaties on military and technical cooperation with Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Armenia.

As a Russian negotiator has told Interfax, the documents allow not only promotion of military cooperation bilaterally but also reinforcement of the CIS collective security system.

The session also finally resolved the issue on funding headquarters to be set up to coordinate military cooperation between the CIS states. According to an agreement, Russia is to foot 50% of the headquarters maintenance bill. The remaining costs are equally shared between the other collective security treaty's participant-states—Kazakhstan, Belarus, Tajikistan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. The headquarters will be housed in the former building of the CIS Combined Armed Forces Command in Moscow. The agreement will be submitted for endorsement at the CIS summit on Friday.

Peacekeeping Forces Commander on Tajikistan Situation

LD2212210593 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1756 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] Commander of the CIS peacekeeping force in Tajikistan General Boris Pyankov of Russia says there is no need for sending further reinforcements to that Central Asian state. The present contingent is quite capable of fulfilling the tasks facing it, he told reporters in Ashgabat on Wednesday.

But the general insists that earlier CIS resolutions on Tajikistan must be implemented. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are to send their own contingents to region, Russia's 201th division must be manned to its full strength and the question of funding the force resolved, he said.

Pyankov said that a high level U.S. delegation visiting the region and Russian commanders had discussed the possibility of placing the force under U.N. or CSCE command. But the Americans objected on the grounds that the force was not always neutral. Nowhere in the world do the peacekeepers guard the borders of a country in which they are deployed, but in all other respects, the force meets the conditions set by the U.N. charter, Pyankov said.

In this connection, he said the question was due to be discussed by the U.N. Security Council soon.

Pyankov described the overall situation in Tajikistan as complicated, though he raised the hope that the country's economic recovery "will take place in conditions of peace rather than civil war".

ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 23 Dec

LD2312072593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0539 GMT 23 Dec 93

["Press Review"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow December 23 TASS—Russian newspapers focus on a news conference by the Russian president in the Kremlin on Wednesday and the coming summit to be held by the heads of state of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Ashgabat, Turkmen Republic.

Commenting on the president's statement, the NEZAVISMAYA GAZETA newspaper writes that, despite the approval of the constitution and in connection with the president's declared intention to make, at long last, his government tough and powerful, Yeltsin has to maneuver between right-wing and left-wing parties.

Analysing the news conference, the newspaper stresses: "The president does not intend to leave his post till 1996. He will create a presidential party. Gaydar will remain in the government which will not be a coalition cabinet, but it should turn to the needs of people and will be drastically cut, including vice-premiers and ministers".

"Will a radically reformed government be able to carry out sweeping reforms?" asks the newspaper.

In an article dealing with the president's statement, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA points to Yeltsin's intention to stay in office till June 1996 in compliance with the provisions of the new onstitution as well as to establish a presidential party.

"This notwithstanding, Yeltsin did not preclude a chance to work with various groups and political blocs," the newspaper writes. "It is possible to cooperate even with Vladimir Zhirinovskiy if his policy is not aggressive," the newspaper quotes the president as saying.

Stressing the importance of the first public statement by the Russian leader after the referendum on the draft constitution and the general elections, ROSSIISKIYE VESTI notes that over 300 Russian and foreign journalists were present at the Kremlin news conference.

Speaking of the coming summit to be held by the heads of state of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Ashgabat, the same newspaper runs an interview with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoliy Adamishin.

The deputy minister notes that "the Commonwealth comes to its feet as a serious regional organisation. Its members singed the treaty on an economic union and mapped out stages for its creation. Interstate sectoral associations are actively operating."

At the same time Adamishin warns that one should not claim for the time being that the process is irreversible. He regards aggressive nationalism in the former Soviet republics as a danger to the CIS in this sphere.

"Politicians who are not infected with this virus, are forced to go back on their principles, pressed by national patriots," Adamishin says.

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA writes that there will be quite a number of disagreements at the Ashgabat summit meeting. "Serious differences have emerged in the recent past between Russia, on the one hand, and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Armenia and Ukraine, on the other," the newspaper continues.

"It is obvious that the recent triumph at the elections by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy will increase apprehensions towards the unpredictable neighbour," the newspaper underlines.

The PRAVDA newpspaper singles out five key items at the Ashgabat talks: Creation of a solvent union, investments, antimonopoly policy, security and rights of national minorities.

"The last item is the most important for Russians," the newspaper notes.

ROSSIISKIYE VESTI carries an article on issues of ensuring the normal operation of the Baykonur cosmodrome. The newspaper notes that, according to specialists, at least 169.9 billion roubles will be needed for the cosmodrome's normal operation next year.

However, there is no answer for the time being to the question of whether Kazakhstan and Russia will shoulder these expenses jointly.

"In the meantime, boiler rooms stop, houses freeze, advanced equipment spoils and, what's the main thing, specialists go away. Will the delapidation of the unique space project stop?" the newspaper asks. "It will if we learn, at long last, not to dictate our conditions to partners but to come to agreement with them."

'Bandits' Seize Children, Demand Plane to Tehran

LD2312115793 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1140 GMT 23 Dec 93

[By Vyacheslav Bondarenko, ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Rostov-on-Don, 23 December—According to preliminary information, today four armed persons of Caucasian nationality seized 14 ninth-form schoolchildren from Rostov school number 25, an ITAR-TASS correspondent has just learned from unofficial sources.

According to as yet unconfirmed information, the bandits forced the schoolchildren into a bus and subsequently went to the area of the military airport. They then made their demands: Make a plane or helicopter available to fly to Tehran. Talks are now underway with the terrorists.

Helicopter Made Available

LD2312151893 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1501 GMT 23 Dec 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vyacheslav Bondarenko]

[Text] Rostov-on-Don, 23 Dec— It has just become known that a helicopter has been made available to the terrorists. They have boarded it together with the hostages. As has already been reported, provisionally the flight route planned is "Georgia- Makhachkala-Iran."

Talks With U.S. on Retargeting Missiles Assessed

PM2312094393 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 23 Dec 93 p 2

[Roman Zadunayskiy article under "Details" rubric: "Where U.S. and Russian Missiles Are Targeted"]

[Text] In the past B. Yeltsin's words to the effect that henceforth Russian ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads were no longer targeted on U.S. cities were given quite a restrained welcome by the Bush administration and did not meet with any special desire on the part of the White House and the Pentagon to take an analogous step. It now comes to light, however, that the Russian military was also in no hurry to retarget the missiles—talks on this are proceeding only now both at the highest level and directly between military chiefs.

Thus, Colonel General I. Sergeyev, commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, recently met in the United States (Omaha) with Gen. L. Butler, chief of the U.S. Strategic Air Command, and with high-ranking Pentagon representatives. It is too soon to speak of the result of the talks but, according to available information, they discussed precisely the retargeting of U.S. and Russian ICBM's at deserted areas of the World Ocean. According to U.S. data, 20 such regions have already been identified.

The retargeting scheme itself is not complex: The coordinates of targets in the Russian Federation and the United States which had been entered into the missiles' computer operational memory will be replaced by the coordinates of regions in the ocean. These are the main targets, while the reserve targets, also entered in the computer memory, will remain untouched. In general, the coordinates of the main targets have to be entered in the computer memory, since the possibility that the missile will fall onto the territory from which it was launched cannot be ruled out. The flight mission—the coordinates of the main target—can be changed in 15 minutes, so retargeting is a symbolic, diplomatic step rather than a military, operational-tactical one, and a demonstration of the significant warming of Russian-U.S. relations.

At the same time there are several aspects which complicate even this, at first sight simple and understandable diplomatic maneuver. It is not clear, for example, how Ukraine, on whose territory 176 missiles with 1,240 nuclear charges are stationed, will react to this. In addition, 81 missiles (81 charges) are on the territory of Belarus and 98 missiles (980 nuclear charges) in Kazakhstan. Under interstate treaties all these silo-housed ICBM's with their nuclear multiple reentry vehicles belong to Russia, but the Ukrainian leadership is known to dissent on this question. Therefore the possibility cannot be ruled out that Kiev will once again show self-will and refuse to retarget "its" missiles (which L. Kravchuk has transferred to the jurisdiction of the 42d Missile Army of the republic's Armed Forces), offended that the talks were held without involving the Ukrainian military department.

The retargeting of ground-based ICBM's will reduce the danger of their unsanctioned launch and, thus, of a nuclear war arising by accident. But similar missiles with nuclear warheads (Russia has 788 of them with 2,652 charges) will remain on submarines of both states, and there seems to be no question of retargeting these. In addition, problems of inspection arise with regard to where the missiles are actually targeted. It only remains for us to take the Pentagon at its word that henceforth Russia will not be the main target of the U.S. military, but only a reserve target. States bordering on the regions of the World Ocean at which the missiles will be retargeted and also Greenpeace will be indignant. The possibility cannot be ruled out that the retargeting of missiles at "abstract" targets will dampen the ardor of missilemen and lessen their attention—which could lead to unsanctioned launches.

The most radical option for preventing an accidental unleashing of nuclear war is to remove the nuclear warheads from the carriers and store them. Incidentally, this simple solution to the problem, proposed by Bruce Blair, a U.S. specialist in questions of nuclear weapon command and control systems at the Brookings Institution, as well as by some Russian specialists, is categorically rejected by both Washington and Moscow. The fact that, apart from the United States and Russia, which

have "become friends," other nuclear states exist in the world, and the policies of some of these inspire real fear, serves as a weighty argument.

U.S. Diplomat's Behavior 'Political Slap in the Face'

PM2312111993 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Dec 93 p 1

[Nikolay Volynskiy report: "Slap in Face?"]

[Text] People in St. Petersburg (some with amusement and some with annoyance) are discussing certain results of U.S. Vice President Albert Gore's visit—especially the meeting at Pulkovo Airport, where a huge crowd of mainly Americans had gathered. People are saying (PRAVDA's correspondent was not invited to the meeting) that Andrew Goodman, U.S. assistant consul general in St. Petersburg, who suddenly appeared from somewhere out of the ranks of Russian soldiers in honor formation, carelessly pushed aside Leningrad Military District Commander S. Seleznev in order to get to his beloved vice president.

Many Russians present, mainly City Hall officials, perceived the diplomat's push, his gesture, as a political slap in the face to all Russians. A high-ranking official told me: "Since the 'communist idol' came crashing down in Russia some (not all, of course!) Americans behave in our country as if they were in a bar; or a brothel."

Anyway, the newspaper SMENA reports that Deputy Mayor V. Putin had a conversation about this with the U.S. consul and informed him that henceforth Andrew Goodman "will not be admitted to events organized by City Hall" for the time being.

City Hall's Foreign Relations Committee itself refused to confirm the existence of a conflict, although the incident at the airport was not denied. What happened was attributed to the fact that in our country, they said, it is accepted that high-ranking officials are received according to Russian protocol while Americans do so according to their rules. It was the Americans who organized this meeting and they who received A. Gore, so it was not a diplomat and a Russian general who clashed at Pulkovo but two protocols....

Deactivation of Ukrainian Warheads Viewed

MK2212101093 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 22 Dec 93 p 1

[Pavel Felgengauer report in the "Disarmament" column: "Ukraine Has Gone Ahead With Abolishing Its Nuclear Potential. Has Russian and U.S. Pressure Yielded Results?"]

[Text] Recently Ukraine has speeded up the dismantling of the nuclear missile potential it has inherited. On 20 December Valeriy Shmarov, Ukrainian vice premier in charge of the military industrial complex, announced that 17 nuclear SS-24 missiles (in all there are 46 SS-24's in Ukraine) have been taken off alert. Combat nuclear units (more than 100) have been taken down from missiles, yet they still remain in silos. Before the end of the year Ukraine has promised to dismantle warheads from yet another three SS-24 missiles. And in 1994, according to Valeriy Shmarov, the remaining SS-24 missiles located on Ukraine's territory are to be taken off alert status. This, in spite of the fact that back on 11 August Grishchenko, head of the Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Ministry's Arms Control and Disarmament Department, announced that, in Kiev's opinion, the Ukrainian SS-24's do not come under the START I Treaty and therefore may be kept legally.

The Russian Defense Ministry confirmed that 17 warheads have indeed been taken down from SS-24 missiles. In addition, according to the Russian Defense Ministry, nuclear units have been dismantled from 41 Ukrainian SS-19 missiles (more than 200 units) while part of the SS-19 missiles have already been taken out of their silos for subsequent destruction. Therefore, approximately one-third of the Ukrainian nuclear missile capability has been taken off alert. Clearly the joint Russian-U.S. diplomatic and economic pressure has finally resulted in appreciable shifts in Kiev's position. A U.S. State Department spokesman in Washington welcomed Ukraine's latest moves as "a step in the right direction."

True, full elimination of all nuclear missile disagreements between Moscow and Kiev is still a long way off. Valeriy Shmarov said that Russian specialists continue to service the nuclear charges located on Ukraine's territory, and described the Russian Government statement that such servicing has been stopped as "populist and uncalled for." Nonetheless, Colonel General Yevgeniy Maslin, chief of the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Defense Ministry (earlier a highly classified branch of the Soviet Army whose specialists deal with all matters of storage, use, and transportation of nuclear units and are generally responsible for all nuclear charges adopted for service), assured SEGODNYA's correspondent that "there are no Russian military servicemen from the 12th Directorate in Ukraine." However, the 43rd Missile Army deployed in Ukraine includes former specialists of the 12th Main Directorate who have "stayed" in Ukraine together with the army and sworn the Ukrainian military oath, and can not now be considered Russian servicemen.

Furthermore, only three defective SS-24 missile warheads have been delivered to Russian territory and transferred to specialists of the Atomic Energy Ministry (former Sredmash). The other decomissioned missile nuclear units are so far in Ukraine. As before, the 43rd Army's combat unit storage facilities remain overloaded in excess of all norms (six to eight times, according to the 12th Main Directorate).

The question about the form and size of compensation to Ukraine for nuclear disarmament also remains open.

Ministry Official Comments

LD2212205293 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1539 GMT 22 Dec 93

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature: by diplomatic correspondents Dmitriy Voskoboynikov, Igor Porshnev, Vitaliy Trubetskoy and others]

[Text] Switching 20 SS-24 rockets on Ukrainian soil off combat duty is an attempt on Kiev's part to struggle out of the corner into which it has driven itself, a senior official in the Russian Foreign Ministry in charge of Ukrainian affairs told Interfax.

He emphasized that the Russian government's statement made in the wake of START-1 ratification by the Ukrainian parliament "remains in force. We will not go back on the agreement made by the presidents of our two countries to have all nuclear weapons removed from Ukrainian soil in 24 months. If the Ukrainian authorities have different views on the matter now, this means they abandon their commitments."

The diplomat said that the "satisfaction" expressed by Kiev about the outlook for signing a Ukrainian-Russian- American agreement on compensating Ukraine for the nuclear weapons to be removed from there was "premature."

In his words, the talks held in Kiev last week between Strobe Talbott, the U.S. president's special envoy in the CIS, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Mamedov, his Ukrainian counterpart Boris Tarasyuk and Ukraine's Vice Premier Valeriy Shmarov "were merely an exchange of opinions and were not supposed to lead to signing of a document."

The Foreign Ministry official did not think that the latest move of the Ukrainian leaders reflected "serious positive changes in Kiev's positions. Russia will not be satisfied until Ukraine fully implements its nuclear disarmament commitments it made in bilateral relations with Russia and on the world scene. Ukraine does not honor any of them at the moment. What it is doing is only moving or pretending to move in that direction."

He also said that Russia did not refuse to pay compensation to Ukraine for strategic nuclear weapons and was prepared to sign an appropriate contract. "Russia does not, however, propose to pay compensation for tactical weapons because this is not provided for in any document. Russia's position on this issue remains unchanged," the diplomat said.

Adamishin Says State of Ties With Ukraine 'Alarming'

MK2212123093 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 22 Dec 93 p 3

[Unattributed INTERFAX report in the "Smolenskaya Square" column: "Anatoliy Adamishin Assesses Russian-Ukrainian Relations as Alarming"]

[Text] Anatoliy Adamishin, first deputy Russian foreign affairs minister, sums up the situation that has taken shape in Russian-Ukrainian relations as "alarming." He considers it unlikely that any serious interstate problems between the two countries will be resolved before the presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine, which are scheduled for 27 March. This primarily relates to the issues of nuclear weapons, the Black Sea Fleet, and the status of Sevastopol.

According to Mr. Adamishin, the interstate climate could be largely improved by promoting contacts on an extra-state basis and also through interaction between Russia and Ukraine on the international level.

Commenting on the preliminary results of elections to the Russian Federation State Duma, Anatoliy Adamishin stated that he totally rules out any influence by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, on Russia's foreign policy. "As for the State Duma, its influence on Russian policy will be either positive or insignificant," the deputy minister thinks.

Delegation To Propose Lease on Baykonur Cosmodrome

LD2212171893 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1503 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] A Russian government delegation is going to Almaty for talks on the status of the Baykonur cosmodrome. It is led by Yuriy Koptev, the General Director of Russia's Space Agency.

Interfax has learned from a dependable source that Kazakhstan will be offered a long-term lease of the cosmodrome with Moscow to fund its maintenance and its personnel and ensure its vital function. Russia is also prepared to offer to Kazakhstan extensive cooperation in space studies.

A spokesman for Russia's Space Agency has told Interfax that possible lease mechanisms and pay arrangements will also be discussed.

Russia's government on Tuesday approved the lease concept and endorsed the draft of a Russo-Kazakh memorandum on Baykonur. The cosmodrome issue may be proposed for debate at a CIS summit in Ashgabat. Negotiations on Baykonur may be continued by Russia's Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin in Almaty, where he is expected on his way back from the summit.

Russia can hardly do without Baykonur, a launching site for "Proton" boosters and commercial spacecraft which cannot be launched from Russia's Plesetsk cosmodrome.

According to Koptev, Russia would need 6-7 years to build a cosmodrome that could replace Baykonur.

Kazakhstan Wants 'Excessive Sum'

PM2312135593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Dec 93 First Edition p 2

[Boris Vinogradov report: "Moscow Agrees To Lease Baykonur From Kazakhstan"]

[Text] Viktor Chernomyrdin's delegation has flown to Almaty, where it is to hold talks on the whole range of economic relations with Kazakhstan. One of the main issues will be the fate of Baykonur.

Under the May 1992 agreement signed by Boris Yeltsin and Nursultan Nazarbayev, the cosmodrome is a troop formation of the Russian military space forces. While it is in joint use, 94 percent of the cost of maintaining it is borne by Russia, which effectively remains its master. All launches of "Proton" rockets and commercial launches are carried out from Baykonur, as at present they cannot be carried out from Russia's "Plesetsk" cosmodrome. To construct a new facility capable of replacing Baykonur would take Russia at least seven years, plus enormous sums that the Moscow treasury currently does not have.

Kazakhstan is unable either to service or to operate Baykonur, but nevertheless it would like to gain the status of a space power and is presenting new conditions to Russia. It established its own aerospace agency and put forward the idea of setting up on the basis of Baykonur an international company with the involvement of Ukraine and other countries. Moscow turned this down and stated that it is prepared to lease Baykonur from Kazakhstan.

Before leaving for Almaty, Viktor Chernomyrdin received a letter from his Kazakhstan counterpart, Sergey Tereshchenko, saying that Kazakhstan agrees in principle to this option, but is asking for an excessive sum from Russia—several billion dollars a year for the right to use Baykonur. We were told at the Russian Space Agency that in this instance Kazakhstan's appetites exceed not only Russia's capabilities but all headings of the Baykonur budget. And this is despite the fact that the space research carried out at Baykonur has never yielded revenue.

The problem of Baykonur is closely linked with the problem of the status of the Russian Army on Kazakhstan's territory. At present the Russian servicemen at the cosmodrome, and also at other facilities, incidentally, have the status of foreigners. There is no treaty on military cooperation between Moscow and Almaty. It is quite possible that the leasing of Baykonur would set a precedent whereby all other Russian military facilities in nearby foreign countries would be regarded as bases for which payment should be made.

At present Kazakhstan merely keeps an eye on order at Baykonur and sees to it that nothing goes missing from this large facility. It has introduced customs controls, posted military guards, expropriated a number of Russian Army buildings and offices, and carried out a careful inventory of all property.

Deal with Serbia 'Helped Milosevic Win Votes'

PM2212171993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Dec 93 First Edition p 3

[Report by Aleksandr Platkovskiy: "Smolensk Square Did Not Know of 'Gazprom' Deal with Serbia"]

[Text] As IZVESTIYA has reported, last week "Gazprom" signed an agreement on the construction of a gas pipeline in Serbia. It is believed that this deal helped Slobodan Milosevic's ruling Socialist Party to gain additional votes at the Serb parliament elections.

The Russian Foreign Ministry did not know that a gas deal was being prepared. The Foreign Ministry's official position is that in any case the agreement cannot be implemented until the international economic sanctions have been lifted from Belgrade.

A high-ranking Russian diplomat did not rule out that the Serb side made skillful use of the talks with "Gazprom." This diplomat said that this is not the first time Belgrade has played "the Russian card" and is doing it "dishonestly and improperly."

Meanwhile there is much that is unclear in the story of this contract. "Gazprom's" interests at the talks in Belgrade were represented by a delegation headed by Stepan Derezhov, general director of "Gazeksport." Immediately after returning from Belgrade he went on sick leave. But one "Gazprom" official involved in the project asked "that attention not be drawn to it." He said that "the agreement is still in its raw state and has not been properly worked through," it is a case of "a protocol of intent" rather than a contract.

It is not clear why "Gazprom" has chosen such an unsuitable time to sign an "unfinished" agreement and thus—deliberately or not—found itself drawn into big-league politics.

TANJUG has reported that the draft is the largest in Serbia in terms of the investments it is attracting. After the gas pipeline has been constructed the total turnover in gas deliveries in exchange for goods will reach an estimated $800 million a year.

Debt to Slovakia Paid With Five MiG-29's

LD2112215493 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1653 GMT 21 Dec 93

[ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Rzhevskiy]

[Text] Bratislava, 21 Dec—Today, Russia handed over five MiG-29's to Slovakia at Sliac military aerodrome as part of a debt repayment of the former USSR. According to experts, 150,000,000 dollars of the debt is compensated by their arrival. When the former Czechoslovakia's

army was divided up. Slovakia received 10 MiG-29's. According to Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, "this deal will balance out the deliveries of MiG-29's to Hungary in some sense."

Finance Minister Comments on Talks in France

LD2112233793 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 2124 GMT 21 Dec 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Nikita Yermakov]

[Text] Paris, 22 Dec (ITAR-TASS)—In the financial and economic relations between Russia and France, there is talk about convening a meeting of the bilateral commission for cooperation, at which credit would be the key issue. This was stated in a conversation with Russian journalists by Russian Finance Minister Boris Fedorov, who is visiting here. We are being pressed to accept credit, he said, but the situation has now changed: we tried to get it earlier, but we do not need it any more. Our principle is that we shall completely reject some of the sources of credit already available, while asking for others to be changed and switched into investment goods, equipment, and machinery.

It was previously a matter of state purchases, which were then distributed, the minister continued. Today it can only be a matter of those enterprises that can realistically pay for imports—for equipment, for instance. But no one will give such credit directly to an actual Russian enterprise. This is a fundamentally new element. There are also still several major projects of social, nationwide significance. Additionally, purchases of those kinds of goods that are not made in Russia are possible.

So the forthcoming joint commission session will be a turning point. The former trade and economic relations between our countries are changing, and the Russian state will no longer act as both producer and trader; it will attempt to move Russian firms on to the French market.

Turning to the problem of paying off Russia's external debt, B. Fedorov drew attention to the fact that its exports exceeded imports, and that Russian funds in Western banks belonged to private, independent enterprises, rather than to the state. Russia's positive balance of payments had a beneficial effect on a whole series of financial and economic indicators, but not on the state of the national budget, which covered debt repayments. Those in the West who thought otherwise, linking revenue from foreign trade with opportunities to pay off Russia's foreign debts, were out-of-date in their thinking, imagining that every kopeck from abroad was going into the state's pocket.

Replying to a question about how the end of the GATT Uruguay Round and the liberalization of world trade would affect Russia, the minister said that the normalization of relations with GATT will take several years. However, we should try rightaway to adapt our tariff policy to the new norms. Unfortunately, many see the role of the export-import regime only as an opportunity for additional protection for inefficient production.

B. Fedorov outlined his point of view on Russia's financial and economic policy, the prospects and solutions to the crisis and the political situation. If a different economic policy were being pursued, the Russian economy would be in the state that the Ukrainian economy, for example, was in, he thinks.

Japan Offers Aid in Nuclear Waste Disposal

LD2212211393 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1358 GMT 22 Dec 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vyacheslav Bantin]

[Text] Tokyo, 22 Dec— Overall, the Russian delegation gives a positive assessment of the results of the two-day Russian-Japanese consultations on the problem of preventing Russian discharges of radioactive waste into the sea in the Far East, that ended in Tokyo today. This was stated in an interview to the ITAR-TASS correspondent by Mikhail Kokeyev, head of the Russian delegation, and deputy head of the Directorate of International Scientific and Technical Cooperation of the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry.

He said that at the consultations agreement had been reached in principle that Japan will provide emergency assistance to take measures aimed at averting the need for the Pacific Fleet to carry out new marine discharges of low-level radioactive waste. For this purpose, it is planned, in particular, to provide Russia with a special tanker to store waste. The two tankers that the Pacific Fleet has at its disposal for this purpose are already full. "Some other emergency measures are also possible that Japan intends to take to render us assistance," Mikhail Kokeyev noted. He let it be understood that it was a matter of really emergency measures which could be carried out within "the next few days or weeks." The head of the Russian delegation stressed, that apart from emergency measures, Tokyo will also give Russia assistance in implementing long-term programs intended to avert the discharge by the Russian Navy of low-level radioactive liquid wastes into the waters of the world's oceans.

Mikhail Kokeyev noted that the reaction displayed by Tokyo to the discharge by Russia of low-level waste into the Sea of Japan in mid- October had been constructive. "Japan did not limit itself to expressing concern about this—Tokyo immediately stated that it was ready to give assistance to Moscow in resolving this complicated problem," the high-ranking official of the Russian Foreign Ministry stated.

Foreign Ministry Aide on Dumping

LD2212205593 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1539 GMT 22 Dec 93

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature: by diplomatic correspondents Dmitriy Voskoboynikov, Igor Porshnev, Vitaliy Trubetskoy and others]

[Text] Russia's Foreign Ministry objects to the dumping of radioactive liquids into the Sea of Japan. However, if Pacific Fleet representatives prove that the tankers where these pollutants are stored may be "blasted," there simply may be no other way out.

A senior Russian Foreign Ministry official has told Interfax that much will depend on the outcome of the current meeting between Russian and Japanese experts in Tokyo. "The construction of storages for radioactive pollutants with Japan's help is being discussed there. Meanwhile, the Japanese have come up with an intermediate offer - to pump these wastes over into a new tanker," he said.

However, it is not clear what tanker is at issue. "If a Russian tanker is meant, it will be 'some junk' since we have no new tankers. Perhaps, the Japanese will agree to re-launch one of its giant tankers. But that would hardly solve the problem either: it is necessary to build storages and install facilities to process radioactive liquids, and that costs quite a penny. So, the ball is in Japan's court," he remarked.

Talks With Japan 'Diplomatic Success' for PRC

PM2212152793 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Dec 93 First Edition p 3

[Report by Vladimir Skosyrev: "Beijing Will Not Buy Aircraft Carrier from Moscow"]

[Text] Beijing—China and Japan have held consultations on defense problems in Beijing.

Observers have judged this rapprochement between Beijing and Tokyo in the sensitive area of security as a diplomatic success for the PRC.

First, Tokyo has signaled to Beijing that contacts between the two countries' Armed Forces are being "unfrozen." In other words, Japan, following the U.S. expedition by an assistant secretary of defense to Beijing back in November, is ending its boycott of Chinese military leaders. I must remind you that both powers imposed this boycott in 1989 when the Chinese Army crushed the student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square.

Second, the meeting will help Beijing to dispel fears being expressed in Japan and other Asian states about the growing cooperation between Chinese and Russian generals.

By arranging contacts with Japan, the PRC has showed that it is prepared to cooperate in the military sphere "in all quarters" and not just with Russia. Incidentally, the Chinese diplomats used the negotiations with the Japanese to refute Western press reports about China's intention to buy an aircraft carrier from Russia or Ukraine.

The negotiations also showed movement in Beijing's position on the nuclear program being implemented by Pyongyang. The Chinese diplomats admitted for the first time that they share the world community's worries about the possible development [sozdaniye] of a nuclear bomb in North Korea.

Cuba's Soto Heads Trade Talks Delegation

PM2112114393 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Dec 93 p 3

[ITAR-TASS report: "Cuban Delegation Arrives in Russia for 'Signing of Important Trade Agreements'"]

[Text] Talks with the Russian side could result in "the signing of important trade agreements" at the end of the week, one member of the Cuban Government delegation which has arrived in Moscow has stated. The delegation, which is headed by Council of Ministers Vice President Lionel Soto, includes Foreign Trade Minister Ricardo Cabrisas and Deputy Minister of Basic Industries Jesus Perez Oton.

After the "period of reorganization of economic ties" which followed the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia and Cuba have begun to seek mutually beneficial mechanisms for commodity exchange. For these purposes the two countries' delegations had contacts in Moscow in November last year, which they continued in Havana in May this year and in Moscow again in July.

Credit of $350 Million Granted

PM2312132593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Dec 93 First Edition p 3

[EFIR-DAYDZHEST, Radio Liberty report under "From Our Correspondents and News Agencies" rubric: "Russia Grants Credit to Cuba"]

[Text] Russia has granted Cuba credit of $350 million for the purpose of promoting the development of power generation and completing the construction of mines begun with the USSR's participation. Cuba's economy is in a sorry plight following the breaking off of trade and other relations in connection with the breakup of the USSR.

Komsomolets Nuclear Sub To Be Sealed in Summer

LD2212231293 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1959 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] Corrosion is going at a high rate in the Komsomolets nuclear submarine that sank in the Norwegian Sea, Tengiz Borisov, chairman of the Russian government's Underwater Works Commission, said at a news conference in Moscow Wednesday.

The submarine sank on April 7, 1989. It carried two torpedoes with nuclear warheads and four conventional torpedoes. Komsomolets was the third Soviet submarine that sank as a result of a technical failure.

Borisov said that raising the submarine was out of the question because its titanium hull, torpedo compartment

hatch rods and bodies of the torpedoes, notably carrying nuclear warheads, were damaged.

Even though the nuclear reactor of the submarine was damaged, it was said to be safe with the radiation leak level being about 10 Ci per liter, but the possible disintegration of torpedo nuclear warheads might result in leakage of plutonium and environmental damage.

Borisov said that plans were about to be finalized to seal the torpedo compartment of Komsomolets. The works, he said, will be carried out next summer at a cost of one to two billion rubles. The Russian government was said to have made a decision to appropriate the funds. Once the sealing is done, Borisov said, a program of extracting nuclear warheads from the submarine will have to be devised.

Plans for Modernizing MiG-21's Reported

PM2312091193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Dec 93 First Edition p 3

[Nikolay Paklin report: "Israeli Engineers Put Forward Their Plans for Modernizing MiG's"]

[Text] The first air show in South Asia is taking place at an air force base near Bangalore. Companies from some 21 countries are participating and they intend to grab a piece—preferably as large as possible—of the Indian aviation market. Although people could not see the Su-27 inceptor aircraft in India, the modernized MiG-21 aircraft was the star of the show.

The Indians have been waiting for it for a long time. The old MiG-21's modernization is a matter of the utmost importance to India. Its Air Force has several hundred of these aircraft. However, many of them have sustained significant wear and tear, but the MiG-21 has been withdrawn from our arsenal and Russian plants no longer produce them.

An idea was mooted several years ago that combat aircraft which were still capable of flying should be modernized rather than consigned to the scrap heap. The Indian side requested that the Mikoyan Design Bureau set about the task.

The number 21-93 is now stenciled on the MiG's modernized fuselage. The fighter has a new weapons and guidance system. "Its combat potential has been increased by a factor of three," Rostislav Belyakov, general designer at the Mikoyan Design Bureau, said. Indian specialists only regret that the engine on the modernized MiG has remained the same.

But the Russian plan for modernizing the MiG-21 is not the only one: Israel is emerging as a competitor. Israeli specialists have prepared their plan for the new MiG's modernization. They have already managed to test it out in Romania and claim that its guidance and weapons system is superior to the Russian one.

Indian aircraft building companies are themselves offering technical assistance to countries which have Russian aircraft in their arsenals. These countries include Malaysia, which recently acquired a consignment of Russian MiG-29's. Malaysia has already expressed its readiness to cooperate with India in this sphere.

Political & Media Issues

Filatov Announces Changes to Yeltsin Administration

LD2212203393 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1515 GMT 22 Dec 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Yuriy Sizov and Gennadiy Talalayev]

[Text] Moscow, 22 Dec—Sergey Filatov has announced today that the Russian president's administration which he heads is now undergoing structural changes. "Naturally there will also be some staff reshuffles", he added.

Speaking on questions of improvement of the presidential administration's work, Sergey Filatov noted in particular that the administration nees a strong analytical center which would process new information and single out core problems which require solution.

There will be serious changes in the structures working directly with the Federal Assembly. For example, it seems that one of the administration's departments which is currently involved in working with the territories and deputies will be divided. Apart from that, the Control Directorate's activities should be extended to the regions and the federal bodies "because abuses of power and violations of law and presidential edicts are still taking place."

Since the procuracy and the local authorities do not always deal with such abuses, the Control Directorate should be reinforced.

Filatov describes the problem of training of civil service officials and putting its activities on legal foundations as "the most important question." He believes that the Law on Civil Service will be adopted soon.

Sergey Filatov also reported that a sitting of the organizational committee which will be engaged in preparing the agenda, the standing orders, the draft law on the status of the deputies and provisions for the State Duma factions will take place this Friday. The organizational committee consists of the faction and party leaders and deputies which should be delegated by territories.

According to Sergey Filatov, "there will be no single majority coalition bloc" in the Duma. "We shall have to work with factions very seriously, as parliaments of other countries do, in order to achieve consensus on the draft laws, which are to be discussed, without resolving to confrontation," he said.

Edicts Create, Eliminate Media Organs

Yakolev To Head TV Service

OW2312064793 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel and Orbita Networks in Russian 1945 GMT 22 Dec 93

[From the "Utro" program]

[Text] The president of the Russian Federation has signed an edict on perfecting the state administration in the sphere of mass information. According to the edict, the Russian Ministry of Press and Information and the Russian Federal Information Center will be eliminated by 15 February 1994, the press service of the Russian Federation president reports.

A Russian Federal Service for Television and Radio Broadcasting has been formed as a central organ under federal authority. Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev has been appointed head of the Russian Federal Service for Television and Radio Broadcasting and Valentin Valentinovich Lazutkin has been appointed first deputy head.

According to the edict, a Committee of the Russian Federation for the Press has also been established as a central organ of federal executive power. Boris Sergeyevich Mironov has been appointed its chairman.

Yakovlev Interviewed on New Role

LD2212233693 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1800 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Report by correspondent Mikhail Aleksandridi; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [Aleksandridid] Today's visit to the Ostankino television center by Viktor Chernomyrdin, who acquainted the Council of Directors with the Russian president's latest edicts on television and radio, put an end to the numerous rumors about who would be filling the vacant and in recent years far from happy post of chairman of the television and radio company. Boris Yeltsin has chosen Aleksandr Yakovlev, one of the architects of perestroyka, who will simultaneously head the Russian Federal Service for Television and Radio Broadcasting, which has just been set up.

[Chernomyrdin] Aleksandr Nikolayevich [Yakovlev] is known throughout the country, throughout Russia, as a professionally trained individual in this area, which is in effect ideology and a part of the life of our country in my view. I think that perhaps in this matter our president has been guided by that fact.

[Aleksandridi] Considering the sad experience of your three predecessors, I do not know whether words of congratulation or words of consolation are most needed today. Nevertheless, in what event will you consider your mission accomplished?

[Yakovlev] I think that we have already realized, as it were, that television comprises real power. It is of no importance whether it is regarded as the fourth branch of authority, which it probably is, but it is certainly power. Any power can be destructive or constructive. This power must however be constructive, especially in conditions where Russia is - how should I phrase this, since I am no supporter of all kinds of panic utterances - but where it is nevertheless in a difficult situation, when

Russia is still being shaped as a state and when its policy and economics are being shaped. But, as you see, a certain boundary has been drawn in the constitution between the past and the future. So evidently a new era is being ushered in in the sphere of being aware of and making sense of everything that is occurring. I think that the staff here is capable of doing that.

[Aleksandridi] Valentin Lazutkin will be working in tandem with Aleksandr Yakovlev. He has been appointed by presidential edict as Yakovlev's first deputy. Lazutkin's experience as a professional television man is recognized by friend and foe alike.

Holding Company Created

LD2212234293 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1931 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] Moscow, 22 Dec (ITAR-TASS)—Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin today issued an edict on the formation of a holding company, the Russian State Television and Radio Technical Support Centre Efir [Rossiyskiy Gosudarstvennyy Teleradiotekhnicheskiy Tsentr Efir] and the Russian State Radio Broadcasting Company "Golos Rossii" [The Voice of Russia], the press service of the Russian Federation president reported today.

The Russian Federation Council of Ministers has been instructed to establish the holding company "Efir" as a joint-stock company, whose company capital should include shares of the joint-stock companies being formed on the basis of state-owned enterprises providing technical support for the Russian state TV and radio companies.

The managing bodies of the "Efir" company are being formed, with the Russian Federation Government representatives included in its board of directors. It has been decreed that at the time of the foundation of the "Efir" holding company, the first deputy head of Russia's Federal Service for Television and Radio Broadcasting should become the chairman of the company's first board of directors, as part of his responsibilities in this post.

The employees of the state enterprises being converted by this decree into joint-stock companies, and other individuals of an equal status, should receive shares of the "Efir" holding company in the privatization process, in accordance with the type of concessions they are entitled to and with the proportion of shares invested by the given enterprise in the holding company. The company's shares that are left over after the work collectives have received their concessions are to remain federal property for three years.

The Russian Federation president's press service release says that the state radio broadcasting company "Golos Rossii" is being set up for broadcasting to foreign countries. It is being formed on the basis of the association "Moscow Radio International" of the "Ostankino" TV and Radio Company.

Eighth Frequency Channel To Debut

LD2312000193 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 2025 GMT 22 Dec 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, 22 Dec—Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin signed an edict today on the use of the eighth frequency channel of Moscow television and its network.

Under the edict, the NTV television company will begin experimental broadcasts on the eighth frequency channel of Moscow television in 1994. The Russian Federation Government has been instructed to consider the participation of the state as one of the founding members of the NTV television company. The Russian Federation Communications Ministry will guarantee the broadcasts of the programs of the NTV television company on the eighth frequency channel of Moscow television, and the preservation of its network and the terms of its broadcasting.

The Russian Federal Service for Television and Radio Broadcasting and the Russian Federation Communications Ministry are within a month to consider the terms of issuing the NTV television company with licences for broadcasting and for communications operations in the field of television broadcasting, and to take a decision regarding the handing over of the eighth frequency channel of Moscow television and its network to the NTV television company (from 1800 [1500 GMT] to the end of the day's programs, with a total of 58 broadcasting hours a week).

An agreement between the National Sport Foundation and the NTV television company to allocate up to two hours a day to publicize sport and physical exercise is being taken into account. The decision should be made regarding the allocation of the morning and afternoon broadcasting hours (before 1800 daily) on the eighth frequency channel of Moscow television to broadcast programs of the "Russian Universities" television channel, and also to show specialized programs on the problems of entrepreneurship, land reform, privatization, conversion, tax system, banking, and insurance activities. This was announced today by the Russian Federation president's press service.

ITAR Named Successor to TASS

LD2212201093 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1812 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] Moscow, 22 Dec (ITAR-TASS)—Today the Russian Federation president signed an edict "On the INFORMATION TELEGRAPH AGENCY OF RUSSIA" [ITAR].

The document rules that ITAR is a successor to the former TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY OF THE SOVIET

UNION [TASS]. The Council of Ministers, the government of the Russian Federation should approve the ITAR charter as a central state information agency in the form of a state enterprise.

Ministries, state committees, and departments of the Russian Federation have been given a priority instruction to send to the agency official documents and materials to be circulated in the mass information media.

Yeltsin Said Setting Up 'Own Security Service'

PM2312115993 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 23 Dec 93 p 1

[Vladimir Zaynetdinov commentary: "KGB: Sunk, Busted, Up the Spout"]

[Text] Celebrating its 76th anniversary, the security services department toasted to long life. Or rather, it was commanded to live long. In the afternoon of 22 December, the Russian Federation president signed an edict abolishing the Russian Federation Ministry of Security and creating the Federal Counterintelligence Service [FCS].

"The system of Cheka-OGPU-NKVD-MGB-KGB-Ministry of Security organs has proved to be unreformable...and is a restraining factor on the implementation of political and economic reforms..." This is the main charge leveled at the Russian state security service.

But is the Ministry of Security alone to blame for this? While reproaching the Ministry of Security for lacking a concept of state security, the powers that be have, incidentally, not troubled themselves especially to give it such a concept.

The political surveillance [sysk] system has been mothballed, but not abolished—this is a serious charge leveled at the state security department. But must it be renounced altogether, as the ardent supporters of the destruction of the Ministry of Security have advocated? In any country, even the most democratic, such a measure exists to defend the state from encroachment on its constitutional structure. But there are also laws putting the political surveillance system within a framework. In our country we have had neither the one nor the other for just over two years now. On the other hand, we have had the events of February, May, and October of this year. There have been casualties of the political struggle.

This is what is worrying. It is doubtful that the "unreformability of the state security system" was the only cause of the Ministry of Security's abolition. It is obvious that, by setting up the FCS with direct subordination to the head of state, the president has taken charge of virtually all Russia's special services (the security minister was a member of government and formally subordinate to the premier). Everything is under the president's exclusive control. The president does not even trust his own "guard"—the president's Main Security Administration—and is setting up his own security service. The regroupment of forces in the most significant institutions of state power is being completed—a reaction to the loss of associates in the elections?

Further Reaction to Abolition of Ministry Noted

Security Officers Comment

MK2312105093 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 23 Dec 93 p 1

[Aleksandr Kudakayev report in the "Special Services" column: "The Security Ministry 'Has No Basis for Explanations.' Security Officers React to the President's Edict"]

[Text] The first reaction by employees of the former Security Ministry to the presidential edict on its abolition has been bewilderment. As a result of meetings with subdivision chiefs, the leadership of the former ministry had to state that it "has no basis for explaining the president's edict." Even senior officers learned about their new status from news reports. Very many questions are being raised by paragraph 6 of the edict (the ministry employees are deemed as provisionally employed pending certification). The leadership of the 7th Chief Directorate (foreign surveillance service) has announced that as of now all its employees are not on its staff. The key question is what kind of certification this will be: Intra-departmental (whereby old scores may be settled) or extra-departmental (which does not take the specifics of the special service into account). In any event, nothing good is expected to come from the purge. True, officers are somewhat optimistic over the fact that the preparation of regulations on the federal counterintelligence service has been entrusted to Nikolay Golushko—that is to say, to the former Security Ministry itself.

As for the statement about political surveillance being stopped, people in the Security Ministry say that this is inseparable from the very existence of the state. In the context of political instability and the strengthening of extremist-minded groupings, the fight against terrorism, illegal armed formations, and organized crime is inconceivable without covert surveillance, interception of correspondence, the planting of agents, and so forth. All these actions, including surveillance by secret agents of organizations, groupings, and persons potentially dangerous to the state is considered normal for any state, employees of the "dismissed" ministry think. Therefore, nearly all Security Ministry officers say that the president's statement about stopping these actions in Russia are of a purely rhetorical nature. In all likelihood, all such services will be preserved and, possibly, reinforced.

Yet everyone agrees that the edict will not add to the president's popularity among state security officers.

Lobov Notes Yeltsin Action

LD2212205993 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1756 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] The abolishment of the Russian Security Ministry has been initiated by the Russian president himself, the Security Council's Secretary Oleg Lobov said in an interview with Interfax on Wednesday. He considers this move by the president "to be natural on the way to establishment of a democratic society and the state of law."

However, Lobov believes it impossible that all the structures of the former security ministry be dismissed at once and their functions not be transferred to anyone. He said that this was prevented by the presidential decree which demanded all the employees of the abolished ministry to remain in their places until a special order.

On the perspectives of the reorganization of the Russian special services, Lobov pointed out the necessity for paying primary attention to defense of the country's economic secrets: "The service for this must be strengthened and its structures must be made more efficient."

According to Lobov, the situation is more difficult with the abolished ministry's territorial departments. It has not been clarified, as yet, who will perform the functions on defense of the state interests at the regional level. The issue on departure abroad of Russians possessing state secrets also seems complex. Earlier, in his words, the security ministry had been deciding who could leave the country and who could not. "This problem cannot be ignored. However, it must be settled strictly on a juridical base," Lobov emphasized.

He did not exclude the possibility that the interdepartment commissions under the Security Council might assume a number of the former security ministry's functions.

Abolition of Ministry Assessed

PM2212173193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Dec 93 First Edition p 1

[Article by Igor Andreyev and Sergey Taranov: "Cheka, OGPU, NKVD, MGB, KGB, MS, FCS.... Lubyanka Ordered To Change"]

[Text] IZVESTIYA recently published Yevgeniy Albats' study, " 'The Lubyanka': Will There Be An End To It?" (Nos. 232-234). Now, it seems, this question can be answered in the affirmative: On 21 December President Boris Yeltsin signed an edict on the abolition of the Russian Federation Ministry of Security and the creation of the Federal Counterintelligence Service [FCS].

The text of the edict, in which unprecedentedly harsh assessments of the Ministry of Security's activity are expressed almost in journalistic form, affords interest.

"The system of Cheka-OGPU-NKVD-MGB-KGB-Ministry of Security organs has proved to be unreformable," the president's document stresses. It goes on to say: "Attempts at reorganization undertaken in recent years have had a largely cosmetic character."

Thus the Russian president puts in the same category both the current Ministry of Security and the Leninist-Stalinist Cheka, OGPU, and NKVD—that is to say, he admits what the latter-day "Chekists" have tried to disavow over the last two-and-a-half years, but were unable to because of the obvious continuity with their predecessors of unhappy memory. They were unable to do so because the structure, thrust, and status of the "organs" and the professional orientation of its officers remained unchanged. "As of the present time, a strategic concept for safeguarding the Russian Federation's security is lacking," the edict says. "Counterintelligence work has been weakened. The system of political investigation has been mothballed and can easily be recreated."

The last circumstance "holds up the implementation of political and economic reforms; moreover, the inefficient system of safeguarding security is "burdensome for the state budget."

The reference to the budget deficit gives society the chance to seriously ponder the question: What proportion of national income goes on maintaining the Ministry of Security? Who forms the "organs'" budget, and how? And why is this a secret?

Meanwhile it is clear that the Ministry of Security really has been abolished. In its place the Federal Counterintelligence Service [FCS] is being set up, headed by a director with the rank of minister and subordinate directly to the country's president.

A man from one of the previous "organs" has been appointed FCS leader—former Security Minister Nikolay Golushko. He has been instructed to elaborate and present for confirmation by the president within two weeks a new statute on the counterintelligence service.

The edict abolishing the Ministry of Security was entirely unexpected. Even within the Ministry of Security there is no uniform understanding of what the "organs" should be. Thus in an interview with IZVESTIYA (2 November) Yevgeniy Savostyanov, chief of the Ministry of Security Directorate for Moscow and Moscow Oblast, said: "...In my view it is society that should decide: Does it need a Ministry of Security, in what form, and for what purpose? The president has stated that the security organs system should be reformed, but he has not said in what direction."

Now it becomes apparent that it is not "society" in the abstract, but former head of the Ministry of Security Nikolay Golushko who is to elaborate the tasks, functions, and structure of the new special services.

However, the paradox may be purely formal. Everyone remembers Vadim Bakatin's unsuccessful attempts to

reform the Union KGB. It was probably decided in the Kremlin that only a "civilian" is capable of getting to grips with the affairs of the vast KGB-Ministry of Security empire, that state-within-a-state.

As for the Security Ministry's thousands of officers and employees, their future is in question. Under the president's edict they are classed as "temporarily performing service in the Federal Counterintelligence Service...until they receive the testimonials necessary for registration as FCS personnel."

Nikolay Golushko and his deputies may be able to provide some clarity. But on the first day of the operation of the president's edict (it came into force from the moment it was signed) the FCS' leaders held a conference in their cabinet in the Lubyanka—and there was simply no one for the press to contact.

Among the senior officers of the abolished Ministry of Security whom the editors did manage to contact 22 December was Aleksey Kondaurov, chief of the Public Relations Center. It would appear—this is our assumption—that he had not expected this turn of events, and he could add very little to the text of the president's edict. He said only that the department would set up a commission to elaborate a statute on the federal service within two weeks. There is no panic in the ranks, in his words; everyone is fulfilling their usual functions. As for the attestation of officers, the criteria for which are unknown to Kondaurov, this, as he put it, holds no terrors for professionals.

Commentary on Dismantling Process

LD2212173793 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1100 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Commentary by Igor Ambrosomov on abolition of the Russian Federation Ministry of Security]

[Text] As you know, Boris Yeltsin issued an edict yesterday abolishing the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation and creating a federal counter-intelligence service. The preamble of the edict contains criticism of the ministry's activities. The Ministry of Security itself is in effect categorized with such bodies as the VChK, OGPU, and NKVD [intelligence bodies of Soviet era], and this system is described as unreformable. And so, as of yesterday the Ministry of Security ceased to exist. Igor Ambrosov comments on this event.

[Ambrosov] Sources in the abolished Ministry of Security told me that the presidential edict abolishing their department and creating a federal counterintelligence service was unexpected for employees of the ministry at all levels, except, perhaps, the top leadership. On the evening of 21 December the abolition of the ministry became known, and from the morning of 22 December workplace meetings started being held at the abolished ministry, at which it is being noted that there is still a lack of clarity in many questions concerning the creation of counterintelligence as a new state department, and also that employees must keep calm.

But it wasn't absolutely necessary to hold workplace meetings to establish the lack of clarity. It's enough carefully to read the text of the edict. Paragraph five of the edict directly instructs the former Minister of Security and present director of the federal counterintelligence service Nikolay Golushko within two weeks to draw up and submit for the approval of the president of the Russian Federation a statute on the federal counterintelligence service. It is thereby acknowledged that as yet there is no detailed idea of what the new department is actually going to do.

Counterintelligence has always been and still is understood as a struggle against the activities of foreign intelligence on the territory of a given state. If the new department is going to deal in practice with what it is supposed to deal with in theory, then the structures of the Security Ministry will have to be subjected to very sharp cuts.

Of course, in counterintelligence the border troops have nothing to do - clearly they will again become a totally independent department. Equally evidently, the structures dealing with the fight against organized crime, corruption, the drugs trade, defending the constitutional system, analytical work on this whole range of issues, and one or two other things, will have to go.

In asking to whom all these functions will pass - which are quite natural functions for any state - experts in the abolished Security Ministry recall another recent presidential edict creating a fundamentally new special service -the service for the protection of the president of the Russian Federation. The statute on this special service are also still at the stage of being drawn up, and moreover, there is sufficient convincing evidence that the service for the protection of the president, apart from the function of ensuring the purely physical protection of the head of state, could quite possibly take on the function of protecting the system of presidential power. And here it may well need one or two things which previously belonged to the Security Ministry.

Let's draw some preliminary conclusions - preliminary, because until statutes on the new special services are drawn up, it's too early to draw any final conclusions. And so, the edict abolishing the Security Ministry completes a process of dismantling the system of security of the former USSR. Instead of one monster department, there now exist about half a dozen independent departments with not quite defined functions, well, and the Security Council, the functions of which are also constantly being specified, one moment being contracted, then being expanded.

Clearly, the coming few months will be devoted to coordination of tasks between these departments, and on this basis to elaboration of another version of a master plan for the national security of the Russian Federation.

FIS Spokesman Describes Reforms

LD2212193493 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1734 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] A spokeswoman for Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) said "revolutionary reforms" in the FIS were practically over.

Tatyana Samolis, press secretary to the FIS director, said in an interview with Interfax that the service, which ceased to be part of the KGB structure on December 18, 1991, had abandoned its former "globalism."

"Today our intelligence works only in those fields where it has real, not sham interests," Samolis said.

She said the staff based in Russia had as a result been cut by 40 percent, the staff working abroad had been halved and about 30 foreign branches had been closed down. Some of the FIS divisions had been abolished, she said.

"But although the world has changed after the Cold War ended, it hasn't unfortunately become any more secure," the press secretary said. She said the FIS's work in some areas had become unnecessary but new fields had appeared. "For example, a department has been set up within the FIS which traces the spread of mass destruction weapons. Another new department is in charge of our interaction with the security services of Western countries," Samolis said.

She said the FIS was not pursuing any activities against other CIS states. But the service did collect intelligence about former Soviet republics, although it had no spy network in any of them, obtaining information from open sources and third countries, Samolis said.

She said the FIS's secession from the KGB and its political neutrality had "to some extent enabled it to survive, for it is impossible to settle any political accounts now." "FIS officers cannot be members of any political parties. This, of course, cannot stop them from having political views or sympathizing with some movements," Samolis said.

Continuing Need for Intelligence Highlighted

PM2212144593 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Dec 93 p 3

[Vadim Kirpichenko article: "Why We Need Intelligence"—first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text]**From KRASNAYA ZVEZDA**Files

Vadim Alekseyevich Kirpichenko was born in 1922. He participated in the Great Patriotic War. He began his intelligence career in 1952 after graduating from the Oriental Studies Institute. From 1974 through 1979 he headed Directorate S—illegals. Then he was for 12 years first deputy chief of the former USSR KGB's First Main Directorate (foreign intelligence). Since 1991 he has been leader of the group of consultants under the director of the Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service [FIS].

Vadim Alekseyevich is the author of the book *From an Intelligence Officer's Archives* [Iz arkhiva razvedchika].

In modern society there are quite a lot of organizations engaged in the collection of information. Journalists do this and commercial structures, political parties, scientific institutions, etc. are engaged in this. The intelligence service differs from all these in that it works only for its country's leadership and obtains secret information of foreign origin.

We are deeply convinced that in the postconfrontational world the intelligence service must be an instrument for securing stability. It makes it possible to remove the unpredictability as regards various countries' political courses. It helps its country's leaders work out an optimal course which takes account of other states' legal interests. If the intelligence service reaches a conclusion about the unpredictability of a particular leader this is also an important result of its activity, because it obliges its country's political leadership to act according to the worst-case scenario.

The intelligence service must be the first to detect the signs of brewing conflict and crisis situations. Often it can serve as a confidential channel to settle conflicts. Finally, the intelligence service uses its special resources to ensure unofficial monitoring of the observance of treaties and sees to it that partners do not harm its country by their intentional or unintentional actions, and that they cannot acquire some new capacity unbeknown to others and make a technological breakthrough which upsets the balance of forces and thereby destabilizes the situation.

Maybe the most substantial changes, although they are less noticeable to the general public, in the Russian intelligence service's activity of late have occurred in its doctrinal tenets. I am referring primarily to the classification of an enemy as an object of intelligence activity.

Historically it so happened that the foreign intelligence service in the Soviet period was always an instrument of ideological struggle in the international arena. In the immediate postrevolutionary years its enemies were naturally foreign anti-Soviet formations whose core consisted of White emigres. They were later augmented by anti-Stalinist opposition of a social democratic and Trotskyist persuasion.

The establishment of a fascist regime in Germany and the growth of Japan's aggressive aspirations in the Far East created a new and quite real threat to our state's very existence. Hence in the thirties a new and powerful enemy of Soviet foreign intelligence quite naturally emerged in the form of fascist Germany and those who supported it or could support it in the future.

The anti-Hitlerite coalition's victory in World War II unfortunately also meant the end of the coalition itself.

Now is hardly the time for an analysis of the Cold War's primary causes—whether it was the West's fear of the spread of communism into West Europe or the war-ravaged Soviet Union's fear of a new, nuclear threat—but to intelligence services on both sides of the Iron Curtain it meant the appearance of new, threatening enemies.

The situation has now changed radically. Given today's realities we abandoned the previous approach whereby intelligence activity was organized on the basis of a set "gallery" of enemies. Now our national and state interests must be taken as a reference point.

In the open society to which we aspire, with its stated aim of integration into the world community, we can no longer single out certain countries or groups of countries as our enemies. But if someone were to set themselves the goal of violating our country's state sovereignty or encroaching on the principles of world order enshrined in international law to which we adhere, they could naturally become our enemies. As regards conventional intelligence activity, here it is important to stick to a position of professionalism and not get carried away by propaganda. In reserving the right to conduct intelligence and obtain secret information we should not be surprised if others do the same.

The changes in the world that have taken place in recent years have changed not only certain doctrinal tenets of some intelligence services but also those of intelligence itself, as well as relations between them.

It by no means follows from this that all ties and relations which existed between intelligence services until recently have suddenly lost force. Wherever they have been based on genuinely common interests they have been preserved. Divesting these relations of an unwarranted ideological burden has only benefited them. The process of establishing new contacts between intelligence services and the search for points of contact and ways of collaborating is now going on alongside this.

In our opinion the strengthening of the international legal base and the increasing role of international organizations uniting most of the world's countries on a nonbloc basis are creating good preconditions for the formation and development of a world intelligence community. It is unlikely ever to be organized in the form of an Interpol-type organization but what undoubtedly merits approval and support is the special services' desire jointly to combat the threat of the proliferation of mass destruction weapons, international terrorism, the drugs business, the illegal movement of capital, and organized crime. In all these areas Russian intelligence is already collaborating with a whole host of special services, including NATO countries' intelligence services. This collaboration and cooperation will, we hope, continue to be developed.

We proceed from the premise that intelligence in its classical form will exist for a long time to come. The new situation will inevitably set it new tasks. Some of them will require new methods and resources. The "rules of the game" which now guide civilized states' intelligence services will be improved. But an intelligence service's main mission—to obtain secret information in the interests of its own state—will be retained. In this context we regard as Utopian some enthusiasts' proposals on the mutual—between Russia and another specific state—abandonment of intelligence operations. Such an abandonment is possible only on a universal, comprehensive basis. Hypothetically it would mean this: the whole world without intelligence services. But at this stage of historical development this is an unachievable aim. Irrespective of the increase in the degree of trust, intelligence is necessary at the present time.

Until 1991 our foreign intelligence service was part of the KGB, which created the preconditions for its use other than for its immediate purpose. In fall 1991 the FIS was separated as an autonomous organization geared exclusively to operate in the foreign sphere.

In July 1992 for the first time in our country's history the Russian Federation Law "On Foreign Intelligence" was passed, which formulated the principles of conducting intelligence activity, outlined the range of resources and methods to be used, and defined the FIS's place in the system of state organs and the procedure for its mutual relations with other organizations and institutions of the Russian state and society.

What exactly are the FIS' tasks? In a nutshell, the intelligence service is supposed to help guarantee a country's national security and its national and state interests. This way of putting the question reflects a real long-term strategy. That Russia's national interests have so far revealed themselves only in the most general form is another matter.

As a result of the positive changes in the world the threat of a nuclear-missile world war and of a large-scale military conflict has now been reduced practically to a minimum, but the potential military danger has not been completely removed. In addition, there is a likelihood that new types of weapons will be developed. Neither can we discount the possibility that mass destruction weapons could be possessed by those regimes which are pursuing an expansionist policy or which have territorial claims against other states. We cannot fail to observe the localized conflicts along the CIS perimeter into which Russia could be dragged.

In these conditions it is right now still a prime task to obtain information which, given a general reduction in defense expenditure, helps to maintain Russia's defense capability and guarantee its economic security, and to obtain information about achievements in advanced science and technology which could be vitally important to our country.

It is not within the intelligence service's terms of reference to elaborate areas of foreign or domestic policy or make autonomous decisions in relation to what is or is not in the state's national interests. The intelligence

service serves the state's legal, constitutional structures—organs of both the executive and legislative branches.

The principles of collaboration between the intelligence service and nascent private structures and national business representatives are not yet crystal clear to us. At this stage we proceed from the premise that the intelligence service, as a state organization financed by the country's budget, must not render any assistance to private national structures. All information, including that of an economic nature, obtained by the intelligence service must be submitted to the state's executive branch.

Under the Russian Federation Law "On Security" the intelligence service is an integral part of the general system of ensuring Russia's national security, together with the law-enforcement organs. At the same time the law on intelligence clearly defines the framework of FIS organs' powers, outside which it does not have the right to act. Specifically, the intelligence service is not a law-enforcement organ and does not have the powers of such organs. Russia's supreme organs of power have made the intelligence service responsible for the functions of countering international terrorism, the drugs business, and organized crime and monitoring the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, but only in respect of intelligence support for this work. The FIS does not possess any powers regarding the juridical or criminal prosecution of citizens.

Without listing in detail the specific resources and methods used by the intelligence service, it can be said that in the main they are similar to those used by all modern states' special services in their activity. I would just like to specially stress that in Russia the intelligence service is prohibited from using inhumane methods and carrying out actions which prejudice an individual's rights and freedoms.

What is extremely important to us as intelligence officers is a clear exposition of the question of how intelligence activity is managed and how it is controlled. We are convinced that control over intelligence activity on the part of the legislative and executive branches is absolutely essential. Control, naturally exercised without prejudicing security when intelligence operations are being carried out, is supposed to guarantee that the intelligence service is used to secure the country's national interests, to preclude all kinds of abuses by certain officials, and to impart complete legality to our actions, a lack of which we suffered for many years. A correctly incorporated control system also creates feedback between the intelligence service and the executive branch, gives us the opportunity to gear ourselves better to the needs for the intelligence product, and gives representatives of supreme power the opportunity to obtain a fuller and more correct impression of the nature of the intelligence service's activity and its needs.

The Law "On Foreign Intelligence" clearly defines state organs' terms of reference regarding questions of managing the intelligence service.

The law stipulates that the Russian president determines the strategy of intelligence work and exercises control over and coordinates Russian intelligence organs' activity. It is his prerogative to appoint the leaders of FIS organs.

The practice of subordinating the FIS directly to the president has fully justified itself during the last two years.

It is only in this way that an objective presentation of the most important and reliable information to the president can be guaranteed, because when the intelligence service becomes part of other structures or becomes subordinate to any kind of coordinating organs there will inevitably be attempts to "correct" intelligence information. Both our own and world experience testifies to this.

Of course, the objectivity of informational intelligence reports and the intelligence service's successful activity in general are guaranteed by both reliable sources and constant businesslike contacts with other state structures, primarily the Security Ministry, the Defense Ministry and its Main Intelligence Directorate, and the Foreign Ministry.

To a certain extent mutual relations between the intelligence service and the mass media and the public can be put in the same category as questions of control.

The development of democratic processes in Russia has objectively facilitated greater openness and glasnost in the activity of all the country's state institutions, including its foreign intelligence service. A special service has been created within the FIS structure—the Bureau for Public and Mass Media Relations—whose task it is to inform the public about the intelligence service's activities.

As regards publications about intelligence, in our country there is no censorship of publications of any kind. However, if the mass media uses material which leads to the disclosure of information constituting a state secret or which has been declared secret, this entails the publisher's responsibility as prescribed by law. In order to avoid such situations it is envisaged that a publisher will be given the opportunity to send material prepared by him to the appropriate intelligence organs for an expert decision.

Yeltsin Signs Edict on Transfer of Customs Bodies

LD2212223093 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1916 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] Moscow, 22 Dec (ITAR-TASS)—Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin today signed an edict transferring the Russian Federation customs bodies to

the state paramilitary organizations, the press service of the Russian Federation president has announced.

Yeltsin Signs Edict To Improve Arbitration Courts

LD2212172393 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1232 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] On Tuesday President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree on improvement of organization and activity of the country's arbitration courts. The presidential press service reports that the RF supreme arbitration court has been set to prepare its proposals together with the Justice Ministry and presidential commission on legislative proposals for the Federal Assembly.

They are to concentrate their activity on disputes related to businesslike activity, including those with the participation of foreign businessmen, and reformation of the trial procedure minding foreign and domestic practice, including transition to the appeal procedure to revise decisions of the court.

Government Leaders' 22 Dec Activities Reported

PM2312120993 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 23 Dec 93 p 1

[Unattributed feature "Executive Branch: Monitoring"]

[Excerpt]

Working Day of Council of Ministers

—Russian Government Head Viktor Chernomyrdin was busy during the day preparing for the session of the Council of Heads of Government of CIS Member States in Ashgabat.

—First Vice Premier Oleg Soskovets held a conference at which the problems of Baykonur cosmodrome were examined.

—First Vice Premier Vladimir Shumeyko held a "round-table" for Russian and foreign journalists. During the afternoon, Vladimir Shumeyko had talks with a Cuban delegation.

—First Vice Premier Yegor Gaydar met with Yaroslavl Oblast Administration Head A. Lisitsin.

—Vice Premier Boris Fedorov was in France.

—Vice Premier Sergey Shakhray participated in a Security Council Interdepartmental Commission session.

—Apart from holding working conferences in preparation for the session of the Council of Heads of Government of CIS Member States in Ashgabat, Vice Premier Aleksandr Shokhin also had talks this day with a Ukrainian Government delegation. Ukrainian Prime Minister Yu. Zvyahilskyy led this delegation.

—During the morning, Vice Premier Anatoliy Chubays participated in a working conference chaired by Government Head Viktor Chernomyrdin. During the evening Anatoliy Chubays met with leaders of a number of enterprises with whom problems of privatization were discussed.

—In the morning, Vice Premier Yuriy Yarov held a conference devoted to the development of a program of coordinated Russian Government actions to strengthen social policies. During the afternoon, Yuriy Yarov held a session of the government commission on questions of the state of the environment and exploiting natural resources.

Council of Ministers Presidium

Questions of the development of small business in Russia have been included in the preliminary agenda for the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government Presidium session scheduled for 23 December.

Agreements

A protocol on cooperation between Russia and Ukraine in the coal industry has been signed in Moscow by Vice Premiers Aleksandr Shokhin and Valentyn Landyk.

Decision in Preparation

A draft State Program for the Social and Economic Development of the Regions of the Far North and Equivalent Localities will be submitted for government scrutiny by mid-January. It will in particular mention the necessity to "make adjustments to the structure of industrial development in the North." [passage omitted]

Shumeyko Willing To Be Federation Council Speaker

LD2212104893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1011 GMT 22 Dec 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Oleg Velichko]

[Text] Moscow December 22 TASS—"I will not object if the president of Russia suggests my candidature to the post of speaker of the Council of the Federation," first vice-chairman of the Russian Council of Ministers Vladimir Shumeyko told journalists here today.

He believes that "members of the upper chamber will be perfectly able, from the professional point of view, to assess laws that will be adopted by the State Duma." The first vice-premier referred to the results of the elections to the Council of the Federation in order to corroborate his statement. He said that 67 per cent of the seats in the upper chamber would be held by people vested with real powers, and 20 per cent—by people directly linked with production.

Shumeyko told journalists that the Ministry for the Press had drawn up six draft decrees to reform the mass

media, which would be submitted to the president for approval. He said that these documents envisaged the establishment of a mass media department under the presidential administration. "Moreover," Shumeyko noted, "two independent federal structures are to be set up. "A federal television and radio broadcasting service (to be headed by Aleksandr Yakovlev, chairman of the Commission for Rehabilitating Victims of Political Repressions under the President of the Russian Federation), which will unite the television and radio broadcasting systems both at federal and regional levels, and also a committee for the press (to be headed by Boris Mironov, director of the "Rossiya" publishing house), which will deal with periodicals, publishing houses, and state inspection. As to the ITAR-TASS and "Novosti" news agencies, they will be state-run and equal.

Asked by ITAR-TASS about the probable composition of the Cabinet of Ministers, Shumeyko said that it should not be a coalition government, but a professional body. "The trail-blazing period of reforms is over," he stated. "Lawmakers must know what they are expected to do, and the government—how it is to be done."

"The government," Shumeyko noted, "is already prepared to submit a draft budget for the next year to the first session of the parliament.

As to the recent resignations of some top officials, the vice- premier said that they were "being prepared over the past six months and were essentially a decided matter."

Chairman of Legislative Commission Interviewed

PM2212113793 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 22 Dec 93 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Mikhail Mityukov, chairman of the Russian Federation president's Legislative Proposals Commission, by Yevgeniy Skukin; date and place of interview not given: "Mikhail Mityukov: We Would Not Like To Look Importunate"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] Even before the elections to the Federal Assembly, whose results have put many people in shock, Mikhail Mityukov, chairman of the Russian Federation president's Legislative Proposals Commission, stated that seven commissions were being created to prepare a session of the State Duma and a sitting of the Federation Council. In a talk with our correspondent he described this difficult work.

[Mityukov] The electoral associations themselves are taking part in the creation of the commissions and they are being helped by the Federal Assembly administration and the Legislative Proposals Commission. Each faction will allocate its own representatives to take part in the work in the commissions.

[Skukin] How are the duties assigned?

[Mityukov] Our committee [as published] is responsible for legal backup and the provision of the documents necessary for the work of the commissions and later of the future Federal Assembly. The organization and technical backup has been taken on by the Federal Assembly administration and in part by the president's administration of affairs. Before the Federal Assembly opens we must prepare drafts of the standing orders of the two chambers, the law on deputies' status, the law on committees and commissions, and acts on the apparatuses of the State Duma and Federation Council.

[Skukin] All this is obviously of extreme importance but how correct is your aid to deputies from the viewpoint of the law and ethics?

[Mityukov] Throughout the world it is customary for parliament itself to prepare all acts concerning its work. And in no way do we want to look like pushy parliamentarians. That is why our aid is exclusively legal and juridical. For one purpose—to ensure that parliament does not mark time from its first steps but can immediately join in lawmaking activity. We shall present all our work to parliament's preparation organs. And whether they accept or reject documents is their business. Obviously the leaders of electoral associations must reach agreement among themselves and create their own coordinating organ. And an address by the president could, for instance, be the impetus toward this.

[Skukin] As former members of the former Supreme Soviet what are the errors against which you would like to warn new parliamentarians? In other words, what anti-Soviet provisions have you included in the drafts of the normative documents?

[Mityukov] In our style of work we would like to avoid wasting time, the so-called veche meetings obsession. Second, we would like to avoid parliament's transformation into a departmental organ lobbying for someone's interests. Finally, we would like to avoid parallel actions by organs of the Federal Assembly. To this end we have suggested a limited number of committees including a sufficient number of members.

[Skukin] The working commission's face is the prestige of its curator. Who are your colleagues?

[Mityukov] All the curators are authoritative specialists and politicians. I only have to name my deputies: Viktor Sheynis—the commission for the agenda and working organs; Igor Bezrukov—the commission for standing orders; and Boris Zolotukhin—the commission for the formation of factions. I myself am in charge of problems connected with State Duma committees.

Judge Views Future of Constitutional Court

MK2212143093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 22 Dec 93 p 2

[Anna Ostapchuk report under the "Law" rubric containing interview with Constitutional Court Judge

Viktor Luchin: "Constitutional Court May Hold Meetings. Will Zorkin and Luchin Go?"]

[Text] The constitution has been adopted. In Nikolay Vitruk's view, if the Constitutional Court resumes work, it will first of all consider individual lawsuits on the protection of citizens' rights and freedoms. "At the same time, if a petition is filed with the Constitutional Court requesting that an enforceable enactment be checked as to its compliance with the requirements of the new Constitution, we may consider this request," the acting Constitutional Court chairman noted.

Nikolay Vitruk said also that literally one of these days the Constitutional Court planned to consider the question of "terminating the suspension of powers of Constitutional Court judges Viktor Luchin and Valeriy Zorkin, and the possibility of their attending Constitutional Court meetings."

This is what Viktor Luchin, an out-of-favor judge, said:

[Luchin] No one has ever stripped me of my powers. Suspension is a temporary thing, to say nothing of the fact that this decision was made with the most flagrant violations of the law. So I do not consider myself as having been dismissed from my job.

In the current situation, in my view, we should proceed from two considerations. The people's will has consecrated the constitution. But when deciding on his future, a judge ought to remain sincere and honest. He has the right to stay on only provided that in his heart he is willing to preserve and protect the new constitution. If he does not accept the constitution, however, his further staying on the Constitutional Court must be ruled out.

[Ostapchuk] If you quit, however, another option will evidently be employed—the old court will be definitively discredited and dissolved. And a new one will subsequently be appointed at the president's recommendation?

[Luchin] I agree. The restriction of our powers looks as if it were part of a planned action. I would be happy if anyone could make me change my mind. Indeed, imagine what public opinion is thinking about us: These people, who are unable to straighten out their personal relations, let alone official ones —how will they cope with matters of state importance?

I believe that the president has given us a chance to make amends, to hear each other by arranging a two-month break for us. We could have used this time for contemplation in order to analyze our achievements and mistakes. We could have imposed a moratorium on public statements and criticism, and discussed our problems in our own circle as behooves educated people. Nikolay Vasilyevich Vitruk has made this attempt once. On 30 November he suggested at the end of the meeting: Let us meet tomorrow to mull over our disagreements. On the next day, however, it was as if someone called him to order—at 1100 they raised the question of suspending Zorkin's and my powers... Personally, I can say that I have done my utmost so as to prompt Zorkin and Vitruk—they are both gifted people, outstanding professionals—to take steps toward each other.

[Ostapchuk] But your opponents at the Constitutional Court also propose what appears to be a compromise option: all judges resign together.

[Luchin] When five judges propose that the entire court resign they are being cunning, because in the back of their minds they hope that the president will nominate them to sit on the Constitutional Court again. It is as if they were suggesting that all bale out when five people have parachutes and the others do not.

Ministry Holds News Conference on Organized Crime

LD2212210393 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1540 GMT 22 Dec 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Roman Zadunayskiy]

[Text] Moscow, 22 Dec—The most difficult thing about the struggle against organized crime is that illicit business is joining up with legal business. We have data on 40,000 enterprises in Russia set up by criminal gangs or taken under their control. This was announced at a briefing at the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation today by Militia Colonel-General Mikhail Yegorov, first deputy minister of internal affairs of Russia.

He pointed out that in the struggle against organized crime two "awkward" trends can now be discerned. The first is the laundering of "dirty" money, obtained from criminal dealings, and also the introduction of forged documents (letters of advice, checks etc) to obtain "funny" money. In Russia there is now about 1,000 billion rubles of this money which is unsecured by anything of material value. About 2,200 criminal cases connected with the laundering and unlawful obtaining of money are now being conducted.

The second trend is the proliferation of firearms among criminals. Thus, the following weapons are missing in Russia as a whole: 213 machine guns, 4,000 pistols, 2,000 submachine guns, and even six rocket launchers. The general named the "hot spots" for regional administrations in fighting organized crime as being Moscow, St. Petersburg, Maritime Kray, Yekaterinburg, Saratov, and Dagestan. This year alone, M. Yegorov said, 19 "professional thieves" have been detained and valuables worth 14 billion rubles have been confiscated.

Gen. Yegorov said the internal affairs bodies of the Russian Federation are ready on a paid basis to mount guard over banks, firms, and ultimately individuals. The militia would be able to react to alarm signals from traders and bankers within minutes. "It is important for traders and bankers to realize that in the event of finding themselves under pressure they should immediately

apply to the law enforcement bodies and not keep silent and then the militia will be able to help them," the general stressed.

Concerning the legislative backing for the fight against organized crime, he noted that a bill on fighting this type of crime should be ready by February next year. Then it will be up to parliament. Mikhail Yegorov also noted that from 1 January, 1994 in Moscow the Bureau for Combating Organized Crime will start with the participation of CIS law enforcement bodies.

Government Papers Fare Well in Subscription Drive

PM2112152593 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 21 Dec 93 First Edition p 1

[Ruslan Ignatyev report under "Topic of Day" rubric: "More Than 1 Million —This Is How Many Subscribers ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA Has in 1994"]

[Text] The preliminary results of the subscription campaign for the first half of 1994 have been announced.

This time around subscriptions to newspapers and magazines have been proceeding with greater difficulties than ever before. Publications have lost readers not only because of high tariffs but also because of general disorganization and muddle on the part both of mail workers and of publishing houses. Some newspapers have been closed down for ideological reasons, and publication of others has been suspended owing to financial collapse. ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA found itself among these publications. Moreover, at the very height of the subscription campaign local communications administrations were given instructions from above to stop the subscription to our newspaper.

In order to do something to help our poorer readers—pensioners, invalids, teachers—ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA announced a preferential subscription. Unfortunately, there were blunders even here. A preferential subscription for ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI instead of our newspaper was drawn up.

Yesterday we obtained from competent sources the preliminary results of the subscription for the first half of 1994. We wholeheartedly congratulate our colleagues at ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI! They have increased the number of subscribers. There are now more than 500,000 of them.

Despite all the obstacles (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA was not printed for two months and 10 days), our newspaper has garnered more than 1 million subscribers against 600,000 in 1993.

For comparison, we give preliminary information on certain publications. Thus, the popular weekly ARGUMENTY I FAKTY has garnered more than 4 million subscribers, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA has a daily circulation of 840,000 and IZVESTIYA approximately half a million, approximately 1,274,000,000 people have subscribed to TRUD and 850,000 to SELSKAYA ZHIZN, PRAVDA has gathered just over 200,000 admirers, RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 70,000, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA more than 30,000, SEMYA approximately 60,000, and OBSHCHAYA GAZETA almost 13,000.

ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA asked Vladimir Shelekhov, deputy general director of the Federal Administration of Mail Communications under the Russian Federation Ministry of Communications, to comment on the results of the subscription campaign for the first half of 1994.

"From the viewpoint of subscriptions this has been a distinctive year. Above all, the timing of the subscription campaign was decided by the Federal Mail Communications regional administrations themselves. They did this based on their own potential and depending on the receipt of orders. A special feature of this subscription was that the demand for local publications increased.

"According to the preliminary results, it is possible to say that such popular publications as ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, TRUD, ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, SELSKAYA ZHIZN, IZVESTIYA, and ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI maintained the number of subscribers on the whole, while the Council of Ministers publications greatly exceeded last year's indicators. Naturally, it took them considerable effort to do this. It must be pointed out that subscription has not yet ended, and the final data on the subscription campaign for the first half of 1994 will be processed in the very near future, and we pledge to give you accurate information then."

Military & Space Issues

Grachev, Others Mark Military Counterintelligence Anniversary

PM2112153393 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Dec 93 p 1

[Report by Boris Soldatenko: "The Mysterious 'SMERSH' That Even 'Arrested' James Bond"]

[Text] Russian military counterintelligence has celebrated its 75th anniversary. A ceremony celebrating the anniversary was attended by Army General Pavel Grachev, Russian Federation defense minister; Colonel General Nikolay Golushko, Russian Federation security minister; and Colonel General Anatoliy Kulikov, Russian Federation deputy minister of internal affairs.

As a result of selfless work by counterintelligence agents, around 20 foreign special services' agents have been exposed in the past year alone.

Arms Trade Reorganization Edict Viewed

PM2312113593 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 23 Dec 93 p 2

[Report by Igor Chernyak under general heading: "Harvest of Visiting Cards on Langkawi Island"]

[Text] It looks as though the struggle for the right to sell Russian weapons and the possibility of controlling their sale is entering a new phase. A month ago Boris Yeltsin issued a secret edict no. 1932s according to which a single company—"Rosvooruzheniye"—was created on the basis of the three leading Russian companies specializing in arms exports—"Spetsvneshtekhnika," "Oboroneksport," and the foreign economic organization of the GUSK [expansion unknown]. Essentially the edict was aimed at abolishing the internecine warfare ruling in Russia in the arms trade and at monopolizing military exports. According to calculations by experts from the interdepartmental commission for scientific and technical questions of the defense industry headed by Mikhail Maley, this reorganization will enable Russia to earn up to $10 billion a year from deliveries of arms and military equipment and to regain the arms markets it has lost.

But the president's edict generated an extremely adverse reaction from the leaders of leading enterprises and design bureaus of the Russian military-industrial complex, who recently sent a collective letter to Boris Yeltsin. In the letter the military-industrial complex elite predicts not profits but colossal losses for Russia as a result of this reorganization and suggests that the president suspend his edict. The defense industry leaders' position was also supported by the leaders of a number of structures of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and the league for assisting Russia's defense enterprises. They believe that reorganization will lead to the destruction of the unified infrastructure of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations' foreign economic activity, will jeopardize new contracts, and make it extremely difficult to extract debts from foreign partners, as a result of which collapse will threaten arms exports. Aleksey Shulunov, president of the league for assisting Russia's defense enterprises, considers that the very idea of creating the "Rosvooruzheniye" company is based on considerations of expediency and is generated by the struggle for power in the company's top echelons.

Lieutenant General Vladimir Samoylov, who served for a long time in a modest post in the Defense Ministry Main Cadres Administration, has been appointed leader of the new structure. Samoylov's career took off after he was switched to the committee for preparing and implementing military reform, to Konstantin Kobets, where Dmitriy Yakubovskiy was also working at the time. Soon, in August 1991, he received the title of major general and two months later the title of lieutenant general.

It is notable that Shumeyko—the Russian vice premier and minister of the press and information—was one of the initiators of the president's secret edict on the reorganization of the arms trade. And one more detail: The "Rosvooruzheniye" company will essentially be under the control of the president's security service, led by Aleksandr Korzhakov. It is expected that henceforth either O. Soskovets or, more likely, V. Shumeyko, will be the government's representative in charge of the arms trade.

Official Interviewed on International Arms Trade

OW2312095193 Moscow Russian Television and Dubl Networks in Russian 0106 GMT 28 Nov 93

[Interview with Lieutenant General Anatoliy Grigoriyevich Funtikov, general director of "Voyentekh," the state arms and military equipment sales company, by unidentified correspondent, from the "Aty Baty" program; date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] Anatoliy Grigoriyevich, a lot has been said recently about Russia selling arms. Some say Russia sells too many, others say too few. There have been a number of air shows, all kinds of military exhibitions, and so on; what is Russia's position in the arms market today, and what is being done to ensure this position is strengthened in some way?

[Funtikov] Russia's arms export situation is very acute at present. This concerns the receipt of non-budget money paid to support the state's defense industry and to ensure the social needs of the Ministry of Defense.

When two countries demonstrate weapons of the same type, it is immediately obvious to experts whose weapons are better. This was the purpose, for example, of the exhibition in Abu Dhabi where special weapons were demonstrated on the test range. Interestingly enough, I visited that exhibition and observed the comparative tests and the performance trials, though not the full-scale range testing.

There were two tanks, our own and the U.S. Abrams tank, which is about 15 tonnes heavier for its class. It is quite a powerful tank too, but we were able to compare their respective performances around the tank course located next to the exhibition.

The course included the usual small hills which each tank had to climb quickly, drive over, and then descend to demonstrate its maneuverability and effectiveness. Our tank, due to our intrepid drivers who charged it up the hill and over so quickly, was dubbed the "flying tank." The American tank approached the hill but could not negotiate it immediately. It had to stop, change gears, climb slowly, and descend just as cautiously.

It was obvious not only to the public, but to all the experts, that its characteristics were inferior. The American drivers even tried to speed over the obstacles as dashingly as our Russian fellows. The whole demonstration ended when an American driving an Abrams tank split his head. Although the Americans insisted the shock absorber system in our tank was inferior to that of the

Abrams, it turned out the opposite was true. When we offered the Americans a chance to try our tank, there was nothing but delight among them.

The Ministry of Defense has its own educational centers which teach, its own test ranges where it can test the effectiveness of weapons, its own repair plants, major military contracting directorates which can repair the equipment, it has its own brigades which can assist customers abroad to assimilate the new equipment...

[Correspondent, interrupting] The so-called equipment work-up technicians?

[Funtikov] Yes.

[Correspondent] Anatoliy Grigoriyevich, there is something puzzling here. It would appear that we have everything, the test ranges, the people, and the will. Nevertheless, we do not deliver, we do not promote, and we do not service, why?

[Funtikov] Take spare parts, for instance. We have just had a problem arise in India over spare parts for our aircraft. In our country, it seems, it is not customary to provide spare parts for even standard equipment, such as automobiles. Our industry produces the initial article, but does not manufacture the spare parts. When it does, it makes too few of them. The habit seems to have been passed on to the weapons manufacturers, as in this specific case with India. We have installed good weaponry there, but there is a large deficiency in spare parts. Our system of marketing, our system of weapons exporting... [pauses] I will be quite frank; let us take the French Leclerc tank shown in Abu Dhabi. Prior to that, the French conducted quite lengthy talks with the United Arab Emirates about its sale. There were only four tanks in existence and the trials were not yet completed, but they had already contrived to sell a batch of them. There seems to be a need for us to learn to pay commissions the same as...

[Correspondent, interrupting] To give bribes?

[Funtikov] No, no, these are not bribes [laughing]. These are called commissions, and this is the accepted way the world over. It is a fact, whether we like it or not. I am not calling for such a system, and the whole world really should not do it; nevertheless, that is the way the market works. Sometimes we do not understand how inferior weapons from other countries are sold while we cannot get sales. There is the example of Bush going to Kuwait and pushing through the sale of American weapons. I think that some of our government structures could help in the export of weapons through the corresponding government structures of those countries to whom we sell wish to sell.

Official Views Status of Defense Industry Enterprises

PM2212102993 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Dec 93 p 2

[Report by Aleksandr Yegorov: "Vladimir Salo: We Shall Deal with 'Public' Enterprises by the New Year"]

[Text] To judge by telephone calls to the editorial office and the defense officials' talk in the corridors, the most urgent problem now is the so-called "public" enterprises.

The general directors of plants and scientific research institutes and the leaders of design bureaus, linking the solution of economic problems with the "nonprivatization" of their enterprises, want to see themselves on the list of these enterprises. This list has allegedly already been compiled and approved in the government.

Is that actually the case? If it is, why is the document not published? We asked Vladimir Salo, chief of the Russian Federation Ministry of the Economy's department for the economy of the defense complex and conversion, to comment on this subject.

In our talk with Vladimir Vasilyevich it emerged that the list of "public" enterprises and organizations, that is state enterprises and organizations not subject to privatization, has not yet been approved. There is a list of defense industry establishments which make up the backbone of the military-industrial complex.

It is planned that it will include 350-500 enterprises engaged in developing and producing particularly important arms systems and weapons and also occupying a monopoly position on the market for these types of arms in Russia, enterprises which are narrowly specialized and employed almost entirely (over 80 percent) in military production and with a unique scientific and production base.

But, Vladimir Salo says, the problem today is nonetheless not when the list will be approved. The whole complexity is in the elaboration of what we can call the "rules of the game," the conditions for the normal functioning of state defense complex enterprises in a market economy, discussed in the Russian Federation president's well known edict of 6 November this year.

Indeed, what is the point of an enterprise becoming a "public" enterprise if the mechanism for its economic and financial life support system is working in such a way that skilled cadres are leaving and the output on which huge efforts and funds are spent is either not paid for by the client or else is not profitable?

It is essential to elaborate a mechanism if not better than at least no worse than the market mechanism. We must regulate existing questions connected with the management of state enterprises, the sides' responsibility, the remuneration of labor, price formation, taxation, and so forth.

The Russian Federation president's edict provides for measures for economic incentives to the state defense order. That includes advancing budget appropriations, improving the profitability level for new highly effective and unique output, and increasing expenditure on the wages of workers employed in the fulfillment of state defense orders. Throughout the world defense orders are advantageous because the state primarily guarantees the sale of output. That is how it should be in our country too.

Under these conditions the ministries and departments concerned are preparing proposals for the quarterly indexing of expenditure on defense. In brief, literally everything must be provided for and balanced. That is complicated. But it can and must be done—and as early as this year, to ensure we are not late for the shaping the 1994 budget.

We may not get a smooth document immediately, Vladimir Vasilyevich said in conclusion, but it must be prepared and submitted as soon as possible so that we can begin work. It will be honed in the process of work.

From what he has said one can draw the conclusion that the list of "public" enterprises, like the document defining the features of these enterprises' activity under market economy conditions, is not far off. They could be approved by the New Year. As soon as this happens KRASNAYA ZVEZDA will inform its readers.

Problems in Defense Industry Examined

PM2312092793 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 2100 GMT 20 Dec 93

[Report from Ulyanovsk by Vyacheslav Prunov; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [Prunov] The Buk antiaircraft missile system has no parallel. An enemy aircraft has no chance if it gets within its operational range.

And this is the Tunguska system, another marvel of Russian military hardware. It is capable of destroying any airborne target within an 8-km radius. So far there is nothing to compare with it in the West. According to specialists, in the United States such systems will be built only toward the turn of the century. An enterprise producing this kind of hardware would be flourishing in any country. In any country except ours, that is. The Ulyanovsk Mechanical Plant is on the rocks. The Ministry of Defense order has been fulfilled, yet there is no money. In order to survive, the defense industry enterprise is trying to start up the production of civilian output—stereo amplifiers, communications systems for power lines, and medical sterilizers. However, solid capital investments are needed to develop the civilian sector.

And so there is only one solution: Arms trade abroad. The sale of two systems of this kind, for example, resolves the wage problem for six months. However, it is not that easy to gain a foothold in Asia or Africa. Participation in international fairs also costs money, considerable sums of money. This is the vicious circle in which conversion is caught up. The president's decree on the stabilization of the economic situation of defense industry enterprises and the "Ulyanovsk Conversion" regional program may make it possible to break out of this circle.

Defense Industry Official Sees Edict as 'Victory'

PM2212101793 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Dec 93 p 2

[Interview with Mikhail Maley, chairman of the Security Council's Interdepartmental Commission for Scientific and Technical Questions of the Defense Industry, by Aleksandr Yegorov; place and date not given: "Mikhail Maley: Long Period Marking Time or Start of a Marathon?"]

[Text] The Russian Federation president's Edict "On Stabilizing the Economic Position of Defense Industry Enterprises and Organizations and Measures To Ensure the State Order" came as a surprise to many people. Perhaps that it is why it has been underestimated. People speak of it as Boris Nikolayevich's election present while at the same time advising "defense industry personnel" not to delude themselves over "uninterrupted funding for conversion programs" and other promises.

In actual fact the appearance of the document is the result of complex, persistent work on the part of several departments, including the Russian Security Council's Interdepartmental Commission for Scientific and Technical Questions of the Defense Industry. In some respects it is even a victory in the struggle with the politicians, who see the very existence of the defense complex as a spoke in the wheels of Russian reforms.

Mikhail Maley, who was recently a presidential adviser and is now chairman of the Interdepartmental Commission, comments on the situation.

[Yegorov] Mikhail Dmitriyevich, with the signing of the edict we can probably say that the time has finally come for real reform of the military-industrial complex. Or is this nonetheless a case of "marking time" once again, as with the way in which we are carrying out the state conversion program? Why has a program, conceived with such difficulty just a few months ago (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA wrote about the conversion program 5 June this year) been recalled by presidential edict, as the document says, in order to review its "economic effectiveness"?

[Maley] There should not of course be any doubt that the 14 targeted conversion programs formulated at colossal effort were examined by specialists with regard to economic effectiveness. Professionals from the Russian Federation Committee for the Defense Sectors of Industry [Roskomoboronprom], the Defense Ministry, the Ministry of the Economy, and the Ministry of Finance worked on it. As someone who took part in this work I can say that technical and economic explanatory

documents and business data were submitted, trips were made to the localities, and inspections were carried out. The whole point is that the money to fund the program has only begun to come in since the second half of 1993. And that is equivalent to ruining the whole business. The government alone is to blame for the disruption. There is no justification for it.

Since everything has come to nothing and we have in actual fact accomplished nothing—but it is necessary to escape from this situation—we have the first point of this edict, which speaks about reviewing the programs and providing uninterrupted funding. It was important to make the last point, since the situation developing within the Council of Ministers apparatus, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of the Economy makes it necessary to have every letter of every word approved by presidential edict. If that is not done, it will not be heeded and carried out.

[Yegorov] The Ministry of Finance did not hear of the edict's existence for at least 12 days after it was signed. I was told this by Vice Premier Boris Fedorov's press secretary when I asked for an interview with her boss. I do not consider this a coincidence. The edict does after all demand that conditions be created "for the stable functioning of defense enterprises in the market economy." That is, the preferential provision of credit prohibited by the premier. What if the "defense industry" is nonetheless refused concessions?

[Maley] That won't happen. The government alone will be unable to do that. Why? Primarily because the president has received reliable information and personally adopted the decision. We are dependent on him now. We are not very interested in what Gaydar thinks, for instance—Gaydar who is now on his second attempt.

His "zero" option did not work back then, in 1992. By leaving the defense industry without orders, without the means to exist, he wanted to bring about its natural collapse, divide it up into its component parts, and build a truncated defense complex out of the remains by simply and cheaply converting all that was left. That did not happen. The defense complex, unexpectedly for Yegor Timurovich, applied the rule of reciprocal credit arrangement and survived by using its material reserves.

[Yegorov] But then a great deal of military hardware and arms were produced to no avail. They remained unclaimed.

[Maley] So whose fault is that? Isn't it the government's? Yegor Gaydar alone is personally to blame for the fact that the defense complex withdrew large financial and material assets from circulation in 1992. And he now, incidentally, intends to wind up the Roskomoboronprom and create in its place a small directorate in the Ministry of the Economy. That won't happen. The situation in the country and the economy is totally different today. These experiments are simply impossible, especially since the results of the government's activity in the second half of 1993 indicate that economic problems in defense sectors of industry have worsened to reach critical level.

A continued passive attitude to the needs of the military-industrial complex poses a real danger both to Yeltsin's authority and to the whole state economy. That is why in a few days I am to see the president and I want to ask approval for reform of the military-industrial complex. We are planning a federal experiment in the Udmurt, Mari, and Chuvash republics and Nizhniy Novgorod and Moscow Oblasts—that is, in areas where the defense industry is concentrated. We will develop them so that the military-industrial complex autonomously funds the expenditure section of the territory's social budget. In order to do this we need just one thing—our hands to be untied.

[Yegorov] Whom do you mean by we?

[Maley] Defense enterprises, institutes, information centers, scientific academies, plus, of course, the Interdepartmental Commission as the federal organ attached to the supreme organ of power, which is coordinating all this work. We are working out an economic development program for these regions, along with all the regulations governing the use of minerals, all the expenditure required for medicine, education, soil improvement, replacement of seed varieties, use of waste, and environmental problems. Experiments of this kind are already under way in Udmurtia and Moscow Oblast. But it must be broadened. Just one thing is required of the government in this situation: That it not stand in the way. That it not stand in the way of the defense industry's escaping from the crisis and pulling the rest with it.

[Yegorov] This probably does not mean that the government should not pay attention to your actions. Evidently when you say that "it should not stand in the way" you are implying some kind of concessions. If not concessions, then special conditions for the economic existence of the military-industrial complex, unlike those you have at present. Is the president's approval needed for this?

[Maley] We need military order debts to be paid without fail. Let the Defense Ministry order one tank rather than 500. But we must receive payment in full for that one tank.

Our country has developed the practice of 100-percent prepayment for any services. We also pay 100 percent for everything although we have agreed to accept 20 percent under the edict. But 20 percent of the unconditional funding. Since without this money we are unable to even start development work.

We want to persuade the president to give the go-ahead to gear the entire military-industrial complex to exports. At one time Stalin set every plant the target of having one export workshop. We are not setting any targets although only gas, oil, and timber (which has already gone down the Suwannee) are still exported by Russia.

We need to change the way that the trade in military output is organized. Let the president say in his edict: You cannot sell to Libya and Iraq, for instance. This means that you can sell output everywhere else. Let the president decide in his edict that nuclear bombs and chemical and biological weapons cannot be sold. This means that everything else can be.

There is the view that the military-industrial complex is a noose around the neck of the economy and the Russian people. The "noose" is renouncing budget money altogether and just asking for authorization for export activity on the world markets. And it guarantees that we will supply the Defense Ministry with the best equipment. Equipment that has lost the tender will appear on the world market.

In order to have more dollars we must sell quality goods rather than "obsolete" goods dating back 15 years. We calculate that even in conditions of tough competition, when we have been expelled from all markets, we will be able to earn around 10 billion a year. That is the magic figure that our leaders are trying to get from the West and are paying interest for.

In order to be able to realize our potential through trade and at the same time fully maintain our kindergartens and health service, build housing, etc, enterprises must be allowed to keep 70 percent of the money they earn, and we will give 20 percent of the money earned to administration heads to meet social needs. The treasury also stands to gain since it will receive annually twice as much as it does now—$3 billion.

We are prepared for action and have no intention of waiting around any longer. That is why we have autonomously begun setting up our own structures: the Military-Industrial Complex Business Center, the Military-Industrial Bank, the Russian Military-Industrial Insurance Company, the Military-Industrial Complex Information-Economic Circle....

It is high time that we "screened" all visiting businessmen so as not to waste time on rapscallions trying to grab a slightly bigger piece of the action and then skedaddle. Just like our traveling salesmen who go to the West claiming friendship with the president, whereas in actual fact.... They can do nothing there without a letter of recommendation from the Military-Industrial Complex Business Center.

The Military-Industrial Bank will be the largest bank in the complex. It will comprise the capital of the military-industrial complex, which is now dispersed among eight sectoral commercial banks. I think that we will manage to do this, since we have sound communications enabling us to carry out a system of electronic settlements within the complex in the space of three hours. And the concentration of capital will make it possible not only to earn even more money but also to develop science and the social sphere.

In one of the unfinished 24-story buildings on the corner of Sevastopolskiy Prospekt in Moscow we are going to build the Russian military-industrial complex business center, where we will house all these companies, banks, republic offices, and the offices of our Western partners.

[Yegorov] Your program sounds respectable. But from what you have said, Mikhail Dmitriyevich, its implementation depends on the president alone. What if Boris Nikolayevich does not give the "go-ahead"?

[Maley] We will still work on the program. In conjunction with the trade unions we will take steps to unite all branches of the defense industry—the atomic and space sectors, the Goskomoboronprom, and trade union currents. We have already talked with Belousov, leader of the executive committee of the Association of Trade Unions in the Defense Sectors of Industry. And he agrees.

[Yegorov] The Edict "On Stabilizing the Economic Position..." indicates that Boris Nikolayevich is now on your side.

[Maley] The edict represents a tremendous moral victory for us, although it is not quite what we wanted. We did after all propose that 10-wage packets for defense industry workers and 15 for atomic industry personnel should be tax-exempt. And we proposed an advance of 30 rather than 20 percent. But the president has signed an edict carrying smaller figures. For which we must nonetheless be grateful. Since this means that he does in principle support the efforts toward the self-reform of the military-industrial complex and toward boosting its usefulness to the Russian Federation.

To rephrase a well-known proverb, I would say that what is sauce for the defense industry is sauce for Russia. We will not be a burden to the people. We will pay our own way and also that of those who are unable to earn their own living today. The military-industrial complex is today the only force apart, perhaps, from the oil men that can do something significant for the country.

Molniya Rocket Launched 22 Dec

LD2312115093 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1111 GMT 23 Dec 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, 23 Dec—A Molniya carrier rocket was successfully launched by the Russian Space Forces from launch pad number 43 of the Plesetsk cosmodrome on 22 December at 2337 hours Moscow time, an ITAR-TASS correspondent was told at the Space Forces press center.

This is the 200th launch of the Molniya carrier rocket from the Plesetsk cosmodrome. According to the data of the flight control center, a Molniya-1 space vehicle to relay TV programs and long distance telephone communications was put into a high elliptical orbit with the

apogee of 39,206 kilometers in the northern hemisphere and the perigee of 446 kilometers in the southern hemisphere.

The period of the satellite's revolution round the Earth is 11 hours and 43 minutes and the orbit inclination is 62.8 degrees. It is expected that the satellite will remain active for two years. The space vehicle is controlled by the Main Space Vehicle Control and Test Centre (Golitsyno-2) which is structurally a part of the Space Forces.

The four-stage Molniya rocket is one of Russia's oldest carriers used to launch space vehicles from the Plesetsk and Baykonur cosmodromes. It was developed towards the end of the Fifties on the basis of the R-7 ICBM. The first three stages of the Molniya carrier rocket became the foundation of the Voskhod-Soyuz family.

Economic Issues

Yeltsin Edict Ensures Gas Supplies for 'Gazprom'

PM2212162593 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 22 Dec 93 First Edition p 4

[Edict of the Russian Federation president "On Ensuring Reliable Gas Deliveries for Consumers by the 'Gazprom' Russian Joint-Stock Company in 1994-1996"]

[Text] With a view to ensuring reliable gas deliveries for consumers by the "Gazprom" Russian joint-stock company, the accelerated development of new natural gas deposits, and the consolidation of Russia's export potential and in accordance with points 2 and 3 of the Russian Federation president's edict no. 1598 of 7 October 1993 "on legal regulation in the period of stage-by-stage constitutional reform in the Russian Federation" I decree:

1. That the "Gazprom" Russian joint-stock company (hereinafter referred to as the "Gazprom" RJC) be deemed a state client for deliveries of natural gas for export, including gas for state needs.

2. That the Russian Federation Ministry of the Economy by agreement with the Russian Federation Ministry of Fuel and Power must assign the "Gazprom" RJC a 1994 quota for the export of natural gas to remote foreign parts of 116.8 billion cubic meters, including the use of regional quotas of 4.4 billion cubic meters and 1.3 billion cubic meters of the oil industry enterprises' export quotas. These volumes must be considered when determining the overall quota for the export of natural gas.

The Russian Federation Ministry of the Economy by agreement with the Russian Federation Ministry of Power and Energy must set the "Gazprom" RJC quotas for the export of natural gas to remote foreign parts for 1995-96 in the volumes envisaged by international agreements and contracts and must also assign oil regional quotas and industry enterprises' export quotas.

3. That it be established that of the total volume of natural gas exports to remote foreign parts after the fulfillment of commitments for oil industry enterprises' regional quotas and export quotas established in accordance with point 2 of this edict, the share to meet federal state requirements is 50 percent and the share for the gas industry's needs is 50 percent.

Here the share ensuring federal state needs includes deliveries under state credit agreements, deliveries of gas in payment for transit across the territories of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania for federal state needs, and also through the individual directives of the relevant state organs.

4. That the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations in accordance with points 2 and [figure illegible] of this edict issue licenses to the "Gazeksport" foreign economic enterprise and the "Gazprom" RJC for the delivery of natural gas for export to remote foreign parts using the quotas meeting federal state needs, regional quotas, and quotas of gas and oil industry enterprises.

5. That it be established that export deliveries of natural gas at the expense of federal needs be paid for monthly from the currency profit by the "Gazprom" RJC at prices in rubles for 1,000 cubic meters of gas with a sum equivalent to $30 at the exchange rate of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation for the payment day and that expenses connected with the transport of this gas across the territories of Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova also be paid.

6. That part of the currency profit from the delivery of natural gas to meet federal needs left after payments by the "Gazprom" RJC envisaged by point 5 of this edict be put into the currency account of the Russian Federation Ministry of Finances.

7. That in 1994 a rate be established for customs dues for natural gas supplied by the "Gazprom" RJC for export to remote foreign parts and the CIS and Baltic countries at the rate of 0.5 ECUs for 1 tonne. The Russian Federation Ministry of Finances must submit proposals to the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government on the size of the customs duty for the "Gazprom" RJC for 1995-96.

8. That the "Gazprom" RJC be exempted from the payment of import duty for equipment, materials, and other commodities purchased to stabilize and develop the gas industry.

9. That it be established that the "Gazprom" RJC's volume of sales include the profit received from deliveries of marketable gas for export to remote foreign parts in the volumes envisaged for the needs of the gas industry and also to the CIS and Baltic countries calculated in rubles at industrial wholesale prices The difference between the currency profit calculated in rubles at the current Central Bank of the Russian Federation exchange rate and the sales volume expected in accordance with this edict is channeled into the "Gazprom" RJC unified stabilization and development fund formed

on the basis of the Russian Federation president's edict no. 1333 of 5 November 1992 "on the transformation of the state 'Gazprom' concern into the 'Gazprom' Russian joint-stock company."

This fund has a strictly targeted purpose and the money put into the fund is not taxable when it is formed and later redistributed among gas industry enterprises.

10. That gas deliveries by the "Gazprom" RJC to gas-consuming enterprises of the CIS countries for counterdeliveries of output and these deliveries of output are not subject to value-added tax. The cost of gas sold through counterdeliveries of gas to gas-consuming enterprises of the CIS countries is determined by the date the output actually arrives from the relevant consumer enterprises.

11. That with a view to normalizing accounts for gas, the Russian Federation State Committee for Economic Cooperation with the CIS states in preparing intergovernment agreements for gas deliveries in 1994-96 examine the proposals of the "Gazprom" RJC for reducing prices for gas delivered to CIS countries with a corresponding reduction in the sum of payments for the transit of gas delivered to remote foreign parties across these states' territories.

12. That with a view to reducing debts and stabilizing accounts for gas, the "Gazprom" RJC be given the right to make decisions to alter prices for gas for consumers in Russia and the Baltic countries upon agreement with consumers on the early extinguishing of debts for gas and the use of advance payments.

13. That a commission be set for the "Gazeksport" foreign economic enterprise of 0.5 percent of the export of natural gas for the share which ensures federal state needs.

14. That this edict be submitted for examination by the Russian Federation Federal Assembly.

15. That this edict enters into force as of the moment it is signed.

[signed] Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin, Moscow, Kremlin 6 December 1993

Government Differences on Economy Revealed

PM2212115793 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 22 Dec 93 p 1

[Igor Petrov report under the "In Government" rubric: "A United Team No More"]

[Text] The first postelection session of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers Presidium, which examined the draft State Program for the Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in Russia, revealed serious disagreements among cabinet members in their approach to this question. The participants failed to reach a unified opinion on this question, and it was resolved that the document required further work to be done on it.

Presenting the program, Anatoliy Chubays, vice premier and leader of the State Committee for the Management of State Property, first stated that he regards "any change in the conceptual basis of the document as fundamentally unacceptable, given that the actual process of privatization is now in its final stage." He reported that as of 1 December this year 65.5 percent of small enterprises had been privatized in Russia, while in the sphere of "large-scale privatization" 10,500 of the 14,500 major enterprises down for privatization had already been registered as joint-stock companies. The exchequer has already received 680 billion rubles [R] from privatization; 115 million vouchers have been taken up by the country's population; and around 55 million Russians have become shareholders in check investment funds or joint-stock companies.

Speaking about the contrast between the present privatization program and the "Mark-1992" program, Chubays stated that it substantially widens the regions' rights in carrying out denationalization and takes sector-specific features of privatization more thoroughly into consideration; the document is based "on the understanding of privatization as a means of implementing reforms in Russia and improving production as a whole rather than as an end in itself."

The discussion that started up after Chubays' report may nominally be split into two parts. Initially, the participants in the session (and an unusually large number of them—over 100—attended the government presidium session, including even such rare "visitors" as Oleg Lobov, secretary of the Security Council Secretary, and Sergey Filatov, leader of the President's Administration), while on the whole supporting the document submitted, made numerous additions to and comments on it, bound up for the most part with the mechanism for the privatization of state property in individual sectors and regions.

Discussion of the program hotted up toward the end of the second hour of debate over two basic questions after speeches had been made by Yegor Gaydar and Yevgeniy Yasin: Why was no specific time mentioned in the title, and was the program worth adopting at all? Yegor Gaydar acknowledged that in fact the program will be in force until the validity of the vouchers expires—until 1 July 1994. He then said that "the very concept of privatization will be radically changed," in particular, the rights of labor collectives during the implementation of privatization will be reduced. The vice premier also stated that it was unacceptable to create a "legal vacuum for privatization" by dragging out the adoption of the program until the Federal Assembly started work.

A number of emotional and pretty abrasive speeches followed in response to this, the most vivid of these being the statement made by Konstantin Buralev,

deputy head of Moscow Government. He bluntly stated that "there is no dire need to adopt a program for just 6 months." He also leveled the charge at the State Committee for the Management of State Property that "the rules of the game are now being determined at the center while the social consequences of privatization decisions are having to be suffered at regional level." Opinions were also heard to the effect that the large concessions to check investment funds included in the draft program were unjustified.

Vice Premier Aleksandr Shokhin proposed "jettisoning" from the draft the section on the participation of foreign investors in privatization, which, in his opinion, creates unjustified advantages for them. On taking the floor Oleg Lobov stated that privatization should not be understood as merely distributing to citizens property from which the state receives scant income. He stressed that "such privatization is first cousin to inflation" and that inflation cannot be defeated "with such a privatization program."

Commenting, at your correspondent's request, on the disagreements which arose at the Presidium session, First Vice Premier Oleg Soskovets noted that the argument essentially revolves around two fundamental approaches to government industrial policy. The first amounts in general to saying that there is no need to interfere in industrial affairs. Let those enterprises which are unable to adapt to market conditions of management go away and die quietly somewhere. On the other hand, those which can keep their head above water have the right to exist.

The second approach endorses the need for state involvement in industry. While advocating on the whole the continuation of the course of share flotation, Soskovets considers that carrying out experiments regarding the natural selection and survival of enterprises when you have an extremely monopolized economy is an extremely dangerous and frivolous occupation.

Analyzing the results of the latest Council of Ministers Presidium session and the course of the discussion which arose, observers note that the dreams of creating a government operating as a united reform team will clearly have to be postponed and that the creation of an effective coalition of professionals is now the best one can talk about.

This first postelection government session showed that the cabinet members, who come from diverse political blocs, find it very difficult to reach a common opinion. The political situation has revealed the manifest coalition nature of the government, which will certainly complicate the process of decisionmaking and have an impact on the effectiveness of its work.

Official on Economy, Politics, Other Issues

PM2212145193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 22 Dec 93 First Edition pp 1, 3

[Interview with Andrey Vavilov, first deputy minister of finance, by B. Kuznetsov; place and date not given: "The Economy Is Not a Hostage to Politics. In the View of the First Deputy Minister of Finance, the Finance Ministry Will Achieve Duty-Free Imports for Investment in the New Year"]

[Text] For a long time we have all been in the position of relatives waiting outside an operating room behind whose doors surgeons are resuscitating the almost lifeless body of the economy. Always provided that they are not arguing and snatching the scalpel from each other. And then a "figure in a white coat" appears in the doorway.

[Kuznetsov] Tell us, Andrey Petrovich, will the patient survive?

[Vavilov] To use your terminology, the main operations have been completed, the country has been brought out of a coma, and the situation has stabilized somewhat.

[Kuznetsov] And what does that mean?

[Vavilov] The rate of production decline is considerably down on last year, totaling in the order of 12 percent, and the budget deficit has been approved by the government at 10 percent of gross domestic product—that is, an albeit temporary lock has been placed on the printing presses which fuel inflation. The exchange rate has stabilized—according to Finance Ministry predictions it will hold at around 1,200 rubles [R] [to the dollar] until the end of the year with minimal lurches. And prices—also a key indicator—were at 15 percent in November, the lowest increase this year.

[Kuznetsov] On the subject of the ruble exchange rate. There are rumors going around in banking circles that the dollar would have already fallen to the R700-800 level if the Central Bank had not been buying up currency.

[Vavilov] I wouldn't want to fuel confrontation between the Finance Ministry and the Central Bank. Different "surgeons" have differing views on how to cure the economy. Although, I confess, you can sometimes be shaken when, following the injection of another stimulant—which is what any large-scale issue of money by the Central Bank is—the patient springs up and tries to flee from the operating table. We have to use forcible restraint.

[Kuznetsov] How does that work?

[Vavilov] Take the exchange rate. The main reason for its stabilization is the increase in the positive trade balance (on an annual basis exports are double the level of imports), and customs duties are now being collected on a much bigger scale than a year ago. By the beginning of 1993 we had managed to turn the sale of currency into a planned process. On the other hand, we have reduced

the money supply by halting technical credits to CIS countries, which were ruinous for Russia, substantially contracting the ruble zone, and blocking the mutual offsetting of enterprise debts (also a Central Bank idea), imposed order in financial operations (remember the fake payment notices?), and so forth. But the main thing is that the economy, having recovered from the shock, is beginning to operate under market conditions.

Oil, coal, grain, and bread prices are mainly or almost completely deregulated. A market environment has taken shape—that is, the market has been sufficiently liberalized so that it no longer has to be drip-fed with subsidies. This means it is now possible to embark on the next operations—monetary, credit and financial operations—without fear of a cardiac arrest. It is time we abandoned direct credits to enterprises out of the state budget, which in practice means handing out various kinds of equipment and components to them. The state, you see, used to take responsibility for credits and thus for repaying them. In the new year the Finance Ministry intends to propose a different scheme: When the actual borrowers take responsibility, credit becomes much more effective. We will also make the financial "layer"—in the shape of commercial banks—thicker; they know how to get their money back. This is a civilized scheme for providing credit which operates in many states. Let me add that the government should also be freed of the responsibility for commodity credits—they are simply not needed. If grain or feed is in demand on the market, buy it with your own resources. It is time for people to learn to live within their means. Incidentally, the Finance Ministry does not rule out a reduction in interest rates on credit next year if the rate of price inflation slows.

[Kuznetsov] At what level of inflation would that be possible?

[Vavilov] No more than 8-10 percent a month.

[Kuznetsov] So the message is "do it yourself"? But far from all enterprises are that healthy. Furthermore, you just try squeezing through the export quota net or getting over the import duty barrier....

[Vavilov] We'll help. The Finance Ministry is indeed pursuing a policy of reducing export quotas; there are too many of them. As for duties, I agree that they should be sensible. Cigarettes and vodka are completely different from everyday clothing. Furthermore, following a comprehensive analysis we have decided to try in the new year for the complete abolition of import duties on imported goods destined for production development and investment programs. Even very recently we could not have allowed ourselves to to this.

[Kuznetsov] Just like you couldn't allow the unfreezing of payments from Vneshekonombank [Bank for Foreign Economic Activity] internal foreign currency deposits. Apparently you were the initiator of the removal of these restrictions.

[Vavilov] Only you mustn't turn me into a fairy godmother. I am a pragmatist. It's just that responsibility for the USSR Vneshekonombank's zero-activity accounts [nulyevyye shcheta] was given to the Russian Government—meaning the Finance Ministry. It took time to carry out operations to increase the level of budget revenue in foreign currency, and at the end of April the restrictions on obtaining these funds were lifted. For the time being corporate bodies have received Finance Ministry bonds underwritten by the state. A different approach was taken to individuals, ordinary citizens, who were owed over $400 million. Since the spring they have already had over $100 million returned to them.

[Kuznetsov] So you helped the rich, but what about ordinary citizens waiting hopelessly in line for housing?

[Vavilov] We'll help them too. The government has now signed off on a decree under which everybody entitled to improved housing conditions will be able to receive a free subsidy to buy or build a house or apartment. The size of the subsidy will vary—between 5 and 7 percent of the cost depending on how long you have been on the waiting list and how much income each family member has. But the main thing is that a fundamental decision on an acute social problem has been adopted.

[Kuznetsov] So, judging by what you say, the prospects for the new year seem to be encouraging. But in six months time, say, won't we again be sighing: "It was fine on paper...."

[Vavilov] I hope not. With one proviso: Provided there are no political upheavals, with the economy once again becoming a hostage to politics with a wave of strikes, emissions of money, and subsidies running into trillions. If we hang in there and stop trying to grab the "scalpel" from each other recovery is guaranteed.

Article Sees Need To Pursue Reforms 'Aggressively'

PM2112145093 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Dec 93 First Edition pp 1-2

[Article by Otto Latsis: "You Cannot Change Reforms in Midstream"]

[Text] The Russian State Committee for Statistics has issued the regular monthly report on "Russia's Social and Economic Situation" for January-November 1993. It holds up a mirror to the statistics relating to Russia as of 1 December, Russia on the eve of the elections. And in its own way it helps us understand the results of those elections.

First, the traditional, most general indicators. GDP fell by 11 percent compared with January-November 1992—a smaller decline than last year's, but more than the government had hoped a year ago. The expected fall in industrial production this year is 15.5-16 percent, as against 18 percent last year. The expected results of the agricultural year are: grain (weight after cleaning)—94

percent of last year's; sugar beet—101 percent; sunflowers—90 percent; potatoes—99 percent; vegetables—100 percent. The increase in the composite index of consumer prices in November was the lowest since the beginning of the year: an increase of 16 percent on the October level (October saw a 20 percent increase on September). Money emission fell 22 percent in November compared with the previous month (in October it had increased by 28 percent).

And now we come closer to the processes that may have had a direct influence on the election results. The average wage of employees in October was 93,000 rubles [R] (in November, according to a preliminary estimate, the figure was R105,000). The average wage in industry in October was R101,200 (R291,400 in the gas industry, R74,800 in machine building, and R68,500 in light industry); in construction—R131,800; in agriculture—R52,700; in health care—R65,500; in public education—R59,200; and in science and scientific services—R57,700. As you can see, the traditional Soviet distortions have not only persisted, but intensified: Rural areas and the budget-funded sphere do not get their fair share, and the pay of people with higher education is below the level of pay for physical labor. The position of wide strata within specific social groups has deteriorated, and alas, they are the most highly skilled strata: Among industrial workers it is the machine builders, and among those engaged in mental labor it is people employed in the sphere of science. Let us add that the income of the 10 percent of the population who are the most well-off is today 10 times the income of the least well-off 10 percent (a year ago the difference was a factor of 7.5 or 8).

But even this is not new; we are only seeing the latest information on the development of familiar processes. What is new, and alarming, is this: Some 750,000 people now have the official status of unemployed. This is actually slightly fewer than at the beginning of the year, and amounts to 1 percent of the entire economically active population. Anywhere in the world, with such an indicator, they would say: Unemployment is practically nonexistent. However, according to the methodology of the International Labor Organization, 3.8 million people should be counted as unemployed in Russia. That is 5 percent of the active population, and in the world in general they say of such a level of unemployment: an average, tolerable level. For us, however, it is an unusually high figure. But that is not all. Our traditions and our not yet very rigorous market conditions make a further category particularly large: that of the potentially unemployed. That is those who, in other countries, would already have been made redundant to rescue the enterprise, but who, in our country, are retained to the last, for pennies, without being fully occupied, because people still do not believe that the enterprise could go bankrupt. Taking this category into account, the total number of fully or partially (potentially) unemployed is 7.8 million, or 10.4 percent of the active population.

The number of people working an incomplete working day (or week) at the administration's instigation was some 950,000 people (2.8 percent of those employed) on 1 April, and 1,070,000 (3.3 percent) on 1 October. Looking at the period since the beginning of the year, the number of people on leave without pay, or on partial pay, at the administration's instigation was 1,907,000 on 1 April, and 3,681,000 on 1 October. Judging by the economic situation, it is to be expected that those enterprises that are averting mass redundancies by means of not fully employing people will not be able to sustain that position for long. Those that fail to find speedy ways to improve the financial situation will either resort to large-scale cuts or go bankrupt. In that event we can expect, in the next few months, a level of open unemployment which is considered alarmingly large throughout the world, and in Russia is unheard-of since the early twenties.

Here I will break away from the State Committee for Statistics figures and turn to another source. The All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion reported the latest results of its monitoring of the socioeconomic reforms. Among the questions which were put to respondents at monthly intervals from March through November, was this: Which of our society's problems worry you most? They had to choose not more than five answers from 15 options that were offered. Opinions on some problems have not changed over that period. The growth of prices, for instance, which was in first place in March-April (84 percent of respondents chose this answer), was still the first concern in October-November (still 84 percent). Crime was and remained in second place (in spring 64 percent mentioned it, in the fall—62 percent). Evaluations of the significance of the majority of other problems have remained fairly stable. But there are also some major shifts. The priority problem of the prereform years—the shortage of food and essential goods—is now fading visibly. In spring 28 percent mentioned it, giving it eighth place, while in the fall it had fallen to 10th place, with only 18 percent of the votes. Meanwhile the growth of unemployment has risen from fifth or sixth to fourth place on the scale of troubles: In spring 30 percent mentioned it, in the fall 36 percent.

An increase in the number of redundancies invariably accompanies a restructuring of the structure of production. Whereas in 1992 restructuring was concentrated for the most part in the defense sector, which lost two-thirds of the arms production order, now it is operating on a much wider front. The liberalization of prices for energy sources, and with it the increase in transportation tariffs, have also put in jeopardy all those areas of production that have consequently started making a loss. Major enterprises are increasingly coming to a standstill for a reason we are not used to: There is no market for their output. At one time everything "offered" was snapped up, at artificial prices and for the state's money. With realistic prices and when it is your own money, it turns out that the country needs different kinds of trucks, tractors, combines, machine tools and so forth—not the ones the Gosplan [State Planning Committee] liked.

Apparently the country has entered or is about to enter a new phase of social crisis. We argued for a long time about whether we needed to dive straight into the cold water of the necessary structural restructuring, through rigorous financial restrictions, or else do it gradually, through mild financial restrictions. Meanwhile the financial restrictions, while remaining mild, did their job. The argument is over: We have—albeit slowly—entered the uncomfortable current of structural change. This does not mean there is no longer anything to argue about. But the subject of the argument is changing. The question now is—how do we cross this current and emerge from it?

In recent days two regular IZVESTIYA writers, both from the management apparatus and both hitherto supporters of the same line, have given markedly different answers to the question of the near future. Andrey Illarionov's stance (IZVESTIYA No. 241) is firm and well defined: "Squash" inflation, without even taking into account the growth of unemployment. Every country experiences unemployment, he writes, it is inevitable, and not as terrible as all that: Unemployment makes a few people suffer, inflation makes everyone suffer. But in Aleksandr Livshits' view (IZVESTIYA No. 242), the situation is so acute that it may be necessary, "for the sake of maintaining sociopolitical stability, to postpone many of the planned market transformations."

Oh, if only it was possible to alleviate the situation in that way... When you are fording a river, you may feel some very unpleasant sensations when you come to the rapids, but you certainly cannot "stabilize the situation" by stopping at that moment. Moreover, as Poland's experience, for instance, shows, the most important factor in the success of market reforms is the timing of elections. That was what put paid to Balcerowicz, who went into elections during a phase of unpopular measures. Unless Russia begins to emerge on the far bank by 1996, unless it sees the first positive results of the reforms, a victory for the Zyuganovites in the next elections is very likely. But the Russian Federation Communist Party is not at all like the sensible Polish left; it is capable of trying to turn back, and then Russia will face new trials.

On the other hand, mass unemployment leads to grave deformations in society —social, psychological, and cultural, and sometimes political too. And it makes life more difficult not only for the unemployed themselves—if only because the burden of paying allowances falls on the whole of society. A deterioration in the entire social atmosphere also becomes inevitable. And if mass unemployment lies in store for us in the near future, this too cannot be called a good way of preparing for the elections due in two years' time. So with all due respect for our two brilliant experts—A. Illarionov and A. Livshits—I am afraid they are still locked into old solutions to old problems. A. Illarionov is right about one thing: Now that areas of production that the market rejects are collapsing or have already collapsed, and wages at certain plants have become a substitute for unemployment benefits, there is even less point in prolonging the agony of the transition to a new state of affairs. But why should redundancy be equated with unemployment? Someone who has lost one job can be offered another. The question is, will the state be able to guarantee this prospect?

The slogan of "support for production," which is used today to justify inflationary props for areas of production that the market rejects, could be endowed with new, positive content. To that end the most sensible plan would be to channel the state's efforts not into preserving old jobs, but into creating new ones. It would be more sensible and it would cost less money. More sensible, because people will move to where they can produce products and services that the consumer wants. But why less money?

Because it is possible to encourage the development of sectors that are labor-intensive but not capital-intensive—first and foremost, to promote the creation of small enterprises, individual, family, and cooperative enterprises, especially in the service sphere.

Of course, direct state investments may also be needed, and not only in small enterprises. In Russia there are many cities and settlements that depend on a plant. Just one plant, and often a defense plant at that. If it closes, those who work there have nowhere to go, and enterprises in the service sphere simply have no one to serve. If you are not going to resettle the inhabitants somewhere else, you have to build a new plant in that city. But even that is better and ultimately cheaper than prolonging the existence of enterprises that have no future.

Economic policy must be adjusted. But our common salvation lies not in slowing down the reforms, but in pursuing them more thoughtfully and aggressively.

Agricultural Losses for Year Reported at 30%

LD2212203993 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1533 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] Russia's agrarian sector has failed to collect the entire harvest grown in 1993. Its losses, due to adverse weather conditions and financial-economic problems, exceed 30%.

According to preliminary data which Interfax has received in the Agriculture Ministry, Russia gathered 100 Mn tons of grain (in bunker weight) compared with 106.8 Mn tons last year, 25 Mn tons of sugar-beets (25.5 Mn tons), and 36 Mn tons of potatoes (37.8 Mn tons).

As many as 26 Mn tons of grain, 2 Mn tons greater than in 1992, have been delivered into the federal and regional food product reserves.

According to experts, production of meat in Russia will fall from 12.9 Mn tons in 1992 to 11.9 Mn tons in 1993 (by 8%), production of milk - from 47.2 to 45.5 Mn tons (3%), procurements of cattle and poultry will total 4 Mn tons (reduced by 9%) and milk - 25 Mn tons (by 4%). However, chief of the Agriculture Ministry's Main

Cattle- Breeding Department Valentin Blokhin declared that the agricultural producers have everything necessary for the winter so as not to allow further decline in production.

At the same time, Blokhin noted that cattle-breeding is unprofitable on Russia's major farms because purchase prices do not cover expenditures. Blokhin cited monopoly and price dictatorship of reprocessing factories as the major problem which "paralyzes the work of this branch."

Problems in Grain Market Noted

PM2212164793 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Dec 93 First Edition p 4

[Article by Sergey Veselovskiy of the Russian Grain Commodity Exchange: "What Is Preventing the Establishment of a Grain Market in Russia"]

[Text] Saratov—The grain market is one of the most up-and-coming exchange markets, since grain is the classic exchange commodity. But the process of forming and developing it is encountering very serious difficulties and contradictions.

For many decades there was a state monopoly on the grain trade in our country. Grain was purchased from the producers and it was stored, processed, and distributed by the Ministry of Grain Products, which subsequently became the federal contract corporation "Roskhleboprodukt." This state of affairs lasted until the end of the eighties, when a free grain market gradually began to emerge and take shape.

But the proportion of grain coming onto the free market is still insignificant—only 2-3 percent of the total quantity. This is due primarily to the fact that until recently "Roskhlebprodukt" formed the federal grain fund and producers were obliged to surrender 30 percent of their harvests to it at fixed prices. That is, nearly all that it was possible to take from them.

The birth and development of the market sector in agriculture, the appearance of joint-stock companies and private farms, and the reorganization and breakup of kolkhozes and sovkhozes are making new demands on grain procurement and processing operations. Small producers have already learned the value of money, so what they want to see is small facilities to process and store grain (small warehouses, elevators, bakeries, flour mills).

But these problems cannot be solved in six months or even in five years—it will take a great deal of material and financial investment.

The solution is to gradually transform the "Roskhleboprodukt" system and adapt it to the demands of the market economy and also provide all-round incentives for Russian and foreign entrepreneurs to invest money in the grain complex.

A fundamentally new situation is currently taking shape in the grain market: Grain prices have been freed, from next year no federal fund will be formed, so there will be no obligatory grain deliveries to the state. As a result "Roskhleboprodukt" loses the role of legislator for grain prices. Who will assume the function now? According to the terms of the free market, this role belongs by right to the exchanges.

Certain grain prices have always been set at the point where the interests of grain producers, processors, and consumers intersect. The price set by ministerial officials, even if they were utterly scrupulous, could not fully reflect all the features of the formation of the value of the commodity, the market situation, and the level of inflation at each specific moment in time. So nearly always one of the sides would reckon that its interests had been compromised and would take action to protect them.

The exchange price eliminates these contradictions in a natural way; in this case there is no one to blame and complain about, no one to badger. The market will decide everything and the market alone.

Grain is currently sold on several Moscow exchanges, above all on the Russian Commodity and Raw Material Exchange and Moscow Commodity Exchange; in Saratov it is sold on the Russian Grain Commodity Exchange, and it is sold on exchanges in Stavropol and Krasnodar. But here too there are considerable fluctuations in volumes and in the list of grain offered for sale, and prices of the same quantities of grain can vary greatly. For instance, on the Russian Grain Commodity Exchange consignments of third-grade common wheat are being put up for auction at prices of between 70,000 and 115,000 rubles [R] per tonne and rye at prices of between R55,000 and R75,000 per tonne.

The practice whereby administrations of Russian oblasts and territories decide to place restrictions on taking particular types of grain and grain products beyond their confines is widespread at the moment. We are getting buyers from traditional grain-consuming regions of the country—Tyumen, Murmansk—at our auctions, but they are unable to take the grain they buy out of the territory. You have to get the administration chief's permission to take out each consignments of grain: This takes take so much time that it is better to buy somewhere else. Often buyers go away empty-handed. The exchange is an open market, but because of administrative obstacles the shadow grain market still has the advantage.

We had a great number of buyers at our last auction, but not one deal was struck. Transactions between buyers and sellers—it takes weeks, sometimes months for money to go from one city to another—are severely hampered by poor work by the banks. Arbitration courts are taking too long to examine cases, which deprives sellers and buyers of a real opportunity to protect themselves against various types of swindles.

We hope that the government will be more rigorous in preventing the appearance of administrative restrictions

on trade within the country, otherwise there can be no question of any grain market.

Miners 'Worried' About Council's 'Separatist' Moves

MK2212120093 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 22 Dec 93 p 2

[Andrey Nikolayev report under the "Intrigue" rubric: "Coal Miners Accuse Yegor Gaydar of Separatism"]

[Text] Participants in the All-Russia conference of chairmen of trade union committees of coal mining industry enterprises passed yesterday a "statement regarding the position of the Council of Ministers-the Russian Federation Government." It says that representatives of primary trade union organizations of 236 mines, 65 open pits, 68 concentrating factories, building organizations, and major plants of the coal mining sector, who attended the conference "are extremely worried about the separatist activities of the Council of Ministers" and primarily of Yegor Gaydar, "aimed at splitting the trade union movement" in the coal mining sector. As is pointed out in the statement, the talks conducted by the government in late November and early December 1993 with the Independent Trade Union of Coal Miners of Russia (ITUCMR), representing the interests of 4 percent of those working in the coal mining sector, "were of a patently unilateral nature, had hidden political preelection motives and ignored the vital problems of an overwhelming majority of workers in the sector." According to the statement, this is confirmed by, among other things, the composition of the commission and the very statute of the interdepartmental commission on the resolution of socioeconomic questions chaired by Yegor Gaydar.

The statement says that the coal mining union thinks it "necessary to hold a meeting and consultations with all those interested in the fate of the coal mining sector" representatives and specialists of the Russian Federation Ministry of Fuel and Energy, the "Rosugol" state company, and paramilitary mining rescue units. The coal mining trade union proposed to the Council of Ministers that it should "update and recast the composition of the interdepartmental commission on resolution of socioeconomic questions to include in it all specialists who really know and understand the problems, who see the prospects, development, tendencies, and ways the sector's tasks should be solved."

In the opinion of some observers, the leadership of the coal mining trade union deliberately undertook this "psychological attack" against the first vice premier in a bid to conclude with the government a sectoral (tariff) agreement without special problems. The more so because a draft agreement for 1994 is ready now, and is expected to be submitted for consideration to the government.

Call for Proper Funding, Change

PM2212113393 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 21 Dec 93 p 2

[ITAR-TASS report under the rubric "Miners' Trade Unions' Opinion": "Dispute With Government Not Over"]

[Text] "We intend to challenge the government decision on the reduction of coal production next year by 40-50 million tonnes," Vitaliy Budko, chairman of the Russian Committee of Independent Mineworkers' Trade Union, stated yesterday. He was speaking at the all-Russia conference of chairmen of trade unions of mining industry organizations and enterprises which has opened in the capital.

We consider the government's decision to reduce coal production unjustified, Vitaliy Budko continued. He supported his viewpoint by arguing that consumer coal orders for next year already stand at 287 million tonnes right now, which constitutes roughly the same level of coal production as at the end of the year now drawing to a close.

Another important question to be discussed at the current conference is the terms of the new tariff agreement between the government and the Russian coal trade unions, the trade union chairman said. "Work on this document, in Vitaliy Budko's words, is proceeding with extreme difficulty. And it is discussion at this impressive conference which will enable substantial improvements to be achieved in the sector itself and in the miners' position when a new tariff agreement is concluded. The very fact of the participation in the conference of more than 350 representatives of all Russia's coal mining regions demonstrates that the question of the fulfillment of the tariff agreement remains crucial.

Concerning the results of the fulfillment of this agreement in the current year, Vitaliy Budko noted that the regular delays in government payments to miners had acquired a systematic character. Next year this practice should be rendered obsolete. We intend not only to demand fulfillment of the terms of the tariff agreement, but also radical solution of the nonpayments situation, which has become catastrophic in scale. After all, coal consumers alone owe miners 628 million rubles [R]. To this must be added the R71 billion unpaid by the government. The essence of these demands, Vitaliy Budko stressed, boils down not to increasing funds available for pay but to the need to preserve the coal sector as such. It still remains a basic sector of the economy.

Realizing the need for structural reorganization in the sector and for a recovery program for unprofitable pits, we seek only that this process be conducted in a civilized manner, above all that the necessary funds be allocated. Unfortunately, despite the fact that it is planned to allocate R100 billion for these purposes in the current year, these decisions remain on paper. At the same time, understanding the objective need to close pits, we insist on the elaboration of a state program in this sphere. Otherwise, if the process is allowed to proceed spontaneously, this could entail serious social consequences. After all, the closure of the 42 most unprofitable pits should release about 50,000 industrial personnel.

Regional Affairs

Preparations Under Way for N. Ossetia Elections

LD2212170893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1455 GMT 22 Dec 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Shanayev]

[Text] Vladikavkaz December 22 TASS—An important stage of the presidential elections campaign is over in North Ossetia, a constituent republic of the Russian Federation. They are to be held on January 16, 1994.

The Central Election Commission has completed the official registration of seven contesters. The eighth candidature of Tamerlan Tsomayev, chief of the department for guarding economic facilities from Leninskiy District of Vladikavkaz, has not been registered due to some violations of the rules governing the collection of signatures to back the candidate's nomination.

Chairman of the Central Election Commission Taimuraz Chedzhemov, who spoke on the local television today, urged North Ossetian voters to elect a really popular president of the people and for the people in North Ossetia on January 16, 1994.

According to information from military sources, received by the North Ossetian Security Council today, the operational situation in the state of emergency zone remains stable. Contrary to reports published by some mass media that numerous spontaneous meetings of local inhabitants were being held in Prigorodnyy District, no inter-ethnic conflicts were recorded there over the past 24 hours. The Russian peace-making forces, jointly with local law enforcement bodies, are in full control of the situation. Detachments of the Russian Army, attached to the provisional administration, are being replaced by new units according to plan. Their numerical strength remains unchanged.

Joint conciliation commissions are working in Prigorodnyy District to resolve the problem of returning refugees to places of their former residence.

Tax Breaks Under Edict Boost Kaliningrad Prospects

PM2212153993 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 22 Dec 93 First Edition p 3

[Report "specially for ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA" by ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Biryukov: "Amber Enclave Cuts Duties in Attempt To Entice Investors"]

[Text] The "Tsepruss" joint venture in Kaliningrad, which bought modern technological equipment abroad to produce export output, has been exempted from paying millions in customs duties and value-added tax.

This is the first enterprise in the westernmost region of Russia to take advantage of the benefits granted to it by the recently signed Russian Federation presidential edict "On Kaliningrad Oblast." Pending the adoption of a corresponding law by the Federal Assembly, this document determines its special status deriving from the territory's position as an enclave.

"I wouldn't describe the benefits as measures designed to encourage the physical production sphere and particularly its export component," oblast administration first deputy head Garyy Chmykhov said, commenting on this fact. "It is more in the nature of fair compensation for the considerable losses incurred by this tiny part of Russia, which found itself cut off from the mother country as a result of the disintegration of the USSR. You see, the oblast's economy is 90 percent dependent on outside supplies of energy, equipment, and raw and other materials, which, because of expensive Lithuanian and Belarusian transit charges, sharply increases the cost of living of the 900,000-plus Kaliningraders.

The expansion of the local administration's rights in terms of day-to-day leadership of the oblast's socioeconomic development, the allocation of a tax credit for investment and subsidies for the implementation of regional programs, and the exemption from customs duties of equipment and goods imported here for domestic consumption and also of exports produced here—these and other measures merely put us in an equal economic situation with internal regions of Russia.

"On the other hand, the presidential edict makes it possible to maximize the benefit for the whole of Russia from utilizing the advantages of the present geopolitical and geographical situation of our oblast, which is located in the very center of Europe. Granting it essentially the status of a free customs zone—which is a development of the idea, adopted in previous legislative acts and government decrees, of creating the 'Yantar' ['Amber'] free economic zone on its territory—opens up opportunities for attracting large-scale Russian and foreign capital."

State Program Supporting North Delayed

MK2212122093 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 22 Dec 93 p 2

[Nikolay Podlipskiy report: "Session of Commission on Immediate Questions. Russia's North Will be Opened Up"]

[Text] Yesterday's sitting of the government commission on immediate questions was somewhat unusual—for the first time during the one year of work of this government setup, a "sectoral" question was withdrawn from the agenda on the initiative of its compilers. Vladimir Kuramin, chairman of the Russian Federation Committee on the Socioeconomic Development of the North, suggested that the discussion of the state program on socioeconomic development of Russia's northern regions be postponed because a last-minute need arose to make rather essential corrections in it.

According to Vladimir Kuramin, changes that should be incorporated in the program were mainly occasioned by

the fact that shortly before the session, the president signed an edict on state support to the Karyak Autonomous Okrug, and the government confirmed a federal program for socioeconomic development of the Kuril Islands. Besides, a similar edict on Karelia is pending. Thus, the Russian Government will take up the program of state support for northern territories not earlier than mid-January.

At the same time, some specialists believe that the rehashing of the program may result in serious changes. For example, there are doubts about classing some of the regions among the northern. Besides, according to a government employee, it is necessary to alter the federal government's approach to solving the problems of small peoples of the North: It is wiser to make use of the North American experience of creating Indian reservations rather than "adaptation to modern socioeconomic conditions."

In the final analysis, Mr. Kuramin said, the program will coordinate the activities of all state bodies tackling the problems of northern territories. There is a prospect of a fundamental change in the approach to the opening up of Russia's North: Wide use will be made of the "duty-tour" method adopted all over the world instead of building permanent settlements.

Northern Regions' Contribution to Russian Economy

- Twenty-eight regions of Russia totaling 11 million square kilometers (64 percent of the country's entire territory) have the status of northern territories or territories deemed to have the same status.
- Living in the country's North are 11 million people (nearly 9 percent of the total population).
- Seven million of the able-bodied population of northern regions account for 15 percent of GNP.
- Products of northern regions account for 50 percent of Russia's export yield.

International Affairs

Kravchuk: 17 Missiles Taken Off Combat Alert

LD2212112893 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 0839 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] Kiev [no dateline as received]—Requested to comment on Deputy Prime Minister Valeriy Shmarov's statement in connection with missile systems being taken off combat alert, President Leonid Kravchuk said on 21 November [date as received] that, indeed, 17 SS-24 missile systems had been taken off combat alert in Ukraine. This does not constitute a violation of the law, he explained, since the latter does not deal with missiles being taken off combat alert, but only with them being withdrawn from Ukrainian territory. "It is better to take missiles off combat alert. Then they will not be used by anyone because the nuclear button is in Russia and no mention of that fact is made by those talking now about law violation."

The issue of compensation and security guarantees, in the president's words, will be provided for in a trilateral agreement between Russia, Ukraine, and the United States. "This agreement will put none of the states in an awkward position," said Kravchuk.

Zlenko: Disarmament Talks To Continue

LD2212212093 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1756 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] The negotiations between Ukraine, Russia and the United States on nuclear disarmament are going on and are likely to produce an agreement, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko told a briefing in Kiev today saying he saw no other way to solve the issue.

He said he was "not concerned over the fact that the question of a compensation for the nuclear weapons and guarantees of Ukraine's security is not hailed by the two other negotiating sides." At the same time, he was quoted as saying: "I cannot say that the issues have already been resolved."

Zlenko said the Ukrainian government had developed a plan for dismantling nuclear warheads on its territory. He added that the plan chiefly relied on Ukraine's "internal possibilities," though Kiev will need financial and technical assistance to solve the issue.

Official on Sequence of START I Implementation

WS2212142493 Kiev Ukrayinske Radio First Program Network in Ukrainian 1100 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] The formula that Russia is imposing on us, according to which we would join the START treaty before it comes into force, is unacceptable—not to mention that it has a tinge of political pressure; this was declared today by Oleksandr Shevtsov, executive director of the National Strategic Research Institute, in an interview to HOLOS UKRAYINY. In this context, the U.S. Senate resolution on the ratification of START I is more comprehensive and prescient. However, given the present situation of Ukraine, Oleksandr Shevtsov emphasized, it would be the most realistic thing if the nonproliferation treaty implementation had the following sequence: Meeting conditions that are included in the treaty so that START I obtains validity, exchanging ratification instruments, and then commencing the treaty's practical implementation, which would result in the complete removal of nuclear weapons from our territory.

Military Leaders on Safety of Nuclear Facilities

AU2212121793 Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER in Ukrainian 21 Dec 93 p 3

[Report by the Defense Ministry's Press Service: "Ukraine's Nuclear Facilities"]

[Text] Some foreign mass media continue carrying information on the critical state of nuclear facilities located on the territory of Ukraine. They make particularly frequent references to "Russian experts," officials of the Russian Ministry of Defense, and some Russian politicians.

Ukraine's defense minister toured units and facilities of strategic rocket troops deployed on Ukrainain territory and visited temporary storage facilities for nuclear warheads detached from those missiles that have been taken off combat duty for an objective evaluation of their condition.

During the trip, Ukraine's Army General Vitaliy Radetskyy and officials in charge of the condition of nuclear weapons spoke to the press.

Lieutenant General Volodymyr Mykhtyuk, commander of the 43d Rocket Army of Strategic Rocket Troops:

"Problems involving maintenance do exist. This is perfectly understandable. However, there is no need to lay it on thick. The situation at nuclear facilities is fully under control. We have all the necessary means for this. Any attempts at drawing parallels with Chernobyl or something similar are absolutely groundless."

Lieutenant General Valeriy Vasylyev, commander of the Ukrainian Air Force:

"The strategic aviation within the Ukrainian Air Force is equipped with nuclear munitions. They are presently reliably stored. Even though our aviators also have numerous problems, there cannot even be talk about a critical situation. Such assertions do not correspond to reality."

Defense Minister Army General Vitaliy Radetskyy:

"On the instructions of the president and in accordance with a special program, we, together with military specialists and scientists, visited all the facilities where nuclear weapons are stored. Our main task was to obtain objective information on the operational status of

nuclear warheads and assess the quality of their maintenance and storage. We particularly wanted to find out what additional measures need to be taken locally with regard to such important issues as the security and defense of the facilities and protection from fire and detonation.

"Of course, we have enough problems. Particularly so on the eve of negotiations on these issues with the Russian side. In the very near future, we plan a meeting with the Russian Federation's defense minister [Pavel Grachev]. A whole package of documents have been elaborated and will be discussed. It is important that both we and Russia show a willingness to constructively resolve all problems that are emerging.

"Therefore, one should not overdramatize the situation, as some journalists and politicians have done. The situation at the missile facilities is satisfactory. We are taking additional measures to reinforce security, maintain normal conditions for storing nuclear warheads, and provide units and subunits of strategic troops with everything necessary."

Kravchuk, Party Leaders Discuss 'Russia Theme'

PM2312123193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Dec 93 First Edition p 2

[Report by Mariya Starozhitskaya of UNIAN: "Ukrainian President Holds Review of Political Forces"]

[Text] Kiev—Leonid Kravchuk's meeting with the leaders of practically all the political parties registered by the Ukrainian Ministry of Justice (31 at present) was held, as was emphasized repeatedly, on an initiative from below. In his speech Yuriy Zbitnev, head of the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine, called it an assembly of naked emperors—the rating of the majority of parties is now below the two-percent mark, and their influence in the regions is utterly insignificant.

The upcoming elections to the Ukrainian parliament were the topic of discussion. Although, as is known, it is not proposed to nominate candidates from the parties, the very course of the election campaign will create an opportunity for political agitation and a strengthening of influence. Incidentally, every other speaker proposed making amendments to the law on elections in favor of parties, but the president tried persistently to persuade them to be aware of reality and to "elect to the new parliament sensible, moderate, tactful people who will defend not party interests but the people's interests."

In L. Kravchuk's opinion, in the future the powers will have to clearly delimit their functions: The president will remain only the head of state, without holding other posts, and there must be a premier and a parliament. For this it is proposed to adopt a law on power for a transitional period and to put it to a nationwide referendum simultaneously with the elections. The future parliamentary majority is faced with deciding both the system of state structure and the fate of the market reforms. Also, the involvement of foreign capital in the Ukrainian elections will be stopped by the security organs—the president has issued a directive to that effect.

"The Russian factor is one of the most important problems," Kravchuk said. "People say that everything would be fine if Ukraine were with Russia. There is no doubt that our countries have a common history and close languages. But this does not mean that we have to live under the same roof. The states' separation is the only path, and it is irreversible. It is necessary to divide things honestly—this is the guarantee of future economic integration. It is obvious that this factor will be used one way or another in the election campaign. I have a great request, from the viewpoint of the historical prognosis, that we do not cross the line where we will divide people up according to language, attitude to Russia, etc., because then we will end up with a divided society after the elections."

The Russia theme has also been heard in the majority of speeches by the present political opponents. Thus, N. Azarov, chairman of the Party of Labor, reminding people of the approaching 340th anniversary of the Pereyaslavl Assembly, called for the political policy of close union with Russia to be replaced.

Mykhaylo Horyn, leader of the Ukrainian Republican Party, in turn reminded those present that the Russian parliament's decree on the Russian status of Sevastopol has not been repealed. "When the opinion of a grandmother from Yaroslavl—'How bad it is that our country is shrinking like this'—coincides with the opinion both of Yeltsin and of Zhirinovskiy, that is very dangerous for Ukraine," he said. "Note must also be taken of those detachments of Russian agitators who will come here to our elections—the security organs must keep them away from us."

The president was determined to argue with that statement:

"If we orient ourselves only on the West, the loss will be 100 percent. We must not try to ascertain who says what but arrange normal economic ties with Russian collectives and Russian people, without laying down our powers. We will live as the Ukrainian state only when we have friendly relations with Russia. Otherwise there will be no state."

At the request of journalists Leonid Kravchuk commented on the standing down of 17 SS-24 missile complexes. "This does not violate the law," he said. "The law stipulates removal from Ukrainian territory; this way the missiles are in the silos but the warheads have been dismantled. Why should they be on standby when the nuclear button is actually in Russia? It is better to stand them down: This way they will not be used by anyone."

Compensation and security guarantees will be stipulated in a trilateral agreement between Ukraine, Russia, and the United States.

Economic Revival Party on Ties With Russia, CIS

MK2212131093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 22 Dec 93 p 3

[Aleksandr Pilat report in the "Crimea" column: "The Economic Revival Party Intends To Create a Eurasian Union. A Free Market is Implied]

[Text] The congress of the Crimean Economic Revival Party [ERP], which has its regional branches not only on the peninsula but also in 15 regions in Ukraine, has taken place in Simferopol. The congress was devoted to the upcoming presidential elections in the Republic of Crimea scheduled for 16 January 1994 and also the elections to the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine and the Supreme Soviet of Crimea, which are due to take place on 27 March 1994. With respect to the presidential elections, the congress made the following decision: not to field its own candidate, recommending to the ERP regional organizations, members, and sympathizers to support the candidacy of Nikolay Bagrov, chairman of the Crimean Supreme Soviet.

An appeal to the voters was adopted. In particular it says that the ERP advocates stability, shifting the main efforts toward radical reform, and achieving economic independence primarily along the path of an open market economy. If ERP candidates are elected to the Crimean and Ukrainian parliaments, they intend to work toward ending economic recession and conducting land reform, ensuring guarantees for all forms of economic management. Participation by ERP representatives in the Supreme Soviet will ensure for the population the curbing of hyperinflation, preventing shocking price increases, and also close and comprehensive links with Russia. Furthermore, the appeal stressed, "We shall maintain a single Black Sea Fleet, free family, cultural, and economic ties and transparent borders with Russia and other CIS countries, and work toward the earliest possible construction of a friendship bridge across the Kerch Strait; also Ukraine's accession to an economic union with the CIS as a full-fledged member and the formation in the geopolitical space of the former USSR of a new great and single county—the Eurasian Union, a confederation of states on a fundamentally new basis."

"I am convinced," ERP cochairman Vladimir Shevyev said in a conversation with NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA's correspondent, "that sooner or later Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, as well as some other republics, will unite. We shall have a common monetary system and a single army. After all, this is advocated not only by our party but by the numerous parties and moments on the territory of the former USSR. I strongly support them and I am sure that those who think that the process of unification should begin and is actually beginning from Crimea are absolutely right. Other regions need a precedent."

Kravchuk on Ties With Moldova, Foreign Policy

AU2212192493 Kiev DEMOKRATYCHNA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 18 Dec 93 p 2

[Report by Hanna Tuhay: "Common Borders, Common Concerns"]

[Text] As a popular saying goes—a good neighbor is better than a bad relative. Ukraine has put this age-old principle at the basis of its external policy and continues to build its relations with neighboring countries on a civilized basis. This conclusion also applies to the recent negotiations in Kiev between a representative delegation of the Moldovan Republic headed by President Mircea Snegur and the Ukraine leadership. Accords were reached on a number of issues, which are vitally important for both states.

"We regard a strengthening of ties with neighboring Moldova," stressed Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk at the news conference following the negotiations, "as one of the priorities in our external policy."

Let us recall our country's explicitly reserved position during the Dniester conflict. Time has proved its wisdom.

Therefore, the fact that, today, Moldovan leaders arrive in Ukraine as they would come to a good neighbor to seek advice and to make proposals on ways to survive in this difficult time shows that there also exists peaceful ways for resolving conflicts. Ukraine is ready to act as an intermediary in resolving problems of the Dniester Region and believes that all processes there must evolve on a legitimate basis. It was once again reiterated in Kiev that the territories of a neighboring country are inviolable and integral.

Our neighbor, like ourselves, is going through difficult times. The high degree of economic integration, stressed Mircea Snegur at the meeting with correspondents, drove our industry, after the disintegration of the USSR, into a critical situation. It is necessary to restore relations and trade.

The reaching of an accord to organize joint customs posts was the first step on this road. Flowing amendments, an interstate agreement will be signed and will facilitate the border-crossing procedure for the cargo from both states. However, this does not mean, stressed the president of Ukraine, that it will be possible to take out everything. There exist norms and limits.

The Ukrainian-Moldovan dialogue proceeded on those days when Russia was making its choice. Naturally, it was interesting to know the opinions of presidents of the two neighboring states about the preliminary results of the elections. Having expressed their confidence in Russia's irreversible progress toward democracy, the two leaders did not, however, conceal their concern. First and foremost, regarding the forthcoming elections in their own countries.

In the opinion of the Ukrainian president, Russia itself may be endangered. "Of course, I am worried, because millions of Russian citizens voted for the slogan of "Great and Indivisible Russia," pointed out Leonid Kravchuk. "I hope, however, that the present authorities, the Russian president, and all democratic forces will not allow these ideas of revanchism to develop into a state concept." However, if this does happen, then, in the opinion of the Ukrainian president, this will signify the beginning of tremendous cataclysms in the world and in Europe: divisions and redivisions....

It is not difficult to foresee what may follow next.

National Affairs

Attempt To Smuggle Radioactive Material Thwarted

LD2312031693 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in English 2200 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] As the Ukrainian Interior Ministry's public relations center disclosed on Wednesday [22 December], officers of the Black Sea regional internal affairs agency and the Odessa (?Bergut) elite anti-terrorist formation squad thwarted an attempt to smuggle a container with 300 grams of potent alpha, gamma, and beta radiation emitters in 60 sealed glass ampoules, which the smugglers intended to sell for $1.02 million. The detainees include the manager of the [word indistinct] research and production association, a broker with the [word indistinct] firm, and four persons without definite employment. In addition to the above radioactive material, several firearms, 100 kilos of mercury, and a lot of document forms were confiscated in the raid. A similar raid is reported to have been carried out in Chisinau, neighboring Moldova's capital, which also yielded a container with 1.5 kilos of radioactive material. A joint search is reported underway for the (?hazardous) materials shipper.

Economy Minister, Deputies Debate Anticrisis Efforts

WS2212142293 Kiev Ukrayinske Radio First Program Network in Ukrainian 1100 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] The Supreme Council session is continuing its work in Kiev. Today's plenary sitting began with debates on information provided by the Cabinet of Ministers about implementation of the Supreme Council resolution of 18 December on Ukraine's economic situation and urgent anticrisis measures. Economy Minister Roman Shpek spoke on behalf of the government. He explained the government's position regarding purposes that the resolution, devised by a working legislative group to improve the economic and social situation, should serve. In particular, Roman Shpek noted that most of the deputies' proposals are in line with intentions of the government to curb inflation and other signs of crisis in the Ukrainian economy. The Cabinet of Ministers is already working on those proposals. The deputies and the economics minister had a discussion on proposals that were rejected by the government. Vitaliy Melnychuk took the floor on behalf of the legislative group that crafted the resolution. The stance of the Ukrainian National Bank was cleared by Viktor Yushchenko, National Bank chairman. Finance Minister Hryhoriy Sikach also presented a report at the beginning of the morning sitting.

Laws on TV, Radio Adopted; Regulating Body Formed

LD2212105393 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 0824 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] Kiev, 21 Dec—At the evening sitting of the parliament, Ukrainian people's deputies examined and adopted the law on television and radio broadcasting in its second reading. A report was delivered by Mykola Mykhaylovych Spys, chairman of the commission for glasnost and mass media issues.

Article 5 of the law introduces a state body under the name of the National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting Issues [Natsionalna Rada z Pytan Telebachennya i Radiomovlennya]. The final version of this article reads as follows:

"With the aim of implementing and complying with the legislation in the sphere of television and radio broadcasting, as well as other legislative enactments, the National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting Issues shall be set up. The National Council shall be an extra-departmental state body which shall function in accordance with the regulations approved by the Supreme Council.

"The National Council shall be made up of eight people, with four of them proposed by the Cabinet of Ministers and four by the president. Their term of office shall correspond with those of the Supreme Council and the president, and shall be four years. The National Council members shall elect a chairman from among themselves. The posts of the chairman and deputy chairman of the National Council shall be full-time and the rest of the members shall work on a civic basis."

The following resolution was adopted, bringing the Law on Television and Radio Broadcasting into effect:

1. The Law on Television and Radio Broadcasting is to be brought into effect on the day of its publication;

2. The National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting Issues is to be formed in February 1994;

3. It is to be suggested that the Ukrainian president and the Supreme Council chairman, by 1 February 1994, should submit for the Ukrainian Supreme Council's consideration candidacies for members of the National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting Issues. The Supreme Council Commission for Glasnost and Mass Media Issues is to submit for the Ukrainian

Supreme Council's consideration a draft of the regulations on the National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting Issues;

4. The Cabinet of Ministers is hereby instructed to draw up and present to the Supreme Council, within three months' time, a proposal on harmonizing Ukraine's legislative enactments and the Law of Ukraine on Television and Radio Broadcasting;

5. The Cabinet of Ministers is hereby instructed to ensure the budgetary financing of and allocating the premises and technological systems to the National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting Issues;

6. The National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting Issues, within six months following the day that the law is made public, is to list in the state register the TV and radio organizations operating in Ukraine and issue them with licences for the right to use a broadcasting channel in accordance with the law.

Ministry Registers 'Crimean Party of Social Guarantees'

AU2312124593 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 17 Dec 93 p 4

[Oleksandr Pilat report from the Crimea: "The Time Seems Ripe...."]

[Text] The Ministry of Justice of the autonomous republic has registered the Crimean Party of Social Guarantees. As our correspondent was told by the cochairman of the party, President of the Corporation for Crimea's Socioeconomic Development Yuriy Tkach, there is an acute need for the creation of such a party. Today, 600,000 pensioners, about 70,000 invalids, and many students who are unprotected against the steady rise in prices and inflation reside on the peninsula. "Our task is not to give these people alms, but to provide them with work that they are able to do," said Tkach. The new political party intends to take part in the elections of the Crimean president and Supreme Council.

Belarus

Details on Shushkevich's Health Discussed

WS2212135993 Minsk BELAPAN in Belarusian 1615 GMT 21 Dec 93

[Text] On 21 December, during the Supreme Soviet session, People's Deputy Alyaksandr Lukashenka spoke, according to his words, "with respect to the next attempt to falsify the real state of Stanislav Shushkevich's illness." According to A. Lukashenka, he has held an inquiry and discovered that, while Vyachaslaw Kuznyatsow, first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet, was announcing the hospitalization of S. Shushkevich "to the whole world," the chairman of the Supreme Soviet had been resting in the House of Government and left five minutes before the closing of the evening sitting. A. Lukashenka stated that, according to his information, Shushkevich's health was good, and doctors have not insisted on hospitalization. However, on 20 December, "on his own initiative," stated Lukashenka, "he was hospitalized not in the facility, where he and other high officials are usually treated, but in an oblast clinic." At the same time, Leanid Kamarow, assistant of the Supreme Soviet Chairman, who has visited S. Shushkevich in the hospital in Borowlany, told a BELAPAN correspondent that medical treatment and tests of the Supreme Soviet chairman will last no less than five days. According to the present medical conclusion, he was diagnosed with hypertension of the second degree.

Medical Report Read

LD2212143793 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1250 GMT 22 Dec 93

[By unidentified BELINFORM correspondent for TASS]

[Text] Minsk, 22 Dec—Doubts expressed by certain circles of Belarus parliamentarians that Stanislav Shushkevich, chairman of the Belarus Supreme Soviet, is in reality ill, has led to the necessity for reading out the speaker's sickness chart at today's morning session of parliament. It has been signed by the chief doctor at the Minsk Oblast hospital and by the doctor treating Shushkevich.

The information that was made available says that Shushkevich, who is undergoing treatment, was taken to the center on the morning of 20 December. He has been suffering from high blood pressure since 1991.

After having been examined at the center, he was diagnosed as having second degree hypertonia with the brain and heart affected (an acute condition) and hypertonia crisis of a second type.

Parliament Authorizes Kebich To Represent Country

WS2312110293 Minsk BELAPAN in Belarusian 1600 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] On 22 December, the 13th session of the Supreme Soviet adopted a resolution "On Procedures for Forming Hard Currency Funds in 1994." According to this document, in 1994, all enterprises are obliged to sell 50 percent of their hard currency revenues on Belarus' internal hard currency market. A portion of the revenues is to be purchased by the National Bank of Belarus at the official exchange rate to form the bank's hard currency reserve fund. Enterprises are obliged to resell 15 percent of their hard currency incomes to the government. This is supposed to be paid to the state budget expense at the official hard currency exchange rate. The National Bank of Belarus and the Cabinet of Ministers were requested to draw up procedures for the obligatory resale, and define sanctions for concealing hard currency revenues and delays in the obligatory resale.

The Supreme Soviet also approved a majority of articles of the draft legislation "On the State Budget of the Republic of Belarus for 1994." In particular, it was approved that the budget deficit in 1994 cannot exceed 6 percent of the GDP.

In connection with the illness of Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich, the Supreme Soviet decided to vest in Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich the right to conduct negotiations and sign international agreements in the name of the Republic of Belarus at the meeting of CIS countries' leaders, which is to be held in Ashgabat on 23-24 December.

Approves 1994 State Budget

LD2212223593 Moscow Programma Radio Odin Network in Russian 1900 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] The Belarusian Supreme Soviet has approved the republic's state budget for 1994. In drawing it up, the government proceeds first and foremost, as Finance Minister Stepan Yanchuk stressed, from the need to keep the budget deficit to the level (?of last) year, which is six percent. According to the calculations of the Council of Ministers, the republican budget for revenues will amount to over 8 trillion rubles in 1994 and for expenditures over 11 trillion rubles.

The Belarusian Supreme Soviet has instructed the government to request the Russian Federation Council of Ministers to allocate 1 trillion rubles to implement measures to eliminate the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster.

Parliament Introduces Fines for Draft Dodgers

PM2212130593 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Dec 93 p 1

[Report by Valeriy Kovalev under the "Yesterday" rubric: "If You Do Not Report to the Military Commissariat When Summoned, Pay a Fine"]

[Text] Minsk—Belarusian parliamentarians have finally heeded repeated requests by the Republic of Belarus Ministry of Defense for tougher sanctions against persons who evade the draft for military service. Corresponding amendments have been made to the republic Code "On Administrative Offenses."

Henceforth failure to report without valid cause to the military commissariat to be drafted for military service will entail the imposition of a fine of between two and three times the minimum wage.

Kebich on Monetary Union, Reorganization

WS2212154193 Minsk NARODNAYA GAZETA in Belarusian 18 Dec 93 p 1

[BELINFORM report: "Prime Minister Shows his Cards"]

[Text] Following the 16 December evening debate of the Supreme Soviet, Vyacheslav Kebich held a news conference with journalists. Responding to a question on the date for a political statement by the Belarusian and Russian governments on unification of the monetary systems, the leader of our government stated that the Belarusian Cabinet of Ministers is already prepared for this.

Vyacheslav Kebich also answered a question regarding the reorganization of the government. According to his words, the upcoming reorganization provides for a 10-percent reduction in the Cabinet of Ministers and a 12-percent reduction in the Cabinet apparatus. Of course, new people will appear in the composition of the government.

According to Kebich, there will be no place for the State Secretariat for Combating Crime and National Security in the new government structure.

Vyacheslav Kebich also commented on an open letter issued by the KGB and the Interior Ministry leaders. [Interior Minister] Vladimir Yegorov and [KGB Chief] Eduard Shyrkovski have sent a new letter to Kebich, in which they admitted that their activities had been premature. This letter will be disseminated by the media in the near future.

First Stage of Army Reform Said Completed

WS2212144393 Minsk BELAPAN in Belarusian 1100 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] According to Defense Ministry reports, the first stage of reforming the Belarus Armed Forces has been completed. Henceforth, the Belarusian Army is comprised of three military corps. They have received the number of forces that served as a basis for new units. Brigades have received the same numbers as former divisions. A brigade is composed of 3,000-5,000 people. The fire power of the new brigades corresponds to that of a former division.

Kravchanka Views Disarmament, Chernobyl

WS2212150093 Minsk NARODNAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Dec 93 p 2

[Speech by Foreign Minister Petr Kravchanka at the 27th UNESCO General Conference session in Paris: "For Accord and Peace"; under the "From Official Sources" rubric]

[Excerpt] Mr. Chairman, Madam Chairman of the Executive Board, Mr. General Director, ladies and gentlemen: On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Belarus, it is a great pleasure for me to welcome the joining of UNESCO by such states as Andorra, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Eritrea, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Macedonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Niue, Solomon Islands, Croatia, Czech Republic, and Turkmenistan, with which the Republic of Belarus has a long tradition of friendly relations or will hope to establish such relations.

Today, in a new situation, the role and importance of the United Nations, as well as UN structural subunits and those international bodies empowered with a high level of autonomy, are increasing considerably. The determination of their new role in the changing world demands reforms in the whole system of the UN organizations and bodies. We state with pleasure that UNESCO has not been excluded from this process.

A great contribution to the realization of the UNESCO mandate in the new situation, when man and his right to life, freedom, and individual respect are being regarded as a core component, has been rendered by Director General Federico Mayor. We state with pleasure that Mr. Mayor, thanks to his purposefulness and dynamism, paid an official visit to the Republic of Belarus in December 1991 and became acquainted with our complex problems on the spot.

Speaking about the need for the rapid development of education, science, and culture, I would like to present to you a broader picture of problems and questions that trouble our people and, I believe, all of mankind. It is already axiomatic that the development of education, science, and culture is impossible without a solid economic foundation, without quite new economic forms, and without a developed and efficient market economy. The Republic of Belarus is confronting many complex and objectively existing problems as it enters the path of innovations.

With regard to these, we put in first place the heavy burden of disarmament problems. As fate has willed, my

state was endowed with a heavy and fearful heritage. After the Soviet Union disappeared from the political map of the world, Belarus became one of the most heavily-equipped states on the planet in terms of weapons. Prior to 1991, we had on average three times as many soldiers and officers deployed on our territory as on the territory of the former Soviet Union. We are suffering under a heavy burden of financial expenses while implementing the policy of nuclear disarmament. We state with pleasure that Belarus was the first among the four successor states of the former Soviet Union to ratify the START agreement and the Lisbon protocol. However, few people know how difficult were the financial consequences suffered by my Fatherland after this noble deed. In the first place—in the area of ecology, since hundreds and thousands of hectares of land around rocket bases have been polluted by radioactive substances. The financial expenses associated with retraining officers of nuclear forces were also quite large.

Few people know that Belarus, while fulfilling the Vienna agreements on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe, has been obliged to destroy over 2,000 tanks, that is, 1.7 times as many as the United States, or 10 times as many as England, or 50 times as many as France. We have never had any tank-producing plants on our territory and we have never produced them, but today we are obliged to waste immense means in order to destroy these terrible weapons on for the good of all.

We have been covered by the black cloud of the Chernobyl catastrophe. I would like to note that it is your organization, our common organization, that was the first to adopt a historic resolution on Chernobyl. I recall the fall of 1990, when resolution L.18/121 regarding the global problems of Chernobyl was being prepared at UN Headquarters. However, here in Paris, in the fall of that year, but somewhat earlier, UNESCO adopted a resolution on this issue, which is the second in scope and importance.

In this respect, we would like to express our gratitude to the UNESCO director general, to the Secretariat of this organization, to Mr. Lefevre, and to dozens of charity, religious, and social organizations that have helped to raise nonbudget funds for implementing that resolution. I would like to emphasize that Chernobyl is not a transient event for my Fatherland. Chernobyl cannot be overcome, it cannot be liquidated. The aftermath of that terrible catastrophe will follow us during the next 300-400 years. Today we state with bitter disappointment that, except for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, we have not been granted aid from a single government in Europe or in the world. Today, we are faced with the terrible consequences of that catastrophe. The number of children suffering from cancer of the thyroid gland has increased dozens of times. The birth rate is falling; the number of psychogenic diseases is increasing. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that there are many kinds of tortures in the world. However, the most fearful torture, the most dreadful one is the torture by fear, since fear, like the sword of Damocles, today hangs over dozens of thousands of Belarusian people. It is a fear to be in nature, to walk in a polluted forest, to consume berries and mushrooms; parents' fear for their children and children's fear for their old parents who refused to leave the Chernobyl zone.

Long ago, in the Middle Ages, a special torture was applied—each minute, a drop of water would fall on the same spot of the human skull, and the victim would loose his mind. We are in a similar situation, for we are tormented by fear. A permanent, continuing fear hovers over my land—people are afraid of infection, of consuming food that may be polluted. All this contributes to the increase in general somatic diseases. We are not talking about only some portion of our population, or children, in particular; we state that all Belarusian children are sick. With regard to this, we attach great importance to the program "Genetic Heritage" which is being elaborated by UNESCO, since, in essence, Chernobyl threatens the genetic survival of our nation—one of the oldest Slavic nations. That is why we highly appreciate UNESCO's efforts to adopt a resolution on the Chernobyl tragedy.

Taking into account the concrete results attained by the implementation of the program "UNESCO-Chernobyl" and, first of all, the significant nonbudget means collected for the fulfillment of many projects of this program, as well as taking into account the number of member states which currently participate in it, my country, Belarus, together with Ukraine and Russia has submitted for consideration by the 27th session of the UNESCO General Conference a draft resolution, in which we express our gratitude to the above- mentioned persons and organizations and ask them to continue their coordinated efforts in that direction. I would like to recall that the draft resolution has been discussed and approved in the First Commission. With regard to this, I would like to appeal to the respected heads of delegations to adopt the text of the resolution during the plenary session. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the resolution regards only nonbudget means—this will not infringe upon the interests of developing countries, since Belarus has always been far from the spirit of egoism and selfishness. We understand the pains and alarms of many developing countries of the world. Even today, this rostrum has given a vent to shocking facts, but we also ask for compassion and appeal to the world community for coordinated efforts in raising nonbudget funds. [passage omitted]

Energy Situation Prompts TV Cutback Plans

WS2212160293 Minsk VECHERNIY MINSK in Russian 14 Dec 93 p 1

[Report by Boris Zalesskiy: "Is Television To Be Cut Off Soon?"]

[Text] In the National News Center, journalists have briefed Belarusian Minister of Energy V.V. Gerasimov; S.K. Mikhalev, deputy chairman of the commission for

oil and chemistry under the Cabinet of Ministers; N.P. Mochernyuk, general director of BELTRANSGAZ; and E.F. Tovpenets, president of the BELTOPGAZ concern.

They described the current situation in the fuel and energy sector in Belarus as difficult and critical. V.V. Gerasimov specified the four main reasons for the current difficulties: the break of economic ties within the framework of the former Union, the general crisis in financial relations, the decline in the level of oil extraction, and nonpayment by consumers. Today, consumers of Belarusian energy owe over 300 billion rubles. The fuel reserves at the power engineering facilities will last for only 10 days.

"At present, our primary task is to provide energy resources for the municipal and everyday sector and the food industry in the first place," stated the minister of energy.

Of course, this is being accomplished at the expense of enterprises and other branches of industry. At the current time, about 30 enterprises have been fully cut off from energy supplies and about the same number has been limited in terms of energy consumption.

The recent news from Moscow is that the gas supplies to our Republic have fully been resumed. However, this means that our debts to Russia are increasing by the rate of 5 billion rubles per day. Of course, this cannot last for long. Either enterprises must be stopped, or debts must be written off on state accounts. The latter cannot be done in a market economy, so we can expect the former.

With regard to oil supplies, the situation is gradually improving due to imports by commercial structures; the recent increase in prices has also played a stabilizing role. These days, before driving, every driver will have to look in his purse and judge whether he needs to drive anywhere at all.

Of course, such a situation makes one think about the savings of heat and electricity. According to the Ministry of Energy, the government has already proposed a package of measures with regard to this, including measures concerning tariff policy. It is expected that the number of organizations provided with energy on favorable terms will be reduced. The journalists were stirred by the statement that cuts in television broadcasting are also being considered. Responding to a question from a VECHERNIY MINSK correspondent, V.V. Gerasimov said that the number of programs after eleven in the evening [2100 GMT] will probably be reduced. However, the final decision will be made in agreement with Gosteleradio [State Committee for Broadcasting].

Moldova

Sangheli May Resign To Run for Parliament

LD2212205493 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1700 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] Moldovan Prime Minister Andrey Sangheli may resign soon as head of the cabinet. He informed an ITAR-TASS correspondent of this in Chisinau today. Andrey Sangheli explained his decision by his intention to take part in elections to the republic's new parliament. The prime minister plans to stand for the Agrarian Democratic Party.

Dniester Authorities Will Not Prevent Elections

LD2212120893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1122 GMT 22 Dec 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Demidetskiy]

[Text] Chisinau December 22 TASS—The authorities of the Dniester Republic have announced that they would not prevent citizens, residing in the Dniester area, from taking part in the elections to the new Moldovan parliament, Valeriy Litskay, state secretary of the unrecognised Dniester Republic, stated here today. He said the Tiraspol authorities did not plan to set up any polling stations or to do anything else, linked with the upcoming elections.

Litskay recalled that the leadership of the republic and the Tiraspol authorities had found common language with the Moldovans during the 1991 presidential elections, according to which eight polling stations were set up in the Dniester area. "No proposals linked with the organisation of the elections on the territory of the Dniester Republic have so far been received, while we do not wish to display any initiatives on this score," he stated.

The central commission for elections to the Moldovan parliament intends, nevertheless, to set up polling stations in the Dniester area. If the holding of elections there proves impossible, the polling stations will be set up on the right-hand bank of the Dniester River.

Kazakhstan

Nazarbayev Comments on Need to Strengthen CIS

LD2312133293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0944 GMT 23 Dec 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Amangeldy Akhmetalimov and Gennady Kulagin]

[Text] Almaty 23 December TASS—Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev declared for the strengthening of economic integration among countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). He spoke late in the evening on Wednesday [22 December] in Ekibastuz at the celebration of the launching of a large power-generating set at a thermal power station. Nazarbayev said the event attests to the undoubted benefit of "economic and human ties among countries of the Commonwealth".

The putting into operation of the power-generating set is the result of the joint work of Kazakhstan people, turbine builders of St. Petersburg, electrical engineers of Novosibirsk and Zaporozhye, boiler builders of Podolsk, as well as assemblymen from Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan.

"All republics of the former USSR are now sovereign states, but this does not mean that we should not cooperate closely to the benefit of our people, preserving age-old goodneighbourliness and friendship. Now this largely depends on the responsibility of politicians sincerely wishing good to their peoples", Nursultan Nazarbayev said.

"All participants in the CIS should put a stop to fratricide by joint effort in 1994. The new year should be proclaimed the year of the strengthening of mutual ties, of opening the frontiers and of creating a common market of the states of the Commonwealth", the Kazakhstan President said.

Russian Community Spokesmen Protest 'Inequality'

PM2212104593 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Dec 93 p 1

[Nikolay Kozhanov report under the "Russians Abroad" rubric: "Don't Let the Grapes of Wrath Ripen"]

[Text] The press conference held at Moscow's Arbat Hotel by the Congress of Russian Communities and the Russian Community in Kazakhstan left a sad and alarming impression. Who could have ever imagined that we would have heard long-established residents and smallholders from the North Kazakhstan lands, which I remember well from my student days in the virgin lands, bitterly complain that for some time now they have been treated not as smallholders but almost as parasites (but at least not as "occupiers") in their native land. Or that there are plans afoot to call ancient Petropavlovsk, founded by Russians in 1752, something like Kzyl-Zhar, while villages and cossack stanitsas which have been Russian for centuries are to be reorganized along the lines of auls....

Boris Fedorovich Suprunyuk, chairman of the Russian community in Petropavlovsk, and Viktor Ivanovich Achkasov, ataman of the Siberian Cossack Gorkaya River Branch host, cited plenty of facts testifying that, despite authoritative assurances by Republic leaders that "there is no Russian problem in Kazakhstan," such a problem does exist and is being steadily exacerbated by actions aimed at dividing along nationality lines people who have for centuries lived shoulder to shoulder in good neighborliness, peace, and accord. They brought to the press conference's notice a recent incident, when N. Tlemisov, chief of the Republic Ministry of Finance's Main Customs Administration who was visiting Petropavlovsk, indignantly exploded on hearing that his interlocutor belonged to the German "Rebirth" Society: "And what do you intend to regenerate in my land?!"

But this is not just a question of emotions by individual functionaries. There have already been instances of persecutions, arrests, and legal rulings along the line that "there are no Cossacks as such in Kazakhstan" (this happened when the Cossacks attempted to have their host officially registered). Inappropriate comparisons have also been drawn between Russia and Kazakhstan's northern Russian-speaking oblasts on the one hand and Hitler's Germany and the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia on the other hand....

Even the legislative statutes of recent years have de facto enshrined the inequality of nations. Why is it, for example, that Kazakhs living in Russia enjoy the right to hold dual citizenship, while non-Kazakhs living in Kazakhstan have no such right? Kazakhs arriving in the Republic have no problems at all with residence permits. Representatives of other nationalities find this the subject of endless and frequently fruitless dealings with numerous bureaucratic institutions. The leaders of Russian communities in Kazakhstan are also amazed by the Russian leadership's passiveness in this regard, a passiveness which, in the worst case scenario, could result in the appearance of at least 6 million Russian refugees in the country. The situation of Russians in Kazakhstan could, in particular, become a priority topic of parliamentary hearings at the newly elected State Duma. It was also proposed to create a free economic zone in North Kazakhstan regions adjacent to Russia.

The press conference participants recalled that more than 90 percent of Russian speakers had voted for Nursultan Nazarbayev at the presidential elections, having pinned on him their hopes for peace and prosperity for their families in the young Republic. It would be nice to hope that Kazakhstan's president was sincere when he declared that "he who solves the problems of his own ethnic group at the expense of others, fanning ethnic dissension in the process, acts contrary to history's laws" and leads the country "into a historical limbo."

Tajikistan

Afghanistan's Rabbani Signs Treaty, Ends Visit

Emphasizes Islamic Ties

LD2212192893 Kabul Radio Afghanistan Network in Pashto 1530 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] Esteemed Borhanoddin Rabbani, president of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, who is in Tajikistan on an official friendly visit, yesterday paid a visit to the State University of Tajikistan and met with teachers, scholars, and staff of the higher education institutions of that country.

Accompanied by Imamali Rakhmanov, president of the Supreme Council of Tajikistan, the university president spoke about the activities of that institution. Then the president of the university presented an honorary PhD degree to esteemed Prof Borhanoddin Rabbani, president of the Islamic State of Afghanistan.

The esteemed president delivered a speech at the meeting, saying that the deep friendly links between the nations of Afghanistan and Tajikistan are nothing new. They have historic roots. The interest of our nations in Islamic civilization and culture and the role of the Afghan and Tajik nations in the enrichment of Islamic civilization and culture are issues that the whole world accepts.

In another section of his speech the esteemed Prof Borhanoddin said: the Afghan nation offered 1.5 million martyrs to gain its independence. Our nation still offers much sacrifices to protect this independence. The people of Afghanistan are fighting problems and working for the reconstruction of their country.

The esteemed president of the Islamic State of Afghanistan added: All freedoms are being observed in Afghanistan in the framework of the sacred religion of Islam, and a general amnesty is being fully implemented. The jail doors in Afghanistan are open. Marxism no longer exists in Afghanistan. We all hold hands as a Muslim nation and work for the reconstruction of our country. Those examples can provide good conditions for the ensuring of peace in other countries, including the fraternal country of Tajikistan.

Friendship Treaty Signed

LD2212201193 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1811 GMT 22 Dec 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Gridneva]

[Text] Dushanbe, 22 Dec—A four-day official visit to Tajikistan by Professor Borhanoddin Rabbani, president of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, ended today with the signing of a treaty on friendship, good-neighborliness, and cooperation between Tajikistan and Afghanistan. The document was signed by Tajik leader Imamali Rakhmanov, chairman of the Republic's Supreme Council, and the Afghan leader.

In addition, they signed intergovernment agreements on the border between the two states, on trade and economic cooperation; also a tripartite agreement on refugees' issues was signed between the Islamic State of Afghanistan, the Republic of Tajikistan, and the mission of the UN High Commission for Refugees.

The heads of state of Tajikistan and Afghanistan made brief statements for the press on the results of the talks. They expressed satisfaction with the talks and stressed that the agreements reached there were a fundamentally new page in the relations between the two fraternal neighboring states.

"Much suffering has fallen to the lot of the Afghan and Tajik peoples but we can overcome it if we extend a helping hand toward each other," Borhanoddin Rabbani said, among other things. Touching upon some aspects of Afghanistan's foreign policy, he said that his country had never interfered in the affairs of the sovereign Tajikistan and would never do so, and that it was consistently following the line of a normalization of relations with the neighboring republic. Afghanistan will do all it can to stabilize the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border and turn it into a peaceful and friendly border, as well as to ensure that Tajik refugees return to their native country as soon as possible.

Correspondents heard with interest the statement by Rakhmanov, the head of the Republic of Tajikistan, that the leadership of the Republic decided, as an act of good will, to free 33 nationals of Afghanistan arrested on the territory of Tajikistan for illegal border crossing. All are to be sent to their home country tomorrow morning.

The official delegation of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, headed by the Republic's president, is to leave for Kabul also tomorrow morning.

Afghan Prisoners Released

LD2312112693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0838 GMT 23 Dec 93

[By KHOVAR agency correspondent Zainiddin Nasriddinov for TASS]

[Text] Dushanbe December 23 Tass—Afghan President Borhanoddin Rabbani departed for Kabul on Thursday [23 December] after his official visit to Tajikistan.

Under the programme of the four-day visit, the Afghan President had talks with Tajik Parliament Speaker Imamali Rakhmanov and other Tajik leaders and made trips to the cities of Kulyab, Khudzhand, and Tursunzade.

The sides signed several documents on improving the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border, returning Tajik refugees from Afghanistan as well as on improving bilateral trade and economic relations.

Meeting halfway the Afghan side, Tajik authorities released 33 Afghans interned in Tajik jails for border violations. Apart from them, Rabbani took home 71 Afghan orphans who were brought up at Tajik boarding schools.

The Afghan president expressed gratitude to the Tajik authorities for a humanitarian act—the release of border violators.

Turajonzoda Views Visit as Insignificant

LD2212145493 (Clandestine) Voice of Free Tajikistan in Tajik 0600 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] His Eminence Haji Akbar Turajonzoda, first deputy leader of the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan [Turajonzoda was a Kazi, spiritual leader, and people's deputy of Tajikistan until December 1992] has said that the current visit by Afghan President Ustad Borhanoddin Rabbani to Tajikistan cannot have a significant role in developing relations between the two countries, because at present, sovereignty does not exist in Tajikistan, and what is signed in a protocol cannot be implemented in Tajikistan.

Speaking on Tehran radio, His Eminence Haji Akbar Turajonzoda added that at present, Tajikistan is unable to conduct any trade with Afghanistan since Tajikistan's economy has totally collapsed and is even unable to sell a match stick to Afghanistan.

Situation Remains Tense on Tajik-Afghan Border

LD2212191993 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Tajik 1600 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] The situation along the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan remains tense. A military source reported that armed Tajik opposition groups since mid-December have been assembling in regions close to the border with Afghanistan. The number of their fighters is [words indistinct].

Armed fighters are mounting armed operations along the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border, especially in the [name indistinct] region of Shurobad.

A reliable source said that the militants have carried out these operations on the occasion of the anniversary of bloody events in Kurgan-Tyube Oblast. As it is known, the opposition militants were defeated a year ago during the fighting and fled to Afghanistan.

According to a reliable military source, the opposition fighters, who have infiltrated the territory of Tajikistan from the territory of the neighboring state, during the past three days have shelled one of the (?border guards') post in Moskovskiy rayon in the direction of Shurobad.

It should be said that the operations by the antigovernment (?groups) are taking place because of the weakness of local government chiefs in the border regions of Afghanistan. All the responsibility arising from armed provocations on the border will lie with them.

Clashes Reported Between Government, Opposition

LD2212163193 (Clandestine) Voice of Free Tajikistan in Tajik 0600 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] Reports coming from the al-Badr front say that serious clashes took place on Monday in the Davlatabad village, Shurabod rayon. A correspondent of Khorasan reports that these clashes took place at 0700 and continued until sunset.

This is the second time this village has come under heavy attack by Mojahedin artillery. During these clashes, nine government soldiers were killed a number of them wounded, and one soldier has been captured.

Decree Issued To Relieve Abdullodzhanov of Post

LD2212121493 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Russian 1000 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Tajikistan on Abdumalik Abdullodzhanov, chairman of the Council of Ministers of Tajikistan.

In connection with being transfered to diplomatic work and in accordance with Point 14 of Clause 108 of the Constitution of Tajikistan, the Presidium of the Supreme Council of Tajikistan decrees:

To relieve Abdumalik Abdulloyevich Abdullodzhanov from the post of chairman of the Council of Ministers of Tajikistan.

The decree enters into force from the date of its signing.

To submit the above mentioned decree to the Supreme Council of Tajikistan for approval.

Samadov Appointed Acting Head

LD2212112593 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Russian 1000 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tajikistan on Abdujalil Samadov:

In accordance with the point 14 of clause 108 of the Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tajikistan decrees:

To appoint Abdujalil Ahadovich Samadov, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, as acting chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Tajikistan.

Iranian Paper Interviews Islamic Renewal Party Figure

LD2212213693 (Clandestine) Voice of Free Tajikistan in Tajik 0600 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Excerpt] An interview with His Eminence Hoji Akbar Turajonzoda, first deputy leader of the Islamic Renewal Party of Tajikistan, with the HAMSHAHRI newspaper of Iran, begins with a conversation with that great Tajik spiritual leader. The interview is entitled "The People of Tajikistan Are Being Slaughtered Because They Show Interest in Islam and Iran." Here is a summary of this interview:

The first question was: Will you please describe to our readers the latest events in Tajikistan following the communists' coming to power.

His Eminence Hoji Akbar Turajonzoda answered that by mentioning the fall of the government of national reconciliation, consisting of Muslims, national groups, and democrats, and the serious clashes that took place in Tajikistan. During these clashes the forces of the present government, which consist of former communists and many criminals, began the relentless killing of the Muslims. During these events many intellectuals, religious faithful, and great Tajik religious and national figures ewere killed. Similarly, the security forces have raided the houses of the people at night, capturing people. So far we do not have any information about the fate of many of them.

Clashes have continued in the capital of Tajikistan, Dushanbe, especially since late November, and the clashes are still continuing. During this period of time, the ruling communists with [words indistinct] military of Uzbekistan have carried out strong attacks against the Muslim positions. They have bombarded many towns and villages. In my village in Kofarnihonskiy rayon, 53 of 178 villagers have been killed as a result of the attacks by the communists. Despite this the resistance still continues in the country.

Four big rayons in Karategin region are controlled by the Muslims and the government could not recapture them despite all their efforts. Even during their attacks they have sustained big losses. In general, the campaign by the communists was one of the reasons that hundreds of thousands of Muslims have fled the country and the towns and villages of Tajikistan have been destroyed.

In such a situation the present rulers who are mainly communists and do not know anything about the policy of governing and implementation of democracy in the country are not popular among the people and the general dissatisfaction is growing.

The HAMSHAHRI correspondent asked about the role of foreign powers in the latest events in Tajikistan and the coming of communists to power.

His Eminence Hoji Akbar Turajonzoda answered that Russia and Uzbekistan have had a particular role in bringing the communists to power. The communists would have never achieved victory without the assistance of those two countries. [Passage omitted]

Turkmenistan

IMF's Camdessus Welcomes Economic Reforms

LD2212134493 Ashgabat Radio Ashgabat Network in Russian 0200 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] President Saparmurad Turkmenbashy [Niyazov] met with Michel Camdessus, managing director of the International Monetary Fund [IMF], who has arrived in Ashgabat at his invitation.

His Excellency Mr. Camdessus congratulated the president on the successful introduction of the national currency and welcomed the steps taken by the Government of Turkmenistan in implementing economic reform.

At the beginning of the meeting between the state leader and his guest, questions of future cooperation between Turkmenistan and the IMF were examined.

Niyazov and Camdessus exchanged letters. These letters attached great value to the initial results of the fruitful cooperation. At the news conference that followed, His Excellency Mr. Camdessus said that Turkmenistan had achieved significant results in reforming the banking system and the policy of introducing rates.

As estimated by the IMF, which has given technical and consultative assistance to Turkmenistan in introducing the manat, this important step enables the Government of Turkmenistan to have independent supervision over the financial situation in the country, to reduce the effects of (?inflation), and to lay the foundation of a long-term economic development.

The IMF will also give assistance to Turkmenistan in changing the manat to a reliable convertible currency in the future. For this reason, the already established economic programs by the Turkmenistan Government, including social protection of the population, a strong budget, and carrying out the credit and financial policy are (?to be implemented).

His Excellency Mr. Camdessus pointed out that foreign investors show interest in Turkmenistan. The managing director of the IMF, welcoming the beginning of privatization in the country, said that strengthening the private sector will enable the government to create the necessary infrastructure and to solve many problems. At the end of his speech, His Excellency Mr. Camdessus expressed his gratitude to President Saparmurad Turkmenbashy for having invited him to Turkmenistan. He also pointed out that he was happy with the results of his visit.

Iranian Envoy, Foreign Minister Discuss Ties

LD2212215093 Tehran IRNA in English 2025 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] Moscow, Dec. 22, IRNA—Turkmen Foreign Minister Khalykberdy Atayev met Iran's Foreign Ministry director general for West Asian affairs Mir Mahmoud Mousavi in Ashgabat Wednesday [22 December], and expressed hope that Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) would help bring Iran and Turkmenistan closer together.

He also expressed hope the upcoming assembly of the foreign ministers of ECO would pave the way for closer cooperation between the 10 member states.

The Iranian envoy delivered an invitation to Atayev from his Iranian counterpart to attend the ECO foreign ministerial meet in Tehran in mid February.

ECO, founded by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, was recently expanded to include Azerbaijan, Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics of Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.

Uzbekistan

Karimov Discusses Obstacles to Reforms

LD2312104193 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 0900 GMT 23 Dec 93

[Text] At an extended council session, Uzbek President Islam Karimov, together with heads of ministries, departments, banks, small joint enterprises, and farms, summed up the results and discussed the problems of economic reform. The republican president named restrained privatization, unenterprising workers in state structures, and instances of bribery and corruption as some of the factors that hinder reforms. Problems were brought into the open and ways for stepping up economic reforms in Uzbekistan were mapped out.

Rumors Circulate on Possible Return to Ruble Zone

MK2212132093 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 22 Dec 93 p 5

[Unattributed INTERFAX report in the "Money" column: "Will Uzbekistan Return to the Ruble Zone?"]

[Text] Reports from Tashkent indicate that for more than a week rumors have been circulating in Uzbekistan that as of 24 December the som-coupons, which in November replaced the old Soviet money as an interim national currency, will be withdrawn from circulation. The Republic's authorities so far are keeping silent, but on the black market in the past two days the rate of the Russian ruble has doubled, with 8 som-coupons being offered for one ruble in Tashkent's central marketplaces.

According to one version, Uzbekistan will either return to the ruble zone or start using the new Russian money. The probability of this option was confirmed by an informal source in the cabinet of ministers who said that in recent days a consignment of banknotes was delivered to Uzbekistan from Russia.

According to another version, Uzbekistan will speed up the introduction of its own currency, which is being printed in London. There is also a third version whereby rumors about the cancellation of the sum-coupons have been circulated deliberately because there is an acute shortage of cash in the Republic. According to the Uzbekistan Savings Bank, nearly one third of the sum-coupons issued are being hoarded by the population.

Armenia

Fighting Reported on NKR Front Lines 22 Dec

NC2212165393 Yerevan Radio Yerevan in Azeri 1430 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] We now present a report we received from the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic [NKR] a short while ago:

The NKR defense headquarters has disclosed that Azerbaijan's military units tried to launch a new attack against the NKR defense positions during the past day. An infantry attack, which was supported by military vehicles, was launched against Askeran on the night of 21 December. The Armenian fighters killed six troops and destroyed several armored vehicles in the fighting. They also forced the advancing units to withdraw to their own positions. Two Armenian fighters were wounded in the clashes.

Meanwhile, the NKR defense positions in Mardakertskiy Rayon were shelled by artillery units last night. Azerbaijan's military units launched an attack in the southeastern sector of the front lines at about 0800 today. The attack was preceded by an intensive wave of artillery shelling. According to the reports we have received, at about 1000 the fighting in that part of the front lines is still continuing.

Azerbaijan Reportedly Fires on Border Regions

NC2212212993 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 2050 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] The Azerbaijani Army again disrupted the peace on Armenia's northeastern border yesterday. The Armenian Defense Ministry press service reported that the enemy fired machine guns at Tiran-Noyemberyan road from its military base at (Mazamil) in Kazakhskiy Rayon between 1230-1300.

The border post in Krasnoselskiy Rayon came under machine gun fire between 2130-2200. Remaining true to the unilaterally declared cease-fire, the Armenian border guards did not retaliate. There were no casualties.

The enemy army units again directed machine gun fire at the defensive positions around Tiran in Idzhevanskiy Rayon at around 1200 today. There were some injuries.

The situation remained calm on the other sectors of the Armenian border.

President Writes Afghan Leaders on Mojahedin Issues

NC2212210693 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 1800 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] The Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan sent letters today to Afghan President Borhanoddin Rabbani and Prime Minister Golboddin Hekmatyar. The president expressed his concern at the participation of the Afghan mojahedin in the Karabakh conflict zone on the side of Azerbaijani troops.

The Armenian president hoped that this is being done without the knowledge of the Afghanistan leadership and that the leadership will take note of these developments.

Arutyunyan Discusses Economics With Iranian Envoy

NC2212213493 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 2000 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] The Armenian Vice President Gagik Arutyunyan received today the Iranian Charge d'Affaires ad interim in Armenia Mr. Ahmad Sobhani at the latter's request.

Mr. Sobhani handed a message to the Armenian vice president from Morteza Mohammad-Khani, who was recently appointed Iran's minister of economy and finance. In his letter to the Armenian vice president, the minister, who is also the chairman of the Iranian state commission on the coordination of the ties between Iran and Armenia, assured that he will exert efforts for the further development and deepening of economic cooperation between the two countries.

The progress of the work done by an Iranian commission that is in Armenia to examine the agreement on the construction of a gas pipeline between Armenia and Iran, and a number of issues pertaining to economic cooperation were also discussed at the meeting.

Central Bank Raises Lending Rate to 210 Percent

NC2212214093 Yerevan SNARK in English 1016 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] Yerevan, December 22 (SNARK)—The Armenian Central Bank increased an interest rate on refinancing credits from December 20.

As SNARK was informed from the Armenian Central Bank press- service, taking into account the dram's devaluation, the Central Bank basing on his authorities has set a new interest rate for refinancing credits—210 percent per annum instead of ex-170 percent. The margin makes 4 per cent.

Azerbaijan

'Enemy Forces' Intensify Operations in Fizuli

Combat in Fizulinskiy Rayon Reported

NC2212165793 Baku Radio Baku International Service in Azeri 1300 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] The Azerbaijani Ministry of National Security Press Service has disclosed that the enemy forces have stepped up their effort to intensify their combat operations in the Fizuli sector of the front line. However, Azerbaijan's defense forces have obstructed the enemy's attacks until now. For example, our positions have been

fired on from Buyuk Bakhmanly in Fizulinskiy Rayon. Our artillery units took action and silenced the enemy fire emplacements. The Armenian bandits retreated in a military vehicle. However, their vehicle hit a mine and was destroyed.

The ferocious enemy units brought four more tanks to Buyuk Bakhmanly, three of which have been deployed in the town and [words indistinct].

Karabakh Reports Offensive

LD2212173993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1622 GMT 22 Dec 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vadim Byrkin]

[Text] Moscow December 22 TASS—The Azeri army launched an offensive in some areas of the Karabakh front line in the past twenty four hours in violation of a truce reached with Russia's mediation, the Nagorno-Karabakh press and information department told ITAR-TASS by telephone on Wednesday with reference to the Nagorno-Karabakh defence headquarters.

On Tuesday evening, the Azeri infantry backed by armoured carriers launched an attack in the direction of Askeran but was rebuffed by defence forces and had to retreat to former positions, killing six soldiers and destroying one armoured carrier.

Last night, Karabakh positions in the Mardakert region came under artillery fire. On Wednesday morning, Karabakh positions in the south-west were attacked following rocket and artillery shelling. Fighting had been going on there until the evening. Losses and damages have not been reported yet.

Aliyev Calls For Help To Halt Arms to Karabakh

LD2212230493 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1838 GMT 22 Dec 93

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature; prepared by Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy and Vladimir Shishlin, edited by Boris Grishchenko]

[Text] Azerbaijan called upon the UN Secretary General, the heads of the UN Security Council member-states and the CIS leaders to undertake "urgent and efficient measures" to prevent delivery of armaments from Armenia to "its regular forces situated on Azerbaijani territory" and "to transform the region of Nagorno-Karabakh into a zone of international inspections and control as the first move towards its demilitarization."

The statement of Azerbaijani President Geydar Aliyev published by his press service on Wednesday points out that Armenia violates the resolution recently adopted by the UN General Assembly which calls for a moratorium on export of booby traps and other kinds of lethal weapons and continues to arm its formations with these weapons on the occupied Azerbaijani territories, including Nagorno-Karabakh. The document underlines that, according to the reported facts, Armenia utilizes the booby traps not only for military purpose and for the further gradual colonization of the occupied territories but also for terrorist acts against the civilian population.

Azerbaijan draws the attention of the UN member-states to the fact that the regular supply by Armenia of "its expeditionary corps in Nagorno-Karabakh" with booby traps, modern armored equipment, artillery and air defense systems is a gross violation of the UN Security Council's resolutions N853, 874 and 884 "which call upon the Armenian government to abstain from delivery of any kind of armaments to the Armenian armed forces stationed on the occupied Azerbaijani territories."

The document says that taking into consideration the serious consequences of the Armenian anti-humanitarian official policy on export of modern lethal weapons and referring to the appropriate resolutions of the UN General Assembly, Azerbaijan calls upon the UN member-states and international organizations providing Azerbaijan with humanitarian aid to include the issue on mine clearing of the occupied territories in their programs concerning humanitarian, social and economic aid to Azerbaijan.

International Help Sought To Clear Land Mines

NC2212203993 Baku Azerbaycan Radio Televiziyasi Television Network in Azeri 1600 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] The Azerbaijani Presidential Press Service has issued a statement saying that in violation of the decision adopted by the UN General Assembly, which some days ago imposed a moratorium on the export of land mines and other destructive weapons, the Armenian Republic is providing this type of cruel weapon to its armed units on occupied Azerbaijani lands and in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Experience shows that, Armenia is using personnel mines not for military purposes, but for terrorism against the Azerbaijani civilians.

Azerbaijan calls the attention of the UN member countries to the fact that Armenia's dispatch of every type of military hardware, artillery pieces, and Zenith launchers, in addition to land mines, to its expeditionary corps in Nagorno-Karabakh violates UN Security Council Resolutions 853, 874, and 884.

In view of this fact, Azerbaijan calls on the UN secretary-general and national leaders of the members of UN Security Council and of the UN to take urgent and effective measures, and it requests the foreign countries providing humanitarian assistance to help clear land mines from Azerbaijani territory as soon as possible and to provide humanitarian, sociological, and economic assistance to the republic.

Elchibey Calls For Cooperation on New Parliament

NC2212220993 Ankara TURKISH DAILY NEWS in English 20 Dec 93 pp 1, 11

[Text] Ankara—In a surprise move, Azerbaijan's former President Abulfaz Elchibey signaled over the weekend that he was ready to cooperate with his successor Geydar Aliyev for the establishment of a democratic parliament.

The deposed president said in a press conference in his home town Keleki in Nakhichevan that he was ready to sign a protocol with his political arch-rival Aliyev on "stopping the Armenian attacks, overcoming economic problems and establishing a democratic parliament," the Anatolia news agency reported. But Elchibey also rapped Aliyev for undemocratic measures and "moving the country towards dictatorship."

The call came at a time of increased speculation that Aliyev was losing his grip on power. In Ankara, Azerbaijan's main opposition party's vice chairman, Sabit Bagirov, said his party still considered Elchibey the legitimate president and might cooperate with Elchibey's Popular [People's] Front in possible early elections.

Bagirov also told reporters that "talks were going on in Russia to decide on Aliyev's successor."

Although Elchibey referred in his press conference to the pro-Russian policies of Aliyev and Prime Minister Suret Guseynov, he refrained from employing strong rhetoric against Moscow's contribution to the Karabakh problem. On the contrary, he maintained that, "Turkey, the United States, and Russia should act together with Azerbaijan to stop Armenian attacks and force Armenian withdrawal from Azeri territory."

But he said he hoped the free world would move to contain the rise of nationalism in Russia. "(The nationalist leader) Zhirinovsky is a typical embodiment of Hitler. Unfortunately, such politicians are gaining strength," he said.

Grim Picture

Elchibey also painted a grim picture of Azerbaijan under Aliyev, saying, "the country was fast moving towards dictatorship." He noted that "a great political and economic decline" was being experienced.

"The Aliyev administration is taking the country to dictatorship," Elchibey said. "Opposition is suppressed, politicians imprisoned and the press muzzled."

Similar complaints were made by Bagirov in Ankara. Aliyev last month closed down newspapers in the country, claiming a shortage of paper.

Elchibey's Envoy Says Aliyev's Days Numbered

NC2212215993 Ankara TURKISH DAILY NEWS in English 20 Dec 93 pp 1, 11

[Text] Ankara—Ali Kerimov, deputy chairman of the Azerbaijan Popular [People's] Front and special envoy of Azerbaijan's former President Abulfaz Elchibey, told the TURKISH DAILY NEWS over the weekend that there was significant opposition mounting against Elchibey's successor Geydar Aliyev in Azerbaijan and that it would not take more than two or three months before Aliyev would be forced to step down as president.

Kerimov briefed Turkish officials in Ankara concerning his talks in Washington where he had participated in the Turkic World Conference between Dec. 2-6. He said that he had met with officials from the U.S. Departments of State and Defense during his stay in Washington.

Kerimov argued that Aliyev would not be elected if democratic elections were held. But, he said if Aliyev chose not prepare the necessary grounds for a democratic election, the people would take to the streets and topple Aliyev just as they had done Mutalibov.

Emphasizing that Elchibey should never be sacrificed in relations with Azerbaijan, Kerimov continued: "With the past six months, Azerbaijan's general situation has been rapidly declining. Around one million Azeris have migrated to various countries. Armenians have been allowed to occupy two of its six major provinces. Inflation has reached about 500 percent whereas the wage increase has remained at only 80 percent. Azerbaijan has also lost its independence by becoming a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

"Twenty percent of the country's oil wells have been given to Russians. It has also been agreed that the oil pipelines will be built through Russia. Thus Russia has been supplied with a 750 million dollar income. All of these developments have caused Aliyev and his administration to lose power and prestige. The opposition has become strong. Aliyev's administration, meanwhile, has taken 34 opposition leaders under custody for no apparent reason. These people have now been held in prison for months where they are awaiting to be tried."

Noting that the press suffers under censorship and that the opposition has not been permitted to function, Kerimov said that through such practices, Aliyev was preparing his own end. "Elections will be held in 1995. However Aliyev cannot administer the country with the existing Parliament and government until then. In spring 1994, the issue of holding early elections will come onto the agenda. If, as a result of Western pressure, democratic elections are held, democratic forces will emerge from the ballot box, but Aliyev will not be among them."

Kerimov pointed out that the results of the Russian elections were very significant for Azerbaijan and that Aliyev could make any concessions to stay in his post. For that reason Kerimov said that unseating Aliyev through popular unrest was not something desirable

because, he noted, if Aliyev were toppled in the streets, such a scenario would trouble the waters and encourage the Russians to also fish in it.

Kerimov recalled that similar developments were experienced in Georgia and Tajikistan and that Russians had sent troops to those countries.

Kerimov said, "Preventing Russian soldiers from entering Azerbaijan can only be possible with pressure from the United States and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)." He said that in the face of all these developments in Azerbaijan, it would not be incorrect to say that Aliyev was on the verge of losing his post, but it may be too early to say that Elchibey was returning to power. He said he and his colleagues hoped Turkey would review its Azerbaijan policy within that framework.

Hard Currency With Seven States Agreed Upon

LD2212120693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1118 GMT 22 Dec 93

[By AZERTAC correspondent Alla Baula]

[Text] Baku December 22 TASS—Azerbaijan will trade with seven CIS states in hard currency and according to world prices in 1994, the AZERTAC news agency learned from the republican government.

It said that the delegation of Azerbaijan which left for the CIS summit in Ashgabat on Wednesday will sign corresponding trade and cooperation agreements there with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Ukraine.

Azerbaijan failed to agree with the seven former Soviet republics on clearing trade in 1994, according to the source.

Georgia

Deputy Premier on Violations of Geneva Memorandum

LD2312103393 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1400 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] Today, Georgian Deputy Prime Minister Tamaz Nadareishvili sent a statement to the UN secretary general's personal envoy, [Edouard] Brunner, the Russian president's personal envoy, [Boris] Pastukhov, and a CSCE representative, Mr. (Manno).

The statement says: We regarded the results of the Geneva talks as an actual way to the political settlement of the conflict. However, the Abkhaz separatists have violated all paragraphs of the agreement since the first days of signing the memorandum. The separatists have been carrying out offensive operations in the Kodori gorge, shelling villages densely populated by Georgians. There are casualties among civilians. Punitive operations are carried out in Gali Rayon. The villages of Primorskiy, Pichora, Kvemo Bargebi, and Zemo Bargebi have been burned down. Civilians have been shot to death. Some inhabitants of the area are taken prisoner and sent to concentration camps situated in Gudauta. The above-mentioned shows that paragraph four of the memorandum is violated.

In this situation, the refugee comeback becomes unreal and their lives are not secure.

Also violated is paragraph seven about the status of Abkhazia. We have stated that the status of Abkhazia should be determined as an autonomy with extended rights within the Georgian state. This has been emphasized in the memorandum and the UN resolution. The separatists regard the status of Abkhazia as that of an independent state. They intend to hold a referendum on the political status of Abkhazia in the very near future. Taking into account some 250,000 Georgians exiled from Abkhazia, we can easily foresee the results of the referendum.

I appeal to you, a guarantor of the Geneva memorandum, to prevent the wrecking of the political settlement of the conflict and violation of all paragraphs of the memorandum.

You have listened to a statement of Georgian Deputy Prime Minister Tamaz Nadareishvili.

Account of POW's Demanded

LD2212232693 Tbilisi CONTACT INFORMATION AGENCY in Russian 1900 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] On 22 December, the Republic of Georgia's Commission on the Issues of Prisoners of War, Hostages, and Those Missing held its meeting in Tbilisi. The meeting was chaired by Aleksandre Kavsadze, the head of the commission, and chairman of the State Committee for Human Rights and Interethnic Relations.

The deputy chairman of the commission, Paata Zakareishvili, reported on the exchange of prisoners of war on the bridge over the Enguri River. He said that the exchange of POW's had been conducted in a normal way. A corresponding commission from the Abkhazian side regarded its mission completed, claiming to have no more prisoners. According to data obtained by the Georgian side, the Abkhazian side still held some 60 prisoners at the moment.

Mr. Zakareishvili said that the Georgian side had put forward a number of demands, namely: The Abkhazian side has to hand the Georgian side a list of those killed during the war, their documents and photo materials; accurate lists of those missing should be made and handed over to the Georgian side; Georgian representatives must be allowed to visit burial grounds of Georgian servicemen and civilians.

Police Chief Says Russian Troops Needed To Control Crime

NC2212215893 Yerevan SNARK in English 1248 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] Tbilisi, December 22 (SNARK)—"To make changes to better the criminal situation in Georgia, to set law and order in our cities is possible only with the assistance of Russian troops," said David Zeikidze, the Tbilisi police chief and deputy minister of internal affairs of the republic.

In his exclusive interview with SNARK he has expressed opinion that Georgia is not able to accomplish this task with its own forces.

Mr. Zeikidze added that at the present time Georgian political forces are discussing the matter on necessity of participation of Russian troops in setting law and order in Georgia with state and governmental structures.

According to Mr. Zeikidze, Georgia has not started talks on the question with Russia yet.

Gamsakhurdia Supporters Arrested for Crimes

PM2312100393 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Dec 93 First Edition p 1

[ITAR-TASS report under "From Our Correspondents and News Agencies" rubric: "Zviadists Are Being Arrested in West Georgia"]

[Text] Supporters of the ex-president are being arrested in West Georgia not for political convictions, but for crimes.

This was stated by Valiko Gogolashvili, leader of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs Press Center. According to him, with the support of the local population the police in Mingrelia arrested a group of bandits who had been terrorizing and robbing the population of a number of rayons for a long time. Weapons and a vehicle which they had stolen from the city of Poti were confiscated. Gogolashvili said that former leaders of armed detachments of Zviadists are now carrying out agitation work among the ex-president's supporters in the region, trying to persuade them to return to a peaceful life and lay down their arms. The authorities do not institute criminal proceedings against those who have not committed any crimes, Gogolashvili concluded.

Gamsakhurdia Reportedly at Bodyguard's House

LD2212132693 Tbilisi IBERIA in Georgian 1135 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] Tbilisi, 22 Dec—An IBERIA correspondent reports that according to the MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI newspaper, Georgian ex-President Zviad Gamsakhurdia, is staying in the house of his bodyguard, Margvelani, in the settlement of Kala in Mestia Rayon, Svaneti [mountainous region in northwestern Georgia].

Two Members of Paramilitary Unit Killed in Tbilisi

LD2212121393 Tbilisi IBERIA in Georgian 1135 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] Tbilisi, 22 Dec—IBERIA has learned that at about 1130 today Zaza Vepkhvadze and Gia Svanidze, [senior] members of the Mkhedrioni [paramilitary unit led by Jaba Ioseliani], came under automatic gunfire as they were getting out of their car in Shatberashvili Street [in Tbilisi]. As a result of the incident, the two men died on the spot and their unidentified companion was seriously wounded and taken to the hospital.

Railway Explosion Near Armenian Border Reported

NC2212165493 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 1400 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] An explosion took place at a railway station approximately 1.5 km from Sadakhlo in Georgia at 0800 this morning. Three railway cars of a [word indistinct] train were (?derailed). Almost 70 meters of railway track were damaged. A team of repairmen have left for the site of the incident. The damage caused by the accident and the number of casualties (?cannot be determined) because of the lack of communication.

Shevardnadze Attends Union of Citizens Meeting

LD2312093693 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 0800 GMT 23 Dec 93

[Text] A constituent conference of the Vake and Saburtalo district branches of the Union of Georgia's Citizens was held in Tbilisi yesterday. The deputy chairman of the union, poet Rezo Amashukeli, and the general secretary of the union Zurab Khomeriki and others made speeches at the conference.

Head of state Eduard Shevardnadze took part in the conference, making a speech. He said that the establishment of this sort of Union was required by these difficult times. We have to cooperate constructively with everyone in order to step forward as a united front to rescue the country. Our movement is a real force, a guarantor of the people's unity and the territorial integrity of the country. I publicly say that we declare a life and death struggle against illegal armed forces, as well as mafiosi and criminal forces, Shevardnadze added. We will undoubtedly establish order and in half a year, Georgia will become a different country.

Members of the Vake and Saburtalo district boards of the Union and their leaders were elected at the constituent conference.

Parliament Adopts Tax Laws, Discusses Recess

LD2212113993 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1900 GMT 21 Dec 93

[Text] The Georgian Parliament today resumed the examination of a draft law on the principles of the tax system which began at a plenary sitting last Thursday [16

...er]. As is known, the issue was introduced by ... Basilia, chairman of Parliament's Budget and ...nce Commission.

Following an article by article examination, held in a lively, businesslike, and studious manner, parliamentarians almost unanimously approved the first three chapters of the draft law. A paragraph dealing with the duties of supervisory bodies from Article 21 in the third chapter was returned for further revision. It was decided that the Judicial, Finance and Budget, and Law and Order Commissions, the Ministry of Justice, and other relevant organizations will draft a resolution on coordinating activities and dividing responsibilities between the republic's Tax Office and Control Chamber. The draft resolution will be submitted to the supreme legislative body separately for approval.

Parliament demonstrated its ability to mobilize forces when considering the most important issues.

At its evening sitting, Parliament scrupulously examined all the articles of a draft law on the profit tax for enterprises. Having taken into account parliamentarians' suggestions and additions, Parliament unanimously adopted the laws of the Republic of Georgia on the principles of the tax system and on the profit tax for enterprises. Parliament decided that both laws would come into force on 1 January 1994.

At the end of the meeting, Iviliane Khaindrava made a statement on behalf of the Republican faction on the advisability of Parliament going into a long recess owing to the complex situation in the country. Legislators will discuss this issue at their next meeting on 23 December. However, Speaker of Parliament Vakhtang Goguadze noted with satisfaction that if Parliament continues to display unanimity and correctness as it did during this sitting, it will be possible to forget about work during the biggest holidays.

Lithuania

Viljandi Moves To Expel Russian Servicemen

PM2212112793 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Dec 93 p 1

[Report by Senior Lieutenant Oleg Groznetskiy of Northwestern Group of Forces Press Center: "'The Decision Has Been Adopted: They Must Be Kicked Out.' The Deportation From Estonia of Former Russian Servicemen and Members of Their Families Has Begun"]

[Text] In the city of Viljandi Mrs. H. Hunt, chairman of the migration commission, and Mr. R. Triyz [name as transliterated], district elder, have declared that reserve officers discharged from the Russian Army after 20 August 1991 who are resident in the city and also their families must leave the Estonian Republic without delay.

The migration commission's decision instructs the local authorities to obtain the passports of "illegal migrants" on a plausible pretext and to stamp them with a discharge from the place of residence—which automatically outlaws them. Then everyone must receive an exit visa within one month, after which he must vacate his apartment and leave Estonia within 20 days. In furtherance of this discriminatory decision the migration department has distributed to all enterprises and organizations where retired servicemen and members of their families work instructions for their immediate dismissal.

It has been learned that a number of officials have given the Estonian Republic Ministry of Internal Affairs a corresponding explanation of the legitimacy of the decision adopted by the Viljandi district's migration commission. Thus, Mr. A. Kollist, general director of the migration department, has deemed its decision perfectly legal on the whole, although he lightly rebuked the local power for its haste. "It is a question of people who do not have the right to remain in Estonia," he explained. "The decision has been adopted, and they must be kicked out. They can appeal to wherever they like, they can bang their fist and turn to the CSCE and the United Nations, but no one will help them, still less Russia. This should not be feared. They really have no rights to demand something."

Mr. Triyz, Viljandi's elder, has declared that he "intends to continue strictly carrying out the law on 'The Speediest Complete Decolonization of the Fatherland.'" He is inspired to do so by the "sluggish" reaction of the Estonian Ministry of Internal Affairs to the local initiative. As can be seen, central departments have no intention of interfering in the activities of local organs of self-management on any questions, still less on the "question of decolonization." The opinion of the local organs of power is considered the priority here. So the deportation of Russians has already begun....
Lawful'

LD2312110993 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0415 GMT 23 Dec 93

[Text] In Estonia, former Russian servicemen and members of their families are under threat of deportation. Organs of power in the localities are instructing Russian Army officers released into the reserves after 20 August 1991, as well as members of their families, to leave the confines of the republic immediately. The central bodies are not intervening in the activities of the local self-government bodies. Moreover, the decisions are recognized as being completely lawful.

Explosion Injures Soldier in Russian Unit

WS2212154793 Tallinn BNS in English 1424 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] Tallinn, Dec 22, BNS - An explosion took place at about 2:30 p.m. Tuesday [21 December] on the territory of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division stationed at Klooga near Tallinn.

The Russian military brought a heavily injured soldier to the Keila hospital at 8:30 p.m.

Hermann Simm, the Harju police commissioner, told BNS today that the soldier, whose arm was amputated, cannot be contacted.

"We still don't know what it was that exploded in the territory of the Klooga unit," Simm said. "We informed the Defense Forces general staff and the Foreign Ministry of the incident."

Recruitment for Peacekeeping Battalion Begins

MK2212133093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 22 Dec 93 p 3

[Unattributed NEGA report in the "Estonia" column]

[Text] According to the republic's Protection Forces command, Estonia has gone ahead with creating a Baltic peacekeeping battalion. Applications to serve in this military unit have already begun to be accepted. Estonian servicemen will form the first three companies. The other two companies will be made up by Latvian and Lithuanian volunteers.

The requirements set for those wishing to serve in the Baltic Battalion are as follows: age between 18 and 30; minimum height, 170 centimeters; physical fitness, as established by a medical certification board; and absence of previous criminal record. Both servicemen and conscripts may apply.

Candidates will receive initial training in Estonia's best Protection Force unit—the Koperyankovsk Battalion, whereupon a final selection of the peace keepers will be

made. The battalion will be financed to UN standards. The working language in the battalion will be English.

The status of the Baltic Battalion prohibits its being used in military operations in the states of the former USSR.

Lithuania

Brazauskas: Referendum on NATO 'Acceptable'

WS2212154693 Tallinn BNS in English 1424 GMT 22 Dec 93

[Text] Vilnius, Dec 22, BNS - The idea to hold a referendum on Lithuania's membership in NATO is quite acceptable, Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas told the RESPUBLIKA newspaper.

A referendum was first mentioned by Parliament Chairman Ceslovas Jursenas, who based his proposal on a supposition that NATO membership would limit Lithuania's sovereignty.

Brazauskas said a decision on NATO membership exceeds the competence of the government and the parliament, not only the party in power. The president said he sees "no such threat, like some others" in the success of the Russian liberal democrats and their leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky. "It is too much honor for a person whose name is Zhirinovsky to speak so much about him." Brazauskas said Lithuania's policy with respect to Russia is unlikely to change.

Answering a question on the dissolution of the delegation for talks with Russia, the president said the delegation was made up of "random chosen persons, who claimed wide authorizations, although without any responsibility for their actions."

Brazauskas said the opposition must work in the parliament. "I don't think the opposition should participate in forming the state's policy."

Foreign Policy Discussed at Seimas Session

WS2312112493 Vilnius ELTA NEWS BULLETIN in English 1957 GMT 22 Dec 93

[From ELTA "NEWS BULLETIN" No. 400]

[Text] Vilnius, Dec 22 - (ELTA)—Today 13 members of Seimas [parliament] took part in the discussion of the Lithuanian foreign policy.

Vytautas Pleckaitis, the leader of the Social Democrats, supported the three directions in the Lithuanian foreign policy, presented in the opening address by the president. However, he found no excuse that no official statement was made on relations with NATO. According to Pleckaitis, Seimas could submmit a request to president, on the basis of which the president could appeal to NATO. This could significantly decrease the tension reigning in society.

The opposition leader Vytautas Landsbergis severely criticized the foreign policy concerning Russia. The try to persuade people made by high officials at the Foreign Ministry and the President's Office that nothing has happened in Russia are childish, he said. Poland made an official statement that after the elections in Russia its security faced danger. Thus, it has additional and very important arguments looking for security guarantees in the West. President Brazauskas had an opportunity to make a statement about unstable security caused by Russia at the top meeting in Vienna, but he did not take advantage of it, Landsbergis admitted.

Algirdas Gricius, deputy chairman of the foreign affairs committee, said that Lithuanian foreign policy should be assessed reasonably and urged to observe the accepted international norms and mind interests of other countries. It is possible not to stick to the norms only in case of danger for Lithuania's independence, he noted. According to him, the admittance of the Visegrad countries to NATO would present danger for Lithuania for this might be interpreted by Russia that the Baltic States were left in the sphere of Russian interests.

Algirdas Saudargas reminded of the common decision made by all political parties that Lithuania should join NATO. He could not understand why this decision was ignored by officials.

Valdas Petrauskas suggested president revoking his decree on discharging the state delegation for the negotiations with Russia and claiming to compensate the damages done during the Soviet occupation. The former member of the delegation Bulovas said that the delegation had performed its tasks and now should be discharged.

The Social Democrat leader Vytenis Andriukaitis said that Lithuanian high-ranking officials should present their opinion about the Russian military doctrine.

Algimantas Tauras expressed a thought that Lithuania should be neutral and demilitarized country. It should maintain good relations with all countries.

Romualdas Ozolas asked rethorically what Lithuania was going to do after nationalism had become the background in the Russian state policy. What steps will be made in case of Russia's military agression? According to him, it is necessary to prepare defence projects for Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia and to realize them with the help of all state institutions.

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